Gangland 6/9/2022

[Dr031718]

The son of slain Luchese loanshark Vincent Zito hugged his dad's alleged killer when he returned to the scene of the crime hours after the murder back on October 26, 2018. But there were no hugs this week as he took the stand as the government's key witness against Anthony (Fat Anthony) Pandrella, the Gambino gangster charged with killing his father in their Sheepshead Bay home.

In testimony that spanned two days at Pandrella's murder and robbery trial in Brooklyn Federal Court, Joseph Zito indicated that it took many months before he began to think differently about his father's longtime friend whom he first met in 2008 and called "Big Anthony."

The pair were so close that Zito testified that he asked Pandrella to drive him to get a suit for his father's funeral and even discussed possible suspects in his dad's murder on that occasion. But he later told cops that a year before the murder, his father gave Pandrella $750,000 to hold for him — money that was never returned and which the government claims is a major reason why Fat Anthony killed Vincent Zito.

His father gave Pandrella the money, Zito testified, "after Anthony said that (his father) was hot." The cash was in three boxes that had contained his "dad's favorite cologne, Paul Sebastian," he said. "That box is amazing. That box holds $250,000 no problem."

In her opening statement, prosecutor Kristin Mace told the jury that instead of returning the cash to Zito, Pandrella "shot (Zito) in the back of the head at close range." As his "body crumpled to the floor" and "blood flowed from his head, the defendant set the gun down between Mr. Zito's legs, grabbed (several) expensive watches" and calmly "walked out of the house," she told the jury.

Under questioning by Mace, Joseph Zito testified that the day before the murder his father told him"that Anthony was coming over the next day. "He better have what he told me he was going to have, his father vowed, adding that "he was supposedly gonna get a substantial amount of money."

During the first four days of the trial, Mace and co-prosecutor Matthew Galeotti have introduced surveillance videos showing Pandrella walking onto the outdoor second floor deck of the Zito home and into Zito's apartment at 8:10 AM. Prosecutors also showed a video of a shirtless Zito that was taken by the same security camera 30 minutes later. It showed him walking onto the deck, look for something in a small refrigerator or cabinet, and then walk back into his apartment. A video shows Pandrela leaving the three family home at 10:43 AM, allegedly with expensive watches that Zito kept as collateral from a loanshark customer.

The government also introduced several surveillance video excerpts taken from the home of a Pandrella neighbor showing him coming and going from his own home. The videos, they claim, corroborate the allegation that Big Anthony shot and killed Zito and stole several expensive watches from Zito's apartment.

Anthony Pandrella arrives at Zito's apartmentIn one video, Pandrella is seen getting out of his black Cadillac carrying a black bag that the prosecutors argue contains the watches that Zito's son and other witnesses say the elder Zito kept in his apartment. In another video, Fat Anthony is seen taking a black garbage bag out of his house and driving away with it, allegedly to ditch his blood-stained sneakers and clothes that could link him to the crime.

And in other videos, he is seen taking a floor mat out of his car and into his home where he allegedly washed it clean of any links to the crime, before bringing it back to his car.

In Pandrella's defense, attorneys James Froccaro and Jonathan Savella introduced three "consciousness of innocence" photos clipped from a prosecution video. They show Joseph Zito embracing Pandrella several hours after Zito's 11-year-old son Vincenzo found his grandfather dead on the floor when he returned home from school that day.

During cross-examination, Joseph Zito denied that it was him hugging the rotund defendant. But he eventually conceded it was him after he watched the Zito home surveillance video of Pandrella greet and then embrace Joseph Zito and his cousin Frankie a few hors after Vincent Zito was found shot to death on his living room floor.

"That's you and Mr. Pandrella hugging or embracing, correct, sir," asked Froccaro.

"I don't remember it, but I've seen it on video, yes," the witness replied.

Despite frequent "I don't remember" answers, Froccaro dragged out several responses from Joseph Zito that were designed to show that the victim's son didn't view his client as a suspect until cops and agents came to that conclusion many months later. The admission was an apparent effort to back up what the lawyer had stated in his opening: the feds arrested the wrong man.

Froccaro eventually got Joseph Zito to concede that he initially told cops that his "father had informed" him a year before his death that a little bird "whispered in his ear that he was hot," not, as he told the jury in his direct testimony, that his dad had given $750,000 to Pandrella for safekeeping after the 350-pound friend he knew as "Fat Anthony" told him he was "hot."

Froccaro also pressed Zito to recall and to acknowledge his earlier testimony that his "father said he wanted the money out of the house" so authorities wouldn't find the cash if they searched the house. Then the lawyer told him: "Your story doesn't make sense, sir."

Chief Judge Margo Brodie agreed with a government objection and told jurors to ignore the lawyer's assertion. They might, but it will be hard for them to forget the follow-up questions and answers.

Froccaro questioned — without any comeback by Mace in her re-direct testimony — why Zito, a convicted felon who was prohibited from owning a gun, would hide his cash, but not the "arsenal of illegal guns" that his father kept in his apartment that could have sent the 78-year-old ex-con back to prison for years.

"How many times in the 40-some-odd years before his death had your father's home been searched by law enforcement, Mr. Zito? Never, right?"
"I have no idea."
"You have no knowledge about whether your father's home was ever searched in the past 40 years?"
"How would I know that?"
"How old are you, sir?"
"Sixty."

After he got the witness to state that "everybody knows" that "it's illegal for a felon to own a gun," Frocarro said: "So if I understand your story correctly, you're saying your father packed up the money like you claimed because he thought the apartment was going to be searched, but he left the guns in the apartment so he could get arrested and sent to prison; is that your story?"

"I don't know," he testified. "I wasn't there with him, you know. I don't actually physically see when he does things. I never seen him physically pack a bag, you know, or whatever."
"Mr. Zito, your father had hiding spots in the house where he kept his money, which he, apparently, did not trust you to know about; is that true, sir?"
"He had hiding spots that he didn't trust anybody about."
"Including you?"
"Anybody."

Before he ended his cross examination, Froccaro got the witness to give the lawyer a way to come up with an innocent explanation why Pandrella's DNA was found on the murder weapon, which a government forensic expert told the jury yesterday.

"I have another question, Mr. Zito, and it's an important one," he said. "At times your father had Mr. Pandrella clean his guns for him; isn't that the truth, sir?"
"I believe so, yes."

When Pandrella was charged with Zito's murder six months after his death, prosecutors linked him to Gambino capo George Lombardozzi in their successful effort to detain him without bail as a danger to the community.

They weren't permitted to mention Fat Anthony's mob ties to the jury, but they were able to get the mob capo's name, and that of his late uncle, the legendary Carmine (The Doctor) Lombardozzi, a longtime Sheepshead Bay resident, and an attendee at the 1957 mob conclave at Apalachin, NY into the case.

Under questioning by Mace, Joseph Zito, a construction worker, testified that Pandrella got him a job doing repair work on the Brooklyn home of George Lombardozzi, ostensibly to establish a connection between Lombardozzi and Pandrella, who was linked by cell site data to the mob capo's home in the hours after Vincent Zito was killed on October 26, 2018.

The Q and A went like this:

"Who again asked you to do work on this house?"
"Anthony got me the job, yes."
"Whose house was it, do you know?"
"He says Georgie."
"Do you know Georgie's last name?"
"He says it was Carmine's nephew, so yes, I knew Carmine."
"What was Carmine's last name?"
"Lombardozzi."

Greek Godfather Seeks Compassion From The Court

John Gotti wanted to bring down the Greek Godfather back in 1989, but couldn't pull it off. A jury couldn't nail him either in 1992 when the inveterate gambler turned down a 12-year deal for a mob rubout in 1992 and lucked out when the jury deadlocked. But luck ran out for the "king" of the Greeks when he rolled the dice one more time. He was convicted of murder and today, Spyredon (Spiros) Velentzas is a sick old man who is 30 years into a life sentence and in search of some compassion.

Velentzas, 86, is seeking a release from prison, citing a litany of ailments including Alzheimer's disease, a "severe" case of rheumatoid arthritis, glaucoma, hypothyroidism, hypertension, diverticulosis, kidney disease and a deteriorating "cognitive impairment" that leaves him "disoriented."

He's a pale shadow of the once powerhouse gambler who was the powerful partner of the Luchese crime family who ran barbut — Greek dice games — for high rollers in Astoria. His operation especially rankled Gotti, who had his own gambling clubs nearby. The Dapper Don famously told a cohort to tell Spiros, "I, me, John Gotti will sever his motherfucking head."

fortunately for Spiros, that threat never came to pass.

