Dan Dorsky & Mike Campi: The New Jersey Port is Still Controlled by Genovese Crime Family. Your thoughts?

[Nick Prango]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tFM0XbPxvM8 Veteran investigators of organized crime, Mike Campi and Dan Dorsky, are claiming that even in 2023 the New Jersey port is controlled by Genovese crime family. Is this true? They recently shed light on the ongoing influence of the Mafia in industries like construction, labor unions, and ports. They indicated that in 2023, a significant part of Mafia's money is still generated through these sectors, with 'ghost employees' added to payrolls to siphon funds. The duo also discussed the continuing control of the Genovese family in New Jersey's ports, suggesting possible political influence and deception at play.

[Cheech]

Well this is only 5 years ago

https://www.nj.com/news/2018/07/at_jers ... _goes.html

[Pmac2]

Think I'm gonna read there book

[Pmac2]

Kindle 22bucks nov something

[Wiseguy]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tFM0XbPxvM8 Veteran investigators of organized crime, Mike Campi and Dan Dorsky, are claiming that even in 2023 the New Jersey port is controlled by Genovese crime family. Is this true? They recently shed light on the ongoing influence of the Mafia in industries like construction, labor unions, and ports. They indicated that in 2023, a significant part of Mafia's money is still generated through these sectors, with 'ghost employees' added to payrolls to siphon funds. The duo also discussed the continuing control of the Genovese family in New Jersey's ports, suggesting possible political influence and deception at play.

Because of the nature of the industry, construction (and related things like demolition and trucking) will be around the longest. There are simply too many ways to exploit it.

As for the ports, the industry is now heavily concentrated on the New Jersey waterfront, which has long benefited the Genovese family. The government has continued to bring indictments over the years but, as long as the mob can just replace them, their control remains. Family members and friends from all five NY families, and even the DeCavalcantes and Philadelphia, have jobs there. The mob presence is in ILA Locals 1, 1235, 1478, and 1804-1 and you also have mob-connected people still involved with the union's funds. Heck, the president of the ILA is Harold Daggett, who was described as a Genovese associate in the failed 2005 government attempt to wrest control of the union away from the mob like they had the Teamsters, Laborers, and Hotel Employees before.

That said, to put things in perspective, whatever it currently is, the portion of the mob's income from labor unions and legitimate industries has been drastically reduced. Keep in mind they lost the garment center, airports, wholesale food markets, Javits center, most of the waste hauling, etc. It should also be noted that, even though organized labor is still relatively strong in New York/New Jersey, it's not what it was years ago. Either there or nationally. In other words, not only the mob but unions themselves have lost a lot of clout.

[nizarsoccer]

Especially since the dismantling of the Waterfront Commission, there are journalists and law enforcement officials talking about the potential comeback of the mob in ports of New Jersey/New York and waterfront racketeering ala the ole' days. I think structurally it's impossible and no one has explained a rational path for mob exploitations of the port ecosystem to any significant degree of the UNIRAC days or even the early 2000s when Andrew Gigante/Anthony Ciccone got busted.

First, history has shown a continuous decline of mob power on the docks. The UNIRAC investigation uncovered that the entire port value chain was complicit. Shipping companies like Prudential Lines, Zim American Israeli Shipping Company and Netumar International were either systematically extorted or complicit in kickback schemes with the mob, Furthermore, terminal operators and stevedores were also shaken down such as Nacirema Operating Co., United Terminals, Inc., and Pierside Terminal Operators Inc. with their owners being complicit in the schemes to enrich themselves. Using this control and participation from corrupt businessmen, the mob was also able to extort secondary service providers such as container repair firms and trucking firms operating at the piers. Finally, the Port Authority itself was corrupted via Anthony Scotto's influence. Now that is union racketeering and shows a systematic extortion of an entire industry.

