THE BLACK HAND FORUM

BeatiPaoli wrote: ↑Fri Dec 29, 2023 6:56 am To Everyone: What was the name of the book, please, and what was the subject matter?

Regards,
BeatiPaoli

The book was originally co-authored by Campi and Dorsky, who prosecuted several trials at which D'Urso testified, and scheduled for publication in November.
[...]
Campi wrote 11 of the 28 chapters; Dorsky wrote 10. The duo collaborated on the introduction and seven chapters. But by mid-October, Dorsky dropped out of the project, and the book, now authored by Campi alone, was originally pushed ahead to this month. But rewriting by Campi and the editing caused by Dorsky's decision has delayed publication until April or May, a Skyhorse Publishing spokesman told Gang Land.

nizarsoccer wrote: ↑Fri Oct 06, 2023 8:52 am Especially since the dismantling of the Waterfront Commission, there are journalists and law enforcement officials talking about the potential comeback of the mob in ports of New Jersey/New York and waterfront racketeering ala the ole' days. I think structurally it's impossible and no one has explained a rational path for mob exploitations of the port ecosystem to any significant degree of the UNIRAC days or even the early 2000s when Andrew Gigante/Anthony Ciccone got busted.

First, history has shown a continuous decline of mob power on the docks. The UNIRAC investigation uncovered that the entire port value chain was complicit. Shipping companies like Prudential Lines, Zim American Israeli Shipping Company and Netumar International were either systematically extorted or complicit in kickback schemes with the mob, Furthermore, terminal operators and stevedores were also shaken down such as Nacirema Operating Co., United Terminals, Inc., and Pierside Terminal Operators Inc. with their owners being complicit in the schemes to enrich themselves. Using this control and participation from corrupt businessmen, the mob was also able to extort secondary service providers such as container repair firms and trucking firms operating at the piers. Finally, the Port Authority itself was corrupted via Anthony Scotto's influence. Now that is union racketeering and shows a systematic extortion of an entire industry.

Now fast forward to the early 2000s and look at Anthony Ciccone's and Andrew Gigante's cases. The “control” the Anthony Ciccone indictment proved was a marketable step down from the influence the mob displayed during the days of UNIRAC. The government did not contend that any shipping lines were extorted. Furthermore, as soon as Ragucci was booted from his post, the Gambino family and the ILA were unable to continue their extortion schemes. Finally, the Gambino’s short-lived dominion over Staten Island’s terminal did not afford them control over much of the city’s waterfront given the fact that by this time New Jersey handled much of the container volume entering New York’s harbor. At the end of the day, simply fewer players were extorted along the port value chain which crystallised the waning influence of the mob over the docks with the passage of time. They were able to only extort a terminal operator, a trucking company, and dock workers. Andrew Gigante’s attempted use of an ILA local to help win a contract suggests that some of the ‘extra-legal’ governance the mob provided still existed in its ability to affect business and commerce at the port. But we also get clues as to the limitation of the influence exerted by the Genovese family. The biggest evidence for that comes from the fact that management-appointed trustees at the Metro-ILA fund seemed to always resist “mobbed-up” vendors proposed by union-appointed trustees. This disagreement, for instance, is what led GPP/VIP to lose their contract in the arbitration with Advance PCS. Logically speaking, if the mob truly controlled employers and their corporations, this wouldn’t have taken place. Thus, at best, their influence was piecemeal and limited to certain companies that did not allow for monopolistic or even cartel-like control of the docks. When taken together, the Anthony Ciccone and Liborio Bellomo cases, the so-called ‘Waterfront Enterprise’ proved to be a remarkable step-down when compared to UNIRAC. The mob was moving away from the core components of the port ecosystem and forced to migrate down the value-chain and extort more and more periphery service providers in the network. Then you go into the 2010s with 'Mafia Takedown Day'. It only proved that the unions were still infested, but it seems the Mafia’s influence was very much dampened, and it was relegated to victimizing dock workers. There was no indication of the Mafia providing ‘extra-legal’ governance on the port and no suggestion that employers of any sort themselves were extorted. At best now the mob can only give out some jobs to preferred candidates. The unions are weak now too and it is not even guaranteed that the mob even controls it to any meaningful extent. Since the start of the 21st century, overall, ILA membership declined by approximately 6% in the Tri-State locals. The hardest hit locals have been the ones located in Manhattan and Brooklyn and overall New York membership is down ~37%. The only ones that have done okay are the New Jersey ones and even there diversity hiring practices will slowly kill any residual mob influence.

Now the most important factor is private capital. The entry of private equity and the corporatization of ports around the world that has changed the power structure at the docks which has resulted in the diminishing need for the Mafia’s extra-legal governance services. Look at the board members representatives of the New York Shipping Association. Without exception, all board members represent companies that are owned by private equity, large publicly traded companies, state-owned corporations, or wealthy families. Unlike small business owners or neglected assets operating with little oversight from upper management, private equity is not susceptible to systematic extortion. Container terminal operators these days are vertically integrated businesses that are their own stevedores in most cases. Due to the high demand for their services (especially at gateway ports like NY/NJ), they have captive customers and secondary service providers. As such, contract enforcement services became less and less of an issue negating the need for the Mafia. Furthermore, these are multi-billion-dollar organizations with armies of lawyers and investors, the political connections, and the IQ necessary to operate businesses without the need for the Mafia’s services. Investment banks serve as key relationship intermediates in connection to large financial transactions. Simply put, the power imbalance is just not there anymore. The mob has historically shown an inability to extort large corporates (see Al D'Arco's example with cosmetics giant Estee Lauder). All that is to say, container terminals are owned by corporations that cannot be intimidated or shaken down and the one ace-in-the-hole (labour unions) that the Mafia processes (or possessed) have structurally declined to reflect the realities of the modern economy.