But today he is "an elderly and sick inmate" who has been a "model prisoner" with no "disciplinary infractions" in his three decades behind bars who will likely need dialysis treatment for kidney disease that the Bureau of Prisons diagnosed three years ago but still has not treated, attorney Gerard Marrone asserts in his court filing on behalf of Velentzas.

Velentzas "needs medical attention immediately," wrote Marrone, and "for the short time he has left on this earth," the lawyer argues, his client should be allowed to serve his prison term under "house arrest" with his wife at his Queens home where his daughter Maria will oversee "his medical treatment" for his kidney disease and arthritis.

This would give Velentzas "the opportunity to have increased interaction with doctors" to prescribe the appropriate care and treatment he needs without any downside for society, since he is no longer a danger to the community, according to Marrone.

That wasn't the case when he was the Greek Godfather. On October 25, 1988, when Sorecho (Sammy The Arab) Nalo was shot and mortally wounded when he went to meet Velentzas at the his travel agency, Nalo fingered Spiros as his killer before he died. His statement wasn't allowed into evidence, and while Velentas was convicted of racketeering, the jury deadlocked at 8-4 for acquittal on the murder charge.

Facing about eight years for racketeering, the lifelong gambler lost the bet of his life when instead of going along with prosecutor Kevin McGrath's plan to forego a retrial and allow the government to argue that Velentzas had plotted to kill Nalo at his sentencing, he went to trial again. He was convicted, and received a mandatory life sentence.

Two years into his life sentence, Velentzas contacted Gang Land and during an interview at the federal prison in Terre Haute, he blamed lies by turncoat Luchese capo Peter (Fat Pete) Chiodo for his problems with Gotti, and for his murder conviction at his retrial.

Chiodo was his mob superior and had authorized Velentzas to open the barbut game in Astoria, but Fat Pete told the Gambinos that Spiros had opened the game on his own, which led to Gotti's colorful threats.

And to cover his lies to his bosses and the Gambinos, Chiodo ordered an underling to whack Sammy The Arab over a $100,000 debt. After Fat Pete flipped, he framed Velentzas for the killing, the Greek Godfather insisted back in 1994.

"I was the king with my own kind, the Greeks," he admitted. "I gave the orders. I was the boss in Astoria," he continued, admitting he "made a lot of money in gambling," operating horse rooms, running all night barbut games and distributing joker poker machines in Greek neighborhoods in Brooklyn and Queens with the backing of the Luchese family.

He insisted back then that he had nothing to do with Nalo's killing — Velentzas was talking to Nalo when he was shot and Spiros claimed that gave him an alibi. But he couldn't convince Gang Land of his innocence, and even worse for him, Spiros was unable to convince the Second Circuit Court of Appeal that he was wrongly convicted of Sammy The Arab's murder.

In his motion to Central Islip Federal Judge Denis Hurley, attorney Marrone makes clear that Velentzas is not asking the judge to vacate his murder conviction. The lawyer argues that his client's ailments, his 30 years in prison, and the government's initial determination back in 1992 that 12 years in prison would have been "enough punishment," are extraordinary and compelling reasons why he should be released from prison.

"Mr. Velentzas does not deserve to die in prison," the attorney wrote.

New Jersey Still Muzzling The Waterfront Watchdog

In March, the U.S. Supreme Court ordered the state of New Jersey not to leave the Waterfront Commission as it had threatened, or to disrupt its work. But New Jersey Governor Murphy's appointee to the panel has staged a virtual boycott of the meetings that has brought the agency almost to a standstill, Gang Land has learned.

The appointee, Joseph Sanzari, is a longtime buddy of the leader of the dock workers union that has pressed for an end to the bistate agency that serves as watchdog over the loading docks of New York and New Jersey.

Sanzari, a close pal of International Longshoremen's Association president Harold Daggett, has showed up at only one Commission meeting during the seven weeks following the Supreme Court ruling. He then abruptly resigned his post, saying he never had any intention of serving on the waterfront panel.

Since he officially resigned, on May 16, Governor Murphy has failed to appoint a successor. That has effectively put a stop to all decisions by the bi-state agency since the Commissioners of both states have to agree with recommendations by Administrative Law Judges who conduct hearings about alleged "inimical" actions by ILA members or potential dock workers.

There is nothing but white space under the heading "Commission Meetings," where the dates and times of several months' worth of Commission meetings and the call-in phone number that members of the public can use to listen in are usually listed on its website. The last Commission meeting was May 9.

Sanzari skipped the first two Commission meetings after the SCOTUS ruling blocking New Jersey from "taking action to withdraw" from the Commission. At the time, he cited recent knee surgery. He attended just one of the next two meetings, and then resigned saying he expected New York to prevail in its suit to permanently block New Jersey from taking over the Commission's duties in the Garden State.

In his one page resignation letter to Murphy, he echoed the long-stated assertions by New Jersey in its filings with the Supreme Court that New Jersey should have control over the piers in its state since most of the cargo that enters and leaves the metropolitan area does so on ships that are loaded or unloaded by workers in New Jersey.

He told Murphy he was resigning because "the recent decision by the Supreme Court makes it unlikely that I will have the opportunity to realize (my) vision of creating a new agency in the near future" that would "work in conjunction with the New Jersey State Police to regulate the ports' shippers and employees."

He was "honored and excited" to have been asked to serve as the state's Commissioner on the bi-state agency, Sanzari wrote, "because I wanted to lead the transition to a new agency to govern the ports in New Jersey" since "over 90% of all port activity and jobs are based in New Jersey."

Joy-Michele Johnson, a senior counsel for Governor Murphy, who attended the first Commission meeting after the SCOTUS ruling and stated that Sanzari was "not feeling well" following major surgery a week earlier, did not return a request for comment about Sanzari's resignation or when the Governor expected to name a replacement Commissioner.

Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has ordered both sides to appear for a status conference next week to work out a briefing schedule. Last month, both states filed follow-up briefs to their initial court filings in March.

[Little_Al1991]

Thanks for posting.
Vic Amuso was also convicted of the murder of Sorecho "Sammy the Arab" Nalo. Describing the events leading to Nalo's murder, Chiodo testified that Amuso assigned him to supervise the illegal gambling operation of Spyredon "Spiros" Velentzas. Velentzas told Chiodo that Nalo was encroaching on his illegal gambling activities, a portion of which benefitted the Luchese family, and requested the aid of the Luchese family in murdering Nalo. According to Chiodo, Amuso was hesitant at first because Velentzas was not formally affiliated with an organized crime family, but after Chiodo told Amuso that Velentzas feared for his life, Amuso told Chiodo that it was "okay" to proceed with Nalo's murder. Chiodo assigned the murder to several Luchese family soldiers. They subsequently shot Nalo to death in his travel agency on October 25, 1988.
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/ap ... 51/622772/

[Shellackhead]

Thanks for posting, Velentzas fucked up.

[Southshore88]

Thanks for posting

[JohnnyS]

Thanks!

[TommyGambino]

Any idea when George Lombardozzi was made? He’s got to be ancient now

[dave]

Thanks for posting! Can you bolden the headline for each article, or separate with a couple extra spaces? Makes it much easier to read everything. Thanks again!

[JohnnyS]

Any idea when George Lombardozzi was made? He’s got to be ancient now

"The Investigations Officer also submitted video-taped surveillances which depicted Lombardozzi intermingling with Gambino Family members on Sunday afternoons at the Veterans and Friends Club in Brooklyn on November 20, 1983, January 8, 1984, and January 22, 1984. As noted by the Investigations Officer in his post-hearing submission at p. 2: Particularly telling was the private stroll which Lombardozzi took with Gambino Capo James Failla and during which the two engaged in a private conversation."

My guess is he was made late 70s or early 80s. He's 80 years old.

[Waingro]

Thanks for posting.

[SonnyBlackstein]

Thanks for the post. Pandrella is fucked.