Now fast forward to the early 2000s and look at Anthony Ciccone's and Andrew Gigante's cases. The “control” the Anthony Ciccone indictment proved was a marketable step down from the influence the mob displayed during the days of UNIRAC. The government did not contend that any shipping lines were extorted. Furthermore, as soon as Ragucci was booted from his post, the Gambino family and the ILA were unable to continue their extortion schemes. Finally, the Gambino’s short-lived dominion over Staten Island’s terminal did not afford them control over much of the city’s waterfront given the fact that by this time New Jersey handled much of the container volume entering New York’s harbor. At the end of the day, simply fewer players were extorted along the port value chain which crystallised the waning influence of the mob over the docks with the passage of time. They were able to only extort a terminal operator, a trucking company, and dock workers. Andrew Gigante’s attempted use of an ILA local to help win a contract suggests that some of the ‘extra-legal’ governance the mob provided still existed in its ability to affect business and commerce at the port. But we also get clues as to the limitation of the influence exerted by the Genovese family. The biggest evidence for that comes from the fact that management-appointed trustees at the Metro-ILA fund seemed to always resist “mobbed-up” vendors proposed by union-appointed trustees. This disagreement, for instance, is what led GPP/VIP to lose their contract in the arbitration with Advance PCS. Logically speaking, if the mob truly controlled employers and their corporations, this wouldn’t have taken place. Thus, at best, their influence was piecemeal and limited to certain companies that did not allow for monopolistic or even cartel-like control of the docks. When taken together, the Anthony Ciccone and Liborio Bellomo cases, the so-called ‘Waterfront Enterprise’ proved to be a remarkable step-down when compared to UNIRAC. The mob was moving away from the core components of the port ecosystem and forced to migrate down the value-chain and extort more and more periphery service providers in the network. Then you go into the 2010s with 'Mafia Takedown Day'. It only proved that the unions were still infested, but it seems the Mafia’s influence was very much dampened, and it was relegated to victimizing dock workers. There was no indication of the Mafia providing ‘extra-legal’ governance on the port and no suggestion that employers of any sort themselves were extorted. At best now the mob can only give out some jobs to preferred candidates. The unions are weak now too and it is not even guaranteed that the mob even controls it to any meaningful extent. Since the start of the 21st century, overall, ILA membership declined by approximately 6% in the Tri-State locals. The hardest hit locals have been the ones located in Manhattan and Brooklyn and overall New York membership is down ~37%. The only ones that have done okay are the New Jersey ones and even there diversity hiring practices will slowly kill any residual mob influence.

Now the most important factor is private capital. The entry of private equity and the corporatization of ports around the world that has changed the power structure at the docks which has resulted in the diminishing need for the Mafia’s extra-legal governance services. Look at the board members representatives of the New York Shipping Association. Without exception, all board members represent companies that are owned by private equity, large publicly traded companies, state-owned corporations, or wealthy families. Unlike small business owners or neglected assets operating with little oversight from upper management, private equity is not susceptible to systematic extortion. Container terminal operators these days are vertically integrated businesses that are their own stevedores in most cases. Due to the high demand for their services (especially at gateway ports like NY/NJ), they have captive customers and secondary service providers. As such, contract enforcement services became less and less of an issue negating the need for the Mafia. Furthermore, these are multi-billion-dollar organizations with armies of lawyers and investors, the political connections, and the IQ necessary to operate businesses without the need for the Mafia’s services. Investment banks serve as key relationship intermediates in connection to large financial transactions. Simply put, the power imbalance is just not there anymore. The mob has historically shown an inability to extort large corporates (see Al D'Arco's example with cosmetics giant Estee Lauder). All that is to say, container terminals are owned by corporations that cannot be intimidated or shaken down and the one ace-in-the-hole (labour unions) that the Mafia processes (or possessed) have structurally declined to reflect the realities of the modern economy.

[Wiseguy]

^ This is basically true. You don't see the systemic level of extortion and overall control on the waterfront from decades ago. While they can still use their influence to profit from ancillary services around the ports (like steering a snow removal or truck cleaning contract to certain people), their primary influence and profit is from being able to dispense jobs. If you look at the leadership of those specific locals on the New Jersey side, you see familiar names, and the Waterfront Commission had pages of family and friends of mobsters working on the docks; many with very high-paying positions. The most recent cases involved mob-connected leaders extorting kickbacks from the union containerization royalties of ILA workers (non-connected I would assume) for jobs, promotions, training, etc. There's a significant difference between that and being able to exert widespread extortion of numerous waterfront companies.

And the entire industry is changed. There isn't much of a New York-side waterfront industry anymore, as the docks there have given away to development. Which is why over 90% of it has been on the New Jersey side. Which makes New Jersey leaving the Waterfront Commission rather ironic. But even there it's an ever-declining fiefdom that will likely resemble the residual mob presence that we saw in the waste hauling industry. Like I've said many times, what will be left when everything else is gone will be construction and businesses related to it.