[TSNYC]

Lombardozzi was convicted of loansharking in southern district in 2007. He was charged in an indictment with Lawrence Galizia, Frank Isoldi, Christopher Demenna, Anthony Hooks, and Robert Schwall. Some info from that case:



UNITED STATES,
v.
George LOMBARDOZZI.
No. S1 02 Cr. 273 (AGS/PKL).
April 11, 2003.
Respectfully submitted, James B. Comey, United States Attorney, Diane Gujarati/Adam B. Siegel, Assistant United States Attorneys, Telephone (212) 637-2507/2486.
BY HAND
Honorable Peter K. Leisure
United States District Court
Southern District of New York
United States Courthouse
500 Pearl Street
New York, New York 10007
Dear Judge Leisure:
The Government respectfully submits this letter in further support of its motion in limine to introduce certain evidence at the upcoming trial of George Lombardozzi (“Lombardozzi”) scheduled to commence on April 15, 2003, and in reply to the letter to the Court from Charles F. Carnesi, Esq., Lombardozzi's counsel, dated April 7, 2003 (“Lombardozzi's Letter”).
As the Court is aware, on or about March 20, 2003, the Government filed-a motion in limine (the “Government's Motion”) seeking to admit at trial: (1) the testimony of the victim in this case concerning his understanding, at all relevant times, that Lombardozzi had ties to organized crime; (2) the testimony of expert witness Kenneth J. McCabe pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702; and (3) statements from the plea allocution of Prank Isoldi (“Isoldi”), one of Lombardozzi's co-conspirators, as proof of the existence of the conspiracy charged in Count Nine of Indictment S1 02 Cr. 273 (“the Indictment”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3). In Lombardozzi's Letter, defendant opposes the introduction of all of this evidence. For the reasons set forth in the Government's Motion and for following reasons, this evidence should be admitted during the Government's case-in-chief.

I. The Victim's Testimony Regarding Lombardozzi

As the Court is aware, the victim in this case will testify at trial that, at the time that he first borrowed money from Lombardozzi and Isoldi, and through the entire lives of the loans, the victim understood that Lombardozzi and Isoldi had ties to organized crime.

Lombardozzi does not appear to challenge the fundamental argument set forth in the Government's Motion: that the victim's understanding that Lombardozzi is connected to organized crime goes directly to his state of mind, and/or to Lombardozzi's reputation, and its admissibility is therefore expressly contemplated by the very statutes which Lombardozzi is charged with violating. See Government's Motion at 2-4. Instead of challenging the Government's proper reliance on the applicable statutes and caselaw, Lombardozzi instead argues that he “is unable to address what role if any his alleged organized crime ties played in the collection of the debt,” because he has not yet received copies of any prior statements made by the victim. Lombardozzi's Letter at 2.

First, as this Court is aware, the Government is not statutorily required to provide prior statements of Government witnesses until after the completion of the witnesses' direct testimony at trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3500. Nonetheless, the Government will, consist with its usual practice, provide such materials substantially in advance of the presentation of evidence in this case. Lombardozzi is certainly not entitled to any more.

Second, and more importantly, in making this argument, Lombardozzi simply misstates the relevant inquiry. As this Court is aware, two of the counts with which Lombardozzi is charged allege violations of 18 U.S.C. § 892, which makes it unlawful to make, or to conspire to make, an extortionate extension of credit. In order to demonstrate an “extortionate extension of credit,” the Government must show that it was “the understanding of the creditor and debtor” at the time the extension was made that a delay or failure in making repayment could result in the use of violence or other criminal means. 18 U.S.C. § 891(6). Thus, the state of mind of the debtor is an essential element of Section 892 that the Government must prove. See Government's Motion at 3. Moreover, as cited in the Government's Motion at 4, the Second Circuit has held that, under Section 892(b), “[e]vidence that the debtor believed the loanshark was connected to organized crime is admissible to show the debtor's belief that the loanshark would use, or had a reputation for using, extortionate means to collect extensions of credit.” United States v. Gigante, 729 F.2d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 1984). Accordingly, the victim's belief that Lombardozzi and Isoldi were connected to organized crime is, without more, relevant and admissible to show the victim's state of mind at the time he took the loan, regardless of what “role” such belief ultimately played “in the collection of the debt.” The relevant issue regarding the admissibility is whether the victim had such a belief, and not the manner in which Lombardozzi later exploited this belief to collect the debt. Although that topic may be an appropriate subject for cross-examination, and may address the weight that the jury should place on the victim's belief, it does not affect the admissibility of the proffered evidence.

Accordingly, the victim should be permitted to testify at trial regarding his understanding, at all times relevant to the Indictment, that Lombardozzi and Isoldi had ties to organized crime.

II. Export Testimony of Kenneth J. McCabe

Lombardozzi argues that McCabe's expert testimony should not be admitted. Lombardozzi's Letter at 3-6. He argues principally that: (A) the Government has not identified any issues that require expert explanations, (B) McCabe's testimony should not be admitted because Lombardozzi is charged with loansharking and not racketeering, and (C) McCabe's testimony would be unfairly prejudicial. Each of these arguments must fail.

A. The Need for Expert Testimony

Contrary to the Lombardozzi's suggestion, the manner in which members of organized crime families conduct their loansharking operations is quite beyond the ken of the average juror. Moreover, an understanding of these operations is plainly Critical to the jury's understanding of the disputed issues at trial.

First, the jurors will hear certain audiotapes in which Isoldi and the victim appear to discuss the fact that Isoldi has to provide the funds that Isoldi collects from the victim to a third individual. This individual may be referred to as “George” or “Georgie.” The evidence further suggests that the third party referenced in some of the conversations has the decision making authority related to the terms of repayment of the debt.

As set forth in the Government's Motion at 8, McCabe will testify that soldiers, or made members of La Cosa Nostra families, frequently conduct their affairs through the assistance of trusted individuals known as associates. McCabe will testify that it is customary for LCN family soldiers who engage in loansharking to ultimately receive the majority of the proceeds of the activities, and to retain all decision making authority with respect to the loans, but equally customary for associates to conduct the daily functions of the operation, including the time-intensive task of collecting the monies from the victims. It cannot seriously be argued that the average juror is aware of the manner in which made LCN soldiers typically delegate certain responsibilities to associates in connection with loansharking activities.
Because Lombardozzi is almost certainly intending to argue that Isoldi used Lombardozzi's name in connection with collection of the debt without Lombardozzi's permission, the fact that the practices employed by Lombardozzi here are absolutely typical and customary is highly relevant, and necessary for the jury properly to understand the references to “Georgie” contained in the recorded conversations. Moreover, because Lombardozzi is likely to argue that he is not guilty because he was not intercepted directly collecting the loan, the general practices of made soldiers of delegating such collection efforts to associates is extremely relevant, and requires specialized knowledge.

Similarly, as the Government disclosed in a letter to the Court dated April 4, 2002 (the “Government's 404(b) Letter”), the Government intends to introduce at trial the testimony of two cooperating witnesses who have personal experience with Lombardozzi's loansharking activities. Government's 404(b) Letter at 2-3. One such cooperating witness will testify as to his own receipt of extortionate extensions of credit; the other will testify that Lombardozzi took control over certain extortionate extensions of credit previously made to other individuals by Isoldi and the cooperating witness. Id.
Quite significantly, both cooperating witnesses will testify that disputes arose in connection with these extensions of credit, and that as a result, meetings between members of different LCN families, known as “sit-downs,” were held to resolve the disputed issues. The underlying facts concerning these meetings are critical to the jury's proper understanding of the witnesses' testimony, and the role played by Lombardozzi in these offenses, as in the offenses charged in the Indictment. Again, it is absurd to suggest that the average juror understands the manner in which LCN soldiers resolve disputes between LCN families, the necessary status that an individual must possess in order to participate in a “sit down,” and the respect accorded by LCN members and associates to decisions reached through the “sit-down” adjudication process. Without McCabe's expert testimony regarding this dispute resolution mechanism and the respect afforded to it, the jury cannot understand the changes in certain relationships initiated as a result of the decisions reached at such meetings. Accordingly, the expert testimony of McCabe is essential to the jury's understanding of these highly relevant and probative events.

The Government also notes that Lombardozzi is charged with conspiring with, among others, Isoldi, to make an extortionate extension of credit, and to use extortionate means to collect an extension of credit. As set forth above, the evidence at trial will demonstrate that the manner in which Lombardozzi interacted with Isoldi, and the manner is which Isoldi interacted with the victim, is highly consistent with the traditional relationships between LCN soldiers, associates, and victims. Accordingly, McCabe's expert testimony will enable to jury properly to understand the nature of the illegal agreements between Lombardozzi and Isoldi.

B. The Nature of the Charges

Lombardozzi argues incorrectly that McCabe's testimony is not relevant because Lombardozzi is not charged with racketeering. The error in his argument is set forth clearly in Lombardozzi's own discussion of the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Amuso, 21 F.3d 1251, 1263-64 (2d Cir. 1994). Lombardozzi's Letter at 4-5.