[Grouchy Sinatra]

Especially since the dismantling of the Waterfront Commission, there are journalists and law enforcement officials talking about the potential comeback of the mob in ports of New Jersey/New York and waterfront racketeering ala the ole' days. I think structurally it's impossible and no one has explained a rational path for mob exploitations of the port ecosystem to any significant degree of the UNIRAC days or even the early 2000s when Andrew Gigante/Anthony Ciccone got busted.

First, history has shown a continuous decline of mob power on the docks. The UNIRAC investigation uncovered that the entire port value chain was complicit. Shipping companies like Prudential Lines, Zim American Israeli Shipping Company and Netumar International were either systematically extorted or complicit in kickback schemes with the mob, Furthermore, terminal operators and stevedores were also shaken down such as Nacirema Operating Co., United Terminals, Inc., and Pierside Terminal Operators Inc. with their owners being complicit in the schemes to enrich themselves. Using this control and participation from corrupt businessmen, the mob was also able to extort secondary service providers such as container repair firms and trucking firms operating at the piers. Finally, the Port Authority itself was corrupted via Anthony Scotto's influence. Now that is union racketeering and shows a systematic extortion of an entire industry.

Now fast forward to the early 2000s and look at Anthony Ciccone's and Andrew Gigante's cases. The “control” the Anthony Ciccone indictment proved was a marketable step down from the influence the mob displayed during the days of UNIRAC. The government did not contend that any shipping lines were extorted. Furthermore, as soon as Ragucci was booted from his post, the Gambino family and the ILA were unable to continue their extortion schemes. Finally, the Gambino’s short-lived dominion over Staten Island’s terminal did not afford them control over much of the city’s waterfront given the fact that by this time New Jersey handled much of the container volume entering New York’s harbor. At the end of the day, simply fewer players were extorted along the port value chain which crystallised the waning influence of the mob over the docks with the passage of time. They were able to only extort a terminal operator, a trucking company, and dock workers. Andrew Gigante’s attempted use of an ILA local to help win a contract suggests that some of the ‘extra-legal’ governance the mob provided still existed in its ability to affect business and commerce at the port. But we also get clues as to the limitation of the influence exerted by the Genovese family. The biggest evidence for that comes from the fact that management-appointed trustees at the Metro-ILA fund seemed to always resist “mobbed-up” vendors proposed by union-appointed trustees. This disagreement, for instance, is what led GPP/VIP to lose their contract in the arbitration with Advance PCS. Logically speaking, if the mob truly controlled employers and their corporations, this wouldn’t have taken place. Thus, at best, their influence was piecemeal and limited to certain companies that did not allow for monopolistic or even cartel-like control of the docks. When taken together, the Anthony Ciccone and Liborio Bellomo cases, the so-called ‘Waterfront Enterprise’ proved to be a remarkable step-down when compared to UNIRAC. The mob was moving away from the core components of the port ecosystem and forced to migrate down the value-chain and extort more and more periphery service providers in the network. Then you go into the 2010s with 'Mafia Takedown Day'. It only proved that the unions were still infested, but it seems the Mafia’s influence was very much dampened, and it was relegated to victimizing dock workers. There was no indication of the Mafia providing ‘extra-legal’ governance on the port and no suggestion that employers of any sort themselves were extorted. At best now the mob can only give out some jobs to preferred candidates. The unions are weak now too and it is not even guaranteed that the mob even controls it to any meaningful extent. Since the start of the 21st century, overall, ILA membership declined by approximately 6% in the Tri-State locals. The hardest hit locals have been the ones located in Manhattan and Brooklyn and overall New York membership is down ~37%. The only ones that have done okay are the New Jersey ones and even there diversity hiring practices will slowly kill any residual mob influence.

Now the most important factor is private capital. The entry of private equity and the corporatization of ports around the world that has changed the power structure at the docks which has resulted in the diminishing need for the Mafia’s extra-legal governance services. Look at the board members representatives of the New York Shipping Association. Without exception, all board members represent companies that are owned by private equity, large publicly traded companies, state-owned corporations, or wealthy families. Unlike small business owners or neglected assets operating with little oversight from upper management, private equity is not susceptible to systematic extortion. Container terminal operators these days are vertically integrated businesses that are their own stevedores in most cases. Due to the high demand for their services (especially at gateway ports like NY/NJ), they have captive customers and secondary service providers. As such, contract enforcement services became less and less of an issue negating the need for the Mafia. Furthermore, these are multi-billion-dollar organizations with armies of lawyers and investors, the political connections, and the IQ necessary to operate businesses without the need for the Mafia’s services. Investment banks serve as key relationship intermediates in connection to large financial transactions. Simply put, the power imbalance is just not there anymore. The mob has historically shown an inability to extort large corporates (see Al D'Arco's example with cosmetics giant Estee Lauder). All that is to say, container terminals are owned by corporations that cannot be intimidated or shaken down and the one ace-in-the-hole (labour unions) that the Mafia processes (or possessed) have structurally declined to reflect the realities of the modern economy.

Interesting read. Thank you. Do you know how the Genovese (Luciano) took control of the west side docks (and eventually NJ) from the likes of Eddie McGrath and the Irish mob? I've always been interested in the history of the mob's waterfront corruption. I know the Brooklyn docks were always Gambino but the Irish had a lot of control of the Manhattan docks, with the Luciano/Genovese eventually taking control. Look forward to this book too.

[newera_212]

I recently read the Steven Depiro detention memo from a long time ago and it sparked an interest I never really had before in the modern day docks and waterfront. Some of the stuff spanned like the past 20 something years, so not that modern, but still. It was hilarious to see the guy Albert Cernadas pulling down an insane 6 figure salary and I'm not talking like $130K or anything either.

[Clark]

Interesting read. Thank you. Do you know how the Genovese (Luciano) took control of the west side docks (and eventually NJ) from the likes of Eddie McGrath and the Irish mob? I've always been interested in the history of the mob's waterfront corruption. I know the Brooklyn docks were always Gambino but the Irish had a lot of control of the Manhattan docks, with the Luciano/Genovese eventually taking control. Look forward to this book too.

The Genovese really never took control from McGrath, per se. Many of the traditional New Jersey locals (ie. ILA Locals 1235) were always under the control of the Genovese dating back many years. McGrath had influence over a number West Side locals (ie. Local 1258, Local 1730, Local 895, Local 791 etc.) but they largely died off from the 1960s to 1970s when the West Side piers were demolished and the New Jersey piers began to grow. The Hell's Kitchen piers are still around (but just barely) and you can read about what happened with those during the 1980s in the book The Westies. McGrath was essentially a Genovese family associate and his role later in life was acting as a liaison between the mob and the ILA officials. He knew them all and even though the West Side piers were gone, the majority of the ILA Executive were still men who came up on the West Side piers. These various union leaders weren't all directly connected to the mob, so it was important that they were "overseen," as they controlled the voting and decision-making in the union. The FBI had McGrath regularly in contact with ILA leaders, right up until John Bowers in the 1980s. When George Barone began informing, he testified that Bowers only became President of the ILA over Al Cernadas because McGrath made a commitment on Bowers' behalf and guaranteed that he would work with them. Here is a portion from his deposition:

"There was this meeting, yes, [Douglas] Rago told me about this meeting, I was in jail. It was concerning John Bowers to becoming the president of the International Longshoremen's Association – international office. [Edward] McGrath told Bowers that he was old, he wouldn't be around that long and that since he had promised Bowers’ father, Mickey Bowers, that if anything ever happened to Mickey, he would take care of John, and he said that’s what I’m doing, but I’m not going to be here. But that’s how it is now, John, these people are there and you have to work with them and they have to work with you. A relationship specifically subject of the support for Bowers to become the president of the international, period."

ILA Local 1804-1, which is one of the largest current locals, did pass from the Irish group to the Genovese. That local is interesting because they are maintenance and repair workers, who didn't have "a territory," so when the West Side docks died, they just moved over to New Jersey. It was started by McGrath's friends, Henry "Buster" Bell and Harry Cashin. George Barone and Douglas Rago were associated with them for years and when Bell went to jail in the 1960s and Cashin died, they took over the local. Barone and Rago are interesting because they were from the West Side and really came up under the Irish element before essentially being recruited by the Genovese.