In Lombardozzi's Letter, he concedes that the Second Circuit upheld the admissibility of expert testimony in Amuso because the defendant was “the alleged head of the Luchese crime family,” and “ecause the murders were committed by other individuals and the defendant did not participate directly in the homicides, the government offered expert testimony to establish an alleged rule of organized crime that ‘only the boss can order executions or any execution performed by the family has to have his authority.’ ” Lombardozzi Letter at 4-5, quoting United States v. Amuso, 21 F.3d at 1263. Accordingly, Lombardozzi himself concedes that the expert testimony in Amuso regarding the LCN was not admitted solely to prove the existence of the racketeering enterprise, but, to the contrary, was admitted to show that the defendant's conduct was consistent with typical LCN practices.

The exact same analysis applies in this case. Isoldi has been intercepted apparently explaining that he is collecting the debt charged in the Indictment on behalf of Lombardozzi. The Government, as set forth above, seeks to offer evidence that (a) Lombardozzi is a made member of the Gambino LCN family, and (b) that Isoldi cannot act in connection with the loan without Lombardozzi's consent. Just as the jury in Amuso needed to understand that the boss of the family had to approve executions in order to understand Amuso's role in the charged homicides, the jurors in this trial will need to understand that associates like Isoldi act only at the direction, and with the permission, of made soldiers like Lombardozzi. Similarly, the jurors need to understand that only a made soldier like Lombardozzi could represent his LCN family at a sitdown with a soldier from another LCN family. Accordingly, because the proffered expert testimony will clearly assist the juror's understanding of the relevant and heavily disputed facts at issue, the testimony is admissible, regardless of the name given the charges.

C. The Testimony is Not Prejudicial

Relevant evidence should only be excluded if its prejudicial effect “substantially outweighs” its probative value. As set forth above, the Government expects that Lombardozzi will argue to the jury that Isoldi was not authorized to refer to Lombardozzi in the process of collecting the debt charged in the Indictment, and that the jury should not convict Lombardozzi because it was Isoldi, and not Lombardozzi, who dealt directly with the victim most frequently in the course of collecting the unlawful debt.

In such instance, McCabe's testimony will fairly rebut Lombardozzi's arguments. Expert testimony regarding Lombardozzi's position in the LCN, and the typical practices of LCN soldiers of delegating debt collection responsibilities is directly relevant to disputed facts at issue. Such evidence is not unduly prejudicial merely because it proves the defendant's guilt. To the contrary, it is extremely relevant and should be admitted.

III. The Plea Allocution of Frank Isoldi

The Government seeks, pursuant to Rule 804(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, to introduce certain portions of Isoldi's guilty plea allocution. Government's Motion at 8-14. Lombardozzi opposes this request, arguing principally that “Isoldi's plea remains suspect” because “Isoldi received a clear benefit from entering into a plea agreement that reduced his potential exposure.” Lombardozzi's Letter at 7. Lombardozzi appears to be arguing that Isoldi's plea is “suspect” because by pleading guilty, Isoldi faced a reduced Sentencing Guidelines range of imprisonment.

This argument ignores entirely the mountain of Second Circuit precedent set forth in the Government's Motion discussing the admissibility of coconspirator plea allocutions. Government's Motion at 8-14. Lombardozzi cannot and does not challenge the correctness of the Government's recitation of the relevant legal-precedents, or the fact that coconspirator plea allocutions are routinely admitted at trials before this Court.
Unable to challenge this accepted practice, Lombardozzi instead attempts to argue that Isoldi's plea of guilty is somehow unique, due to the fact that Isoldi may have faced a reduced Sentencing Guidelines range of imprisonment by pleading guilty, As Lombardozzi is undoubtedly aware, however, in almost all instances, defendants are subjected to reduced Sentencing Guidelines ranges of imprisonment when they enter pleas of guilty. United States Sentencing Guidelines §§ 3E1.1(a) and (b)(2). As set forth in the Government's motion, Isoldi pled guilty (a) while facing a lengthy term of imprisonment and having been advised of these potential penalties; (b) provided a detailed allocution; (c) in open court; (d) under oath; and (e) in the presence of his counsel. For all of the reasons set forth in the Government's Motion, Isoldi's plea allocution bears all of the relevant indicia of reliability, and is properly admissible, with an appropriate limiting instruction to the jury. See United States v. Moskowitz, 215 F.3d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam)(“[W]e have found particularized guarantees of trustworthiness where, inter alia, (1) the plea allocution undeniably subjected [the defendant] to the risk of a lengthy term of imprisonment, even if it was also made in the hope of obtaining a more lenient sentence; (2) the allocution was given under oath; and (3) the district court instructed the jurors that they could consider [the defendant's] allocution only as evidence that a conspiracy existed and not as direct evidence that defendants were members of that alleged conspiracy or that they were otherwise guilty of the crimes charged against them.”)