The docks are an interesting study on why the Genovese are often considered the Ivey League. They were willing to work with others, take care of the right people, and not abuse their interests etc., as long as they had they maintained their hooks in it.

[Grouchy Sinatra]

Interesting read. Thank you. Do you know how the Genovese (Luciano) took control of the west side docks (and eventually NJ) from the likes of Eddie McGrath and the Irish mob? I've always been interested in the history of the mob's waterfront corruption. I know the Brooklyn docks were always Gambino but the Irish had a lot of control of the Manhattan docks, with the Luciano/Genovese eventually taking control. Look forward to this book too.

The Genovese really never took control from McGrath, per se. Many of the traditional New Jersey locals (ie. ILA Locals 1235) were always under the control of the Genovese dating back many years. McGrath had influence over a number West Side locals (ie. Local 1258, Local 1730, Local 895, Local 791 etc.) but they largely died off from the 1960s to 1970s when the West Side piers were demolished and the New Jersey piers began to grow. The Hell's Kitchen piers are still around (but just barely) and you can read about what happened with those during the 1980s in the book The Westies. McGrath was essentially a Genovese family associate and his role later in life was acting as a liaison between the mob and the ILA officials. He knew them all and even though the West Side piers were gone, the majority of the ILA Executive were still men who came up on the West Side piers. These various union leaders weren't all directly connected to the mob, so it was important that they were "overseen," as they controlled the voting and decision-making in the union. The FBI had McGrath regularly in contact with ILA leaders, right up until John Bowers in the 1980s. When George Barone began informing, he testified that Bowers only became President of the ILA over Al Cernadas because McGrath made a commitment on Bowers' behalf and guaranteed that he would work with them. Here is a portion from his deposition:

"There was this meeting, yes, [Douglas] Rago told me about this meeting, I was in jail. It was concerning John Bowers to becoming the president of the International Longshoremen's Association – international office. [Edward] McGrath told Bowers that he was old, he wouldn't be around that long and that since he had promised Bowers’ father, Mickey Bowers, that if anything ever happened to Mickey, he would take care of John, and he said that’s what I’m doing, but I’m not going to be here. But that’s how it is now, John, these people are there and you have to work with them and they have to work with you. A relationship specifically subject of the support for Bowers to become the president of the international, period."

ILA Local 1804-1, which is one of the largest current locals, did pass from the Irish group to the Genovese. That local is interesting because they are maintenance and repair workers, who didn't have "a territory," so when the West Side docks died, they just moved over to New Jersey. It was started by McGrath's friends, Henry "Buster" Bell and Harry Cashin. George Barone and Douglas Rago were associated with them for years and when Bell went to jail in the 1960s and Cashin died, they took over the local. Barone and Rago are interesting because they were from the West Side and really came up under the Irish element before essentially being recruited by the Genovese.

The docks are an interesting study on why the Genovese are often considered the Ivey League. They were willing to work with others, take care of the right people, and not abuse their interests etc., as long as they had they maintained their hooks in it.

Great post! Thank you!

[Tonyd621]

Especially since the dismantling of the Waterfront Commission, there are journalists and law enforcement officials talking about the potential comeback of the mob in ports of New Jersey/New York and waterfront racketeering ala the ole' days. I think structurally it's impossible and no one has explained a rational path for mob exploitations of the port ecosystem to any significant degree of the UNIRAC days or even the early 2000s when Andrew Gigante/Anthony Ciccone got busted.

First, history has shown a continuous decline of mob power on the docks. The UNIRAC investigation uncovered that the entire port value chain was complicit. Shipping companies like Prudential Lines, Zim American Israeli Shipping Company and Netumar International were either systematically extorted or complicit in kickback schemes with the mob, Furthermore, terminal operators and stevedores were also shaken down such as Nacirema Operating Co., United Terminals, Inc., and Pierside Terminal Operators Inc. with their owners being complicit in the schemes to enrich themselves. Using this control and participation from corrupt businessmen, the mob was also able to extort secondary service providers such as container repair firms and trucking firms operating at the piers. Finally, the Port Authority itself was corrupted via Anthony Scotto's influence. Now that is union racketeering and shows a systematic extortion of an entire industry.

Now fast forward to the early 2000s and look at Anthony Ciccone's and Andrew Gigante's cases. The “control” the Anthony Ciccone indictment proved was a marketable step down from the influence the mob displayed during the days of UNIRAC. The government did not contend that any shipping lines were extorted. Furthermore, as soon as Ragucci was booted from his post, the Gambino family and the ILA were unable to continue their extortion schemes. Finally, the Gambino’s short-lived dominion over Staten Island’s terminal did not afford them control over much of the city’s waterfront given the fact that by this time New Jersey handled much of the container volume entering New York’s harbor. At the end of the day, simply fewer players were extorted along the port value chain which crystallised the waning influence of the mob over the docks with the passage of time. They were able to only extort a terminal operator, a trucking company, and dock workers. Andrew Gigante’s attempted use of an ILA local to help win a contract suggests that some of the ‘extra-legal’ governance the mob provided still existed in its ability to affect business and commerce at the port. But we also get clues as to the limitation of the influence exerted by the Genovese family. The biggest evidence for that comes from the fact that management-appointed trustees at the Metro-ILA fund seemed to always resist “mobbed-up” vendors proposed by union-appointed trustees. This disagreement, for instance, is what led GPP/VIP to lose their contract in the arbitration with Advance PCS. Logically speaking, if the mob truly controlled employers and their corporations, this wouldn’t have taken place. Thus, at best, their influence was piecemeal and limited to certain companies that did not allow for monopolistic or even cartel-like control of the docks. When taken together, the Anthony Ciccone and Liborio Bellomo cases, the so-called ‘Waterfront Enterprise’ proved to be a remarkable step-down when compared to UNIRAC. The mob was moving away from the core components of the port ecosystem and forced to migrate down the value-chain and extort more and more periphery service providers in the network. Then you go into the 2010s with 'Mafia Takedown Day'. It only proved that the unions were still infested, but it seems the Mafia’s influence was very much dampened, and it was relegated to victimizing dock workers. There was no indication of the Mafia providing ‘extra-legal’ governance on the port and no suggestion that employers of any sort themselves were extorted. At best now the mob can only give out some jobs to preferred candidates. The unions are weak now too and it is not even guaranteed that the mob even controls it to any meaningful extent. Since the start of the 21st century, overall, ILA membership declined by approximately 6% in the Tri-State locals. The hardest hit locals have been the ones located in Manhattan and Brooklyn and overall New York membership is down ~37%. The only ones that have done okay are the New Jersey ones and even there diversity hiring practices will slowly kill any residual mob influence.

Now the most important factor is private capital. The entry of private equity and the corporatization of ports around the world that has changed the power structure at the docks which has resulted in the diminishing need for the Mafia’s extra-legal governance services. Look at the board members representatives of the New York Shipping Association. Without exception, all board members represent companies that are owned by private equity, large publicly traded companies, state-owned corporations, or wealthy families. Unlike small business owners or neglected assets operating with little oversight from upper management, private equity is not susceptible to systematic extortion. Container terminal operators these days are vertically integrated businesses that are their own stevedores in most cases. Due to the high demand for their services (especially at gateway ports like NY/NJ), they have captive customers and secondary service providers. As such, contract enforcement services became less and less of an issue negating the need for the Mafia. Furthermore, these are multi-billion-dollar organizations with armies of lawyers and investors, the political connections, and the IQ necessary to operate businesses without the need for the Mafia’s services. Investment banks serve as key relationship intermediates in connection to large financial transactions. Simply put, the power imbalance is just not there anymore. The mob has historically shown an inability to extort large corporates (see Al D'Arco's example with cosmetics giant Estee Lauder). All that is to say, container terminals are owned by corporations that cannot be intimidated or shaken down and the one ace-in-the-hole (labour unions) that the Mafia processes (or possessed) have structurally declined to reflect the realities of the modern economy.

Well to be fair, Estee lauder ran to the Justice Dept. So, it failed, yes, but not because Estee lauder had some intimidating corporate structure

[Dr031718]

Looks like the book got pulled from release. Was supposed to come out in December and now can’t find it anywhere for sale or presale

[Pmac2]

That's crazy. I haven't heard of a mob book ever being pulled. Just leak it...

[chin_gigante]

Would be a shame if this doesn't come out, I noticed previously that the release date had been pushed a couple of times. I've contacted the publisher to inquire so hopefully will get an answer soon