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Government respectfully requests that its application to introduce at trial (1) the testimony of the victim regarding his understanding of Lombardozzi's ties to organized crime; (2) the expert testimony of Kenneth J. McCabe; and (3) the statements from the plea allocution of Isoldi attached to the Government's Motion, should be granted in its entirety.
Respectfully submitted,
JAMES B. COMEY
United States UNITED STATES,
v.
George LOMBARDOZZI.
No. S1 02 Cr. 273 (AGS/PKL).
April 11, 2003.
Respectfully submitted, James B. Comey, United States Attorney, Diane Gujarati/Adam B. Siegel, Assistant United States Attorneys, Telephone (212) 637-2507/2486.
BY HAND
Honorable Peter K. Leisure
United States District Court
Southern District of New York
United States Courthouse
500 Pearl Street
New York, New York 10007
Dear Judge Leisure:
The Government respectfully submits this letter in further support of its motion in limine to introduce certain evidence at the upcoming trial of George Lombardozzi (“Lombardozzi”) scheduled to commence on April 15, 2003, and in reply to the letter to the Court from Charles F. Carnesi, Esq., Lombardozzi's counsel, dated April 7, 2003 (“Lombardozzi's Letter”).
As the Court is aware, on or about March 20, 2003, the Government filed-a motion in limine (the “Government's Motion”) seeking to admit at trial: (1) the testimony of the victim in this case concerning his understanding, at all relevant times, that Lombardozzi had ties to organized crime; (2) the testimony of expert witness Kenneth J. McCabe pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702; and (3) statements from the plea allocution of Prank Isoldi (“Isoldi”), one of Lombardozzi's co-conspirators, as proof of the existence of the conspiracy charged in Count Nine of Indictment S1 02 Cr. 273 (“the Indictment”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3). In Lombardozzi's Letter, defendant opposes the introduction of all of this evidence. For the reasons set forth in the Government's Motion and for following reasons, this evidence should be admitted during the Government's case-in-chief.
I. The Victim's Testimony Regarding Lombardozzi
As the Court is aware, the victim in this case will testify at trial that, at the time that he first borrowed money from Lombardozzi and Isoldi, and through the entire lives of the loans, the victim understood that Lombardozzi and Isoldi had ties to organized crime.
Lombardozzi does not appear to challenge the fundamental argument set forth in the Government's Motion: that the victim's understanding that Lombardozzi is connected to organized crime goes directly to his state of mind, and/or to Lombardozzi's reputation, and its admissibility is therefore expressly contemplated by the very statutes which Lombardozzi is charged with violating. See Government's Motion at 2-4. Instead of challenging the Government's proper reliance on the applicable statutes and caselaw, Lombardozzi instead argues that he “is unable to address what role if any his alleged organized crime ties played in the collection of the debt,” because he has not yet received copies of any prior statements made by the victim. Lombardozzi's Letter at 2.
First, as this Court is aware, the Government is not statutorily required to provide prior statements of Government witnesses until after the completion of the witnesses' direct testimony at trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3500. Nonetheless, the Government will, consist with its usual practice, provide such materials substantially in advance of the presentation of evidence in this case. Lombardozzi is certainly not entitled to any more.
Second, and more importantly, in making this argument, Lombardozzi simply misstates the relevant inquiry. As this Court is aware, two of the counts with which Lombardozzi is charged allege violations of 18 U.S.C. § 892, which makes it unlawful to make, or to conspire to make, an extortionate extension of credit. In order to demonstrate an “extortionate extension of credit,” the Government must show that it was “the understanding of the creditor and debtor” at the time the extension was made that a delay or failure in making repayment could result in the use of violence or other criminal means. 18 U.S.C. § 891(6). Thus, the state of mind of the debtor is an essential element of Section 892 that the Government must prove. See Government's Motion at 3. Moreover, as cited in the Government's Motion at 4, the Second Circuit has held that, under Section 892(b), “[e]vidence that the debtor believed the loanshark was connected to organized crime is admissible to show the debtor's belief that the loanshark would use, or had a reputation for using, extortionate means to collect extensions of credit.” United States v. Gigante, 729 F.2d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 1984). Accordingly, the victim's belief that Lombardozzi and Isoldi were connected to organized crime is, without more, relevant and admissible to show the victim's state of mind at the time he took the loan, regardless of what “role” such belief ultimately played “in the collection of the debt.” The relevant issue regarding the admissibility is whether the victim had such a belief, and not the manner in which Lombardozzi later exploited this belief to collect the debt. Although that topic may be an appropriate subject for cross-examination, and may address the weight that the jury should place on the victim's belief, it does not affect the admissibility of the proffered evidence.
Accordingly, the victim should be permitted to testify at trial regarding his understanding, at all times relevant to the Indictment, that Lombardozzi and Isoldi had ties to organized crime.
II. Export Testimony of Kenneth J. McCabe
Lombardozzi argues that McCabe's expert testimony should not be admitted. Lombardozzi's Letter at 3-6. He argues principally that: (A) the Government has not identified any issues that require expert explanations, (B) McCabe's testimony should not be admitted because Lombardozzi is charged with loansharking and not racketeering, and (C) McCabe's testimony would be unfairly prejudicial. Each of these arguments must fail.
A. The Need for Expert Testimony
Contrary to the Lombardozzi's suggestion, the manner in which members of organized crime families conduct their loansharking operations is quite beyond the ken of the average juror. Moreover, an understanding of these operations is plainly Critical to the jury's understanding of the disputed issues at trial.
First, the jurors will hear certain audiotapes in which Isoldi and the victim appear to discuss the fact that Isoldi has to provide the funds that Isoldi collects from the victim to a third individual. This individual may be referred to as “George” or “Georgie.” The evidence further suggests that the third party referenced in some of the conversations has the decision making authority related to the terms of repayment of the debt.
As set forth in the Government's Motion at 8, McCabe will testify that soldiers, or made members of La Cosa Nostra families, frequently conduct their affairs through the assistance of trusted individuals known as associates. McCabe will testify that it is customary for LCN family soldiers who engage in loansharking to ultimately receive the majority of the proceeds of the activities, and to retain all decision making authority with respect to the loans, but equally customary for associates to conduct the daily functions of the operation, including the time-intensive task of collecting the monies from the victims. It cannot seriously be argued that the average juror is aware of the manner in which made LCN soldiers typically delegate certain responsibilities to associates in connection with loansharking activities.
Because Lombardozzi is almost certainly intending to argue that Isoldi used Lombardozzi's name in connection with collection of the debt without Lombardozzi's permission, the fact that the practices employed by Lombardozzi here are absolutely typical and customary is highly relevant, and necessary for the jury properly to understand the references to “Georgie” contained in the recorded conversations. Moreover, because Lombardozzi is likely to argue that he is not guilty because he was not intercepted directly collecting the loan, the general practices of made soldiers of delegating such collection efforts to associates is extremely relevant, and requires specialized knowledge.
Similarly, as the Government disclosed in a letter to the Court dated April 4, 2002 (the “Government's 404(b) Letter”), the Government intends to introduce at trial the testimony of two cooperating witnesses who have personal experience with Lombardozzi's loansharking activities. Government's 404(b) Letter at 2-3. One such cooperating witness will testify as to his own receipt of extortionate extensions of credit; the other will testify that Lombardozzi took control over certain extortionate extensions of credit previously made to other individuals by Isoldi and the cooperating witness. Id.
Quite significantly, both cooperating witnesses will testify that disputes arose in connection with these extensions of credit, and that as a result, meetings between members of different LCN families, known as “sit-downs,” were held to resolve the disputed issues. The underlying facts concerning these meetings are critical to the jury's proper understanding of the witnesses' testimony, and the role played by Lombardozzi in these offenses, as in the offenses charged in the Indictment. Again, it is absurd to suggest that the average juror understands the manner in which LCN soldiers resolve disputes between LCN families, the necessary status that an individual must possess in order to participate in a “sit down,” and the respect accorded by LCN members and associates to decisions reached through the “sit-down” adjudication process. Without McCabe's expert testimony regarding this dispute resolution mechanism and the respect afforded to it, the jury cannot understand the changes in certain relationships initiated as a result of the decisions reached at such meetings. Accordingly, the expert testimony of McCabe is essential to the jury's understanding of these highly relevant and probative events.
The Government also notes that Lombardozzi is charged with conspiring with, among others, Isoldi, to make an extortionate extension of credit, and to use extortionate means to collect an extension of credit. As set forth above, the evidence at trial will demonstrate that the manner in which Lombardozzi interacted with Isoldi, and the manner is which Isoldi interacted with the victim, is highly consistent with the traditional relationships between LCN soldiers, associates, and victims. Accordingly, McCabe's expert testimony will enable to jury properly to understand the nature of the illegal agreements between Lombardozzi and Isoldi.
B. The Nature of the Charges
Lombardozzi argues incorrectly that McCabe's testimony is not relevant because Lombardozzi is not charged with racketeering. The error in his argument is set forth clearly in Lombardozzi's own discussion of the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Amuso, 21 F.3d 1251, 1263-64 (2d Cir. 1994). Lombardozzi's Letter at 4-5.
In Lombardozzi's Letter, he concedes that the Second Circuit upheld the admissibility of expert testimony in Amuso because the defendant was “the alleged head of the Luchese crime family,” and “ecause the murders were committed by other individuals and the defendant did not participate directly in the homicides, the government offered expert testimony to establish an alleged rule of organized crime that ‘only the boss can order executions or any execution performed by the family has to have his authority.’ ” Lombardozzi Letter at 4-5, quoting United States v. Amuso, 21 F.3d at 1263. Accordingly, Lombardozzi himself concedes that the expert testimony in Amuso regarding the LCN was not admitted solely to prove the existence of the racketeering enterprise, but, to the contrary, was admitted to show that the defendant's conduct was consistent with typical LCN practices.
The exact same analysis applies in this case. Isoldi has been intercepted apparently explaining that he is collecting the debt charged in the Indictment on behalf of Lombardozzi. The Government, as set forth above, seeks to offer evidence that (a) Lombardozzi is a made member of the Gambino LCN family, and (b) that Isoldi cannot act in connection with the loan without Lombardozzi's consent. Just as the jury in Amuso needed to understand that the boss of the family had to approve executions in order to understand Amuso's role in the charged homicides, the jurors in this trial will need to understand that associates like Isoldi act only at the direction, and with the permission, of made soldiers like Lombardozzi. Similarly, the jurors need to understand that only a made soldier like Lombardozzi could represent his LCN family at a sitdown with a soldier from another LCN family. Accordingly, because the proffered expert testimony will clearly assist the juror's understanding of the relevant and heavily disputed facts at issue, the testimony is admissible, regardless of the name given the charges.
C. The Testimony is Not Prejudicial
Relevant evidence should only be excluded if its prejudicial effect “substantially outweighs” its probative value. As set forth above, the Government expects that Lombardozzi will argue to the jury that Isoldi was not authorized to refer to Lombardozzi in the process of collecting the debt charged in the Indictment, and that the jury should not convict Lombardozzi because it was Isoldi, and not Lombardozzi, who dealt directly with the victim most frequently in the course of collecting the unlawful debt.
In such instance, McCabe's testimony will fairly rebut Lombardozzi's arguments. Expert testimony regarding Lombardozzi's position in the LCN, and the typical practices of LCN soldiers of delegating debt collection responsibilities is directly relevant to disputed facts at issue. Such evidence is not unduly prejudicial merely because it proves the defendant's guilt. To the contrary, it is extremely relevant and should be admitted.
III. The Plea Allocution of Frank Isoldi
The Government seeks, pursuant to Rule 804(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, to introduce certain portions of Isoldi's guilty plea allocution. Government's Motion at 8-14. Lombardozzi opposes this request, arguing principally that “Isoldi's plea remains suspect” because “Isoldi received a clear benefit from entering into a plea agreement that reduced his potential exposure.” Lombardozzi's Letter at 7. Lombardozzi appears to be arguing that Isoldi's plea is “suspect” because by pleading guilty, Isoldi faced a reduced Sentencing Guidelines range of imprisonment.
This argument ignores entirely the mountain of Second Circuit precedent set forth in the Government's Motion discussing the admissibility of coconspirator plea allocutions. Government's Motion at 8-14. Lombardozzi cannot and does not challenge the correctness of the Government's recitation of the relevant legal-precedents, or the fact that coconspirator plea allocutions are routinely admitted at trials before this Court.
Unable to challenge this accepted practice, Lombardozzi instead attempts to argue that Isoldi's plea of guilty is somehow unique, due to the fact that Isoldi may have faced a reduced Sentencing Guidelines range of imprisonment by pleading guilty, As Lombardozzi is undoubtedly aware, however, in almost all instances, defendants are subjected to reduced Sentencing Guidelines ranges of imprisonment when they enter pleas of guilty. United States Sentencing Guidelines §§ 3E1.1(a) and (b)(2). As set forth in the Government's motion, Isoldi pled guilty (a) while facing a lengthy term of imprisonment and having been advised of these potential penalties; (b) provided a detailed allocution; (c) in open court; (d) under oath; and (e) in the presence of his counsel. For all of the reasons set forth in the Government's Motion, Isoldi's plea allocution bears all of the relevant indicia of reliability, and is properly admissible, with an appropriate limiting instruction to the jury. See United States v. Moskowitz, 215 F.3d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam)(“[W]e have found particularized guarantees of trustworthiness where, inter alia, (1) the plea allocution undeniably subjected [the defendant] to the risk of a lengthy term of imprisonment, even if it was also made in the hope of obtaining a more lenient sentence; (2) the allocution was given under oath; and (3) the district court instructed the jurors that they could consider [the defendant's] allocution only as evidence that a conspiracy existed and not as direct evidence that defendants were members of that alleged conspiracy or that they were otherwise guilty of the crimes charged against them.”)
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Government respectfully requests that its application to introduce at trial (1) the testimony of the victim regarding his understanding of Lombardozzi's ties to organized crime; (2) the expert testimony of Kenneth J. McCabe; and (3) the statements from the plea allocution of Isoldi attached to the Government's Motion, should be granted in its entirety.
Respectfully submitted,
JAMES B. COMEY
United States Attorney






__________________________________________________

[TSNYC]

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
George LOMBARDOZZI, Defendant–Appellant.
Docket No. 04–0380–cr.
Argued: Nov. 30, 2004.
Decided: July 11, 2007.
Synopsis
Background: Defendant was convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Peter K. Leisure, J., of conspiring to make and making an extortionate extension of credit and conspiring to use extortionate means to collect an extension of credit. Defendant appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Hall, Circuit Judge, held that:
1 evidence was sufficient to establish victim's requisite state of mind;
2 evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's requisite state of mind;
3 any Confrontation Clause error resulting from admission of expert testimony did not affect defendant's substantial rights;
4 admission of co-conspirator's plea allocution was harmless error;
5 prior bad acts testimony was admissible; and
6 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent did not knowingly or recklessly mislead grand jury in his testimony.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes (33)
Expand West Headnotes
Attorneys and Law Firms

*65 Alan S. Futerfas, New York, NY, for Appellant.
Adam B. Siegel, Assistant United States Attorney, (David N. Kelley, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Diane Gujarati, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), New York, NY, for Appellee.
Before: KEARSE, SACK, and HALL, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
HALL, Circuit Judge:
Appellant George Lombardozzi was charged in four counts of a 19–count indictment. Count 7 charged him with conspiring to make an extortionate extension of credit in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 892; Count 8 charged him with the substantive offense of making an extortionate extension of credit in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 892; Count 9 charged him with conspiring to use extortionate means to collect on an extension of credit in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 894; and Count 10 charged him with using extortionate means to collect on an extension of credit in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 894. The four charges all stemmed from loans amounting to approximately $100,000 that Lombardozzi made in 1998 and 1999. A jury convicted Lombardozzi of three of the four charged offenses. They acquitted him of Count 10, the substantive offense of using extortionate means to collect on an extension of credit. His conviction was based in part on evidence *66 presented in the form of a co-defendant's plea allocution. Following the trial, the United States Supreme Court decided Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), holding that in order for testimonial evidence such as a plea allocution to be admissible against a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause requires the unavailability of the witness and a prior opportunity for cross-examination of the witness by the defendant. Id. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354.
Lombardozzi raises a number of challenges to his conviction. He argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction; that the admission of his co-conspirator's plea allocution violated his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights; that the district court improperly admitted expert testimony and evidence of prior bad acts; and that the government presented perjured testimony to the grand jury.
For the reasons set forth below, the judgment of the district court (Leisure, J.) is affirmed.
Background
Lombardozzi, an alleged member of the Gambino La Cosa Nostra Crime Family, first met Henry Leung in 1994 at a restaurant that Leung managed in Manhattan. Leung was planning to open a new restaurant and needed a loan to be able to do so. One of Leung's frequent customers was Daniel Marino, whom Leung knew was engaged in racketeering and loansharking or, as Leung described him, a “wiseguy .... involved with the mob.” Leung asked Marino for a $50,000 loan. In response, Marino introduced Leung to Lombardozzi who agreed to provide him with the loan. Leung was told that Lombardozzi was the guy who “takes care of the money.” Frank Isoldi, another member of “Marino's group” and Lombardozzi's co-defendant, subsequently met Leung in the restaurant's wine cellar and gave him a brown paper bag containing $50,000 in cash. Thereafter, Leung made repayments to William Scotto, whom he described as the “muscle” for the group. The loan was eventually paid off and is not the subject of the current indictment.
In 1998, Leung sought an additional $20,000 loan from Marino's group. Because Marino was incarcerated, Lombardozzi and Isoldi agreed to loan Leung the money. Again, in the wine cellar of Leung's restaurant, Isoldi delivered to Leung a paper bag containing the money. The terms of the loan originally required repayment in the amount of $1,500 per month for two years, but Scotto subsequently informed Leung that “the old man”—whom Leung understood to mean Lombardozzi—had changed the terms and increased the payments to $2,500 per month for two years.
Shortly thereafter, Leung again borrowed money from Lombardozzi and Isoldi, this time for both himself and his friend Michael Wong. He originally asked for $25,000 ($20,000 for Wong and $5,000 for himself), but the principal amount of the loan eventually ballooned to $100,000. Leung was required to pay two points, or two percent, interest each week (104% per year), which amounted to $2,000 per week in interest in addition to the $100,000 principal.
Given the exorbitant payments required, Leung had to borrow money from other loansharks just to pay his debt to Lombardozzi in a timely manner. The interest on the additional loans was 250%—more than twice what he was paying Lombardozzi. In addition, Leung sold many of his personal possessions, moved to a less expensive residence, and borrowed money from friends. Eventually, Leung was able to *67 renegotiate the terms of the loans with the other loansharks, although he never sought to do so with Lombardozzi.
The FBI approached Leung in early 2001 seeking information about his dealings with Lombardozzi, but Leung denied knowing him. Leung told Isoldi and Scotto about the FBI's inquiry, and they gave him the phone number of a lawyer. Despite the inquiry, the collections continued until Lombardozzi was arrested in May 2002.
In September 2002, Isoldi pleaded guilty to Count 9 of the indictment, under which he was charged as a co-defendant of Lombardozzi with conspiring to use extortionate means to collect on the extension of credit made to Leung. In connection with his Rule 11 guilty plea proceedings, in response to Judge Leisure's questioning, Isoldi allocuted to the relevant facts underlying that charge. Then, prior to the commencement of Lombardozzi's trial in April 2003, the district court granted a motion in limine allowing the government to introduce a redacted version of Isoldi's plea allocution as evidence against Lombardozzi. Judge Leisure instructed the jury that it was to consider the redacted plea allocution only as evidence of the existence of the conspiracy charged in Count 9 of the indictment and the nature of Isoldi's role in that conspiracy. Following a nine-day trial, in which the government's evidence against Lombardozzi consisted of, inter alia, Isoldi's plea allocution, intercepted telephone calls, Leung's testimony, and expert testimony, the jury convicted Lombardozzi on Counts 7, 8, and 9. It acquitted him of the substantive offense of using extortionate means to collect on an extension of credit (Count 10). The district court sentenced Lombardozzi principally to 41 months' imprisonment, the lowest sentence possible within the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range.
Discussion
1. The Government Presented Sufficient Evidence at Trial
A. Standard of Review
Lombardozzi challenges the sufficiency of the government's evidence with respect to two elements of the crimes for which he was convicted. The first is the victim Leung's understanding that the loans he received were extortionate, an essential element for conviction under § 892. The second is Lombardozzi's own state of mind with respect to the extortionate nature of the loans and their collection, an essential element for conviction under both §§ 892 and 894.
123“As we have repeatedly observed, a defendant raising an appellate challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction faces a ‘heavy burden,’ because we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor.” United States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438, 459 (2d Cir.2004). This deferential standard “is especially important when reviewing a conviction of conspiracy .... because a conspiracy by its very nature is a secretive operation, and it is a rare case ‘where all aspects of a conspiracy can be laid bare in court with the precision of a surgeon's scalpel.’ ” United States v. Pitre, 960 F.2d 1112, 1121 (2d Cir.1992) (quoting United States v. Provenzano, 615 F.2d 37, 45 (2d Cir.1980)). “Reversal is warranted only if no rational factfinder could have found the crimes charged proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Gaskin, 364 F.3d at 459–60.
B. Statutes Under Which Lombardozzi Was Convicted
4Lombardozzi was convicted of conspiring to make and making extortionate *68 extensions of credit in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 892 and conspiring to use extortionate means to collect on an extension of credit in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 894. Section 892(a) prohibits “mak[ing] any extortionate extension of credit, or conspir[ing] to do so.” An “extortionate extension of credit” is defined as “any extension of credit with respect to which it is the understanding of the creditor and the debtor at the time it is made that delay in making repayment or failure to make repayment could result in the use of violence or other criminal means to cause harm to the person, reputation, or property of any person.” 18 U.S.C. § 891(6) (emphasis added). The states of mind of the defendant and the debtor are, therefore, both essential elements of the crime of making extortionate extensions of credit under § 892.1 See United States v. Allen, 127 F.3d 260, 266 (2d Cir.1997) ( “Crucial to conviction under this statute is proof that both the creditor and the debtor understood when the loan was made that force could be used to collect the loan at issue.”); United States v. Natale, 526 F.2d 1160, 1168 n. 10 (2d Cir.1975) (noting that unlike 18 U.S.C. § 894, “the state of mind of the victim [is] an essential element of [§ 892] to be proved by the Government”). Section 892(b) further provides that the government can establish prima facie evidence that a loan was extortionate if it can show: (1) the repayment of the loan would be unenforceable through civil judicial process against the debtor, (2) the loan had an annual interest rate in excess of 45 percent, and (3) “[a]t the time the extension of credit was made, the debtor reasonably believed that ... the creditor had a reputation for the use of extortionate means to collect extensions of credit or to punish the nonrepayment thereof.” 18 U.S.C. § 892(b).
56Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 894(a) prohibits “knowingly participat[ing] in any way, or conspir[ing] to do so, in the use of any extortionate means (1) to collect or attempt to collect any extension of credit, or (2) to punish any person for the nonrepayment thereof.” “[E]xtortionate means” is defined as “any means which involves the use, or an express or implicit threat of use, of violence or other criminal means to cause harm to the person, reputation, or property of any person.” 18 U.S.C. § 891(7). Unlike § 892, proof of a victim borrower's state of mind is not an element of this offense. See Natale, 526 F.2d at 1168 (noting that “it is the conduct of the defendant, not the victim's individual state of mind, to which the thrust of [§ 894] is directed”). With regard to the defendant's *69 state of mind, the government must prove that he intended by his conduct to instill fear of harm in the victim borrower. See United States v. Sears, 544 F.2d 585, 588 (2d Cir.1976).
C. Whether the Evidence Was Sufficient to Prove Leung's State of Mind
78Lombardozzi argues that the government's evidence was insufficient to prove Leung's requisite state of mind. We disagree. “[T]he inquiry [into the victim borrower's state of mind] should be whether the record as a whole discloses a reasonable basis upon which the borrower[ ] might have predicated [his] fear that default or delinquency might result in harm to [himself] or [his] famil[y].” Annoreno, 460 F.2d at 1309. A finding that the record discloses such a reasonable basis does not necessarily depend on evidence of explicit threats made by the creditor, and the victim borrower's requisite state of mind can be inferred. See, e.g., id. (“Our review of the record compels the conclusion that the nature of these transactions, in which oral, unsecured loans were made at rates of interest often 30 times the commercial rates with provision for nefarious repayment at such places as street corners, taverns, pool halls and closed barber shops, would inform the average borrower ... that the loans were extortionate in nature.”). In our analysis, the component of our standard of review that requires us to draw all reasonable inferences in the government's favor is significant because even though Leung did not testify as to any specific threats or discuss his state of mind in detail, his state of mind can be inferred from the evidence offered at trial.
First, the jury could infer from several portions of Leung's trial testimony his understanding that violence or criminal harm would result if he defaulted on his loans. Leung testified that he was introduced to Lombardozzi through Marino, someone he knew was a “wiseguy .... involved with the mob,” who engaged in racketeering and loansharking. See United States v. Madori, 419 F.3d 159, 169 (2d Cir.2005) (upholding the admission of evidence that the debtor believed the creditor was “connected to organized crime ... to show the debtor's belief that the [creditor] would use, or had a reputation for using, extortionate means to collect extensions of credit” (citing United States v. Gigante, 729 F.2d 78, 83 (2d Cir.1984))). Regarding the loans he took out on behalf of his friend Wong, Leung testified that he sought money from other sources in order to repay the loans “ecause when the time come[s], the day to collect, I have got to have the money ready, because they are not going after [Wong], they are going after me.” With regard to making payments in general, moreover, Leung testified that he was “very nervous ... because every morning when I wake up, it's this money, that money. And I have a business, I cannot run away, and I don't want anything to happen to the business.” In describing a telephone conversation with Isoldi about making payments, Leung explained that in telling Isoldi “f you can help me with that, I would be deeply appreciat[ive],” he meant that he wanted Isoldi to hold off Lombardozzi. Indeed, he testified that “I just don't want them to do anything, you know—you know, I'm a little scared, so that's why I'm just telling him to hold off, hold off [Lombardozzi].” Finally, on cross examination, Leung testified that when he was having trouble making payments, Lombardozzi told him that he had “better take care of it.” Although this statement does not necessarily rise to the level of an explicit threat, it at least permits the inference of an implied threat from which Leung's fear of harm can be reasonably inferred. See *70 Madori, 419 F.3d at 169 (upholding the admission of evidence of veiled threats to prove the victim borrower's state of mind) (citing Gigante, 729 F.2d at 83).
Leung's understanding that extortionate means would be used to collect on any default can also reasonably be inferred from his testimony regarding the terms of the loan, i.e., 104% interest, the delivery of the money in a paper bag in Leung's wine cellar, and his statement to FBI Agent Christopher Bryceland that Isoldi acted as a “runner” for Lombardozzi (giving Leung the actual cash and collecting payments on Lombardozzi's behalf). See Annoreno, 460 F.2d at 1309. Leung also testified that he sold his assets, sought loans from friends, and borrowed money from other loansharks at interest rates of more than 250% in order to repay his loan to Lombardozzi on time, all evidence from which the jury could permissibly infer that Leung feared the consequences of non-payment.
Finally, the testimony of Agent Bryceland and tape-recorded conversations between Isoldi and Leung constitute additional evidence from which the jury could infer Leung's understanding that delays in making payments could result in violence or other criminal harm. Specifically, Agent Bryceland testified that Leung told him that Leung believed Lombardozzi was involved with organized crime and that he would be dead if he talked to the FBI. Leung also informed Agent Bryceland that he was concerned for his safety and that Isoldi and another associate “have muscle and ... would do harm to him personally or to his restaurant if he did not make timely payments.” In a telling exchange with Agent Bryceland, Leung initially denied knowing either Lombardozzi or Isoldi and lied about the loans, likely out of fear for his own safety, and from the taped conversations in evidence, the jury could infer that Leung was scared and nervous. See, e.g., United States v. Wills, 346 F.3d 476, 499 (4th Cir.2003) (noting that it is reasonable for a jury to conclude, based on recorded conversations, that the victim was in fear).2
Based on the foregoing proof and reasonable inferences that could be drawn from it, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Leung understood that delay or default in making repayment could result in violence or other criminal harm.
D. Whether the Evidence Was Sufficient to Prove Lombardozzi's State of Mind
9With respect to Lombardozzi's state of mind, under § 892 the government had to prove that at the time Lombardozzi caused the loan to be made to Leung, Lombardozzi had an understanding that if Leung delayed in making, or failed to make, repayment, Leung could be harmed. Under § 894 the focus is on the defendant's actions and intentions with respect to the collection activity. The government had to establish that, in collecting the loans, Lombardozzi intended, as the result of his actions, to cause Leung to fear he would suffer harm to his person, reputation, *71 or property. Lombardozzi argues that the government did not provide evidence sufficient to prove that he had the required state of mind. We disagree.
Lombardozzi's state of mind, much like Leung's, can reasonably be inferred from the terms of the loans that he extended. Indeed, a jury may permissibly infer that someone who makes an unsecured loan and charges exorbitant interest rates surely intends to back up the loan with threats of violence. See United States v. Polizzi, 801 F.2d 1543, 1555 (9th Cir.1986) (“The jury could reasonably have concluded that [the] evidence proved that [defendant] knew [the victim] was paying an extortionate rate of interest on his debt and that [defendant] must therefore have known that the debt could have been secured only by threats of violence or harm to [the victim].”). Given the context of an unsecured loan at an exorbitant interest rate, a jury could also infer from Lombardozzi's own statements his intent to back up the loan with threats of violence. For instance, he told Leung to “keep up what [he was] doing” when Leung made payments, which Leung understood to mean “make the payments on time, be a good boy.” Further, when Leung started having trouble making payments, Lombardozzi told him that he had “better take care of it.” It is reasonable for a jury to infer that these statements were threatening in nature, if not direct threats themselves. In addition, those statements permitted the inference that Lombardozzi not only understood the extortionate nature of the loan, which is the state of mind required under § 892, but that he intended to instill fear in Leung, which is the state of mind required under § 894. While those statements were not made contemporaneously with the making of the loans, they nonetheless did provide evidence as to Lombardozzi's state of mind regarding their repayment. See United States v. Lamattina, 889 F.2d 1191, 1193 (1st Cir.1989) (“Although these threats were made after the time of the loans, they may still shed light on appellant's intentions when he made the loans. Surely, this evidence is more than sufficient to reasonably infer the requisite ‘understanding.’ ”).
Taped conversations between Leung and Isoldi also shed light on Lombardozzi's state of mind. The jury was entitled to infer from those conversations that Leung was afraid; that Isoldi, as a coconspirator, was speaking for Lombardozzi; and that instilling such fear was Lombardozzi's intent. For example, in one such conversation, occurring at a time when Leung was having trouble making payments, Isoldi told him “I think I'm going to have to make an appointment for you to see [Lombardozzi] in person, because it's going to get out of hand.” Isoldi also threatened to bring Lombardozzi to the restaurant if Leung did not make his payments. Peter Perrotta, Isoldi's associate, corroborated the details of the conversations. Perrotta testified that “[Isoldi] seemed very animated that [Leung] wasn't ready to see [Lombardozzi], and basically said that [Lombardozzi] wasn't going to be happy, and that he doesn't want to have to send [Scotto].” From this evidence, a jury could reasonably infer that Lombardozzi intended to harm Leung if he did not pay, or at the very least that he intended Leung to fear harm, particularly considering the suggestion of sending Scotto—the group's “muscle”—to see him.
E. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, there is sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that the government proved the requisite states of mind for Leung and Lombardozzi so as to sustain Lombardozzi's convictions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 892 and 894.
*72 2. The Admission of Kenneth McCabe's Expert Testimony was not Plain Error
A. The Expert Testimony of Kenneth McCabe
The government called Kenneth McCabe, a criminal investigator for the United States Attorney's office for the Southern District of New York, as an expert who testified as to, inter alia, the general structure of La Cosa Nostra in New York and Lombardozzi's affiliation with organized crime. On direct examination McCabe was asked whether he had an opinion as to whether Lombardozzi is affiliated with organized crime. McCabe answered, “Yes. George Lombardozzi is a soldier in the Gambino crime family.” Earlier in his testimony, in describing the general structure of organized crime, McCabe stated that “soldiers” are also known as “made” members. On cross-examination McCabe testified that his opinion regarding Lombardozzi's affiliation with organized crime was based on conversations with cooperating witnesses and confidential informants, but added that he personally observed Lombardozzi's activities approximately two dozen times since 1985. McCabe testified that during his surveillance he witnessed Lombardozzi having conversations with known organized crime figures and frequenting social clubs which McCabe identified as “meeting place[s] for organized crime members to socialize and commit planned crimes, collect monies.” Lombardozzi failed to object to the admission of McCabe's testimony on Confrontation Clause grounds at trial.
Lombardozzi now argues on appeal that the admission of McCabe's expert testimony was improper under, inter alia,3 the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment because McCabe's opinion, in effect, directly conveyed to the jury out-of-court testimonial statements of confidential informants and cooperating witnesses whom Lombardozzi never had an opportunity to cross-examine. In Crawford, the Supreme Court stated that the Confrontation Clause “does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.” 541 U.S. 36, 60 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177. In light of that statement in Crawford and this Court's previous determination that it is permissible for an expert witness to form an opinion by applying her expertise to otherwise inadmissible evidence because, in that limited instance, the evidence is not being presented for the truth of the matter asserted, see United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 57–58 (2d Cir.2003), the admission of McCabe's testimony was error only if he communicated out-of-court testimonial statements of cooperating witnesses and confidential informants directly to the jury in the guise of an expert opinion. While the record indicates that may have been the case, and admission of McCabe's testimony, therefore, may have constituted error, we hold it did not rise to the level of reversible plain error because it did not affect Lombardozzi's substantial rights.
B. Standard of Review
1011Because Lombardozzi failed to preserve the issue, we review the admission of McCabe's testimony under a plain error standard. See United States v. Banks, 464 F.3d 184, 189 (2d Cir.2006). That standard is not met unless there is, inter alia, “(1) ‘error,’ (2) that is ‘plain,’ and (3) that ‘affect[s] substantial rights.’ ” *73 Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466–67, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). “If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467, 117 S.Ct. 1544 (internal quotations marks omitted). “[R]eversal for plain error should ‘be used sparingly, solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.’ ” Banks, 464 F.3d at 189 (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982)).
C. Analysis
i. Whether the error was “plain”
1213For an error to be “plain” it must be “clear” or “obvious,” Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, “at the time of appellate consideration.” Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544. In fact, the error must be “ ‘so egregious and obvious as to make the trial judge and prosecutor derelict in permitting it, despite the defendant's failure to object.’ ” United States v. Feliciano, 223 F.3d 102, 115 (2d Cir.2000) (quoting United States v. Gore, 154 F.3d 34, 43 (2d Cir.1998)). As stated above, based on Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (stating the Confrontation Clause bars only those out-of-court testimonial statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted), and this Court's decision in Dukagjini, McCabe's reliance on out-of-court testimonial statements in forming his opinion that Lombardozzi is affiliated with organized crime may only have been permissible if McCabe applied his expertise to those statements but did not directly convey the substance of the statements to the jury. See Dukagjini, 326 F.3d at 59 (stating that United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924 (2d Cir.1993), “permits an expert to rely on hearsay evidence for the purposes of rendering an opinion based on his expertise” but adding that an expert may not simply repeat “hearsay evidence without applying any expertise whatsoever” because it enables the government to put before the jury an “out-of-court declaration of another, not subject to cross-examination ... for the truth of the matter asserted”). In Dukagjini, we found expert testimony to have been erroneously admitted even though the expert testified that his opinion was based on his own knowledge of the investigation as well as out-of-court statements made by “cooperating individuals,” because his opinion, at least in part, seemed to convey out-of-court statements to the jury directly. Id. We held, however, the conclusion that the expert's testimony actually conveyed out-of-court statements to the jury “require[d] an inference that was not so obvious as to be correctable as plain error.” Id. at 61.
Similarly here, McCabe suggests that he relied on a variety of sources in forming his opinion as to Lombardozzi's affiliation with organized crime. While the out-of-court statements made by cooperating witnesses and relied upon by McCabe were almost certainly testimonial, and the confidential informants' statements also may have been testimonial, the content of those statements was never revealed to the jury, and there is no indication of the extent to which McCabe relied on them. It is clear, however, that McCabe's opinion as to Lombardozzi's affiliation was fully supported by evidence that can in no way be considered testimonial, specifically, McCabe's personal surveillance of Lombardozzi. A conclusion, therefore, that in opining that Lombardozzi was affiliated with organized crime McCabe was directly conveying to the jury out-of-court testimonial *74 statements—rather than merely applying his expertise to those statements—requires an inference not obvious or egregious enough to be correctable as plain error. See Dukagjini, 326 F.3d at 61; cf. United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654 (6th Cir.2005) (reviewing district court decision de novo, and finding no Confrontation Clause violation where defendants could not “point to any testimony by [the expert] that was not supported by prior in-court witness testimony or by documents properly admitted into evidence”).
In addition to allowing McCabe to testify that Lombardozzi is affiliated with organized crime, however, the district court allowed McCabe to testify that Lombardozzi is a “soldier” in the Gambino crime family, ruling that that evidence was relevant to show that Leung's subjective beliefs about Lombardozzi's debt collection practices were reasonable. Although McCabe's opinion as to Lombardozzi's actual rank in the crime family appears to have been based not on his own observations but on the inadmissible hearsay statements of others, and hence to have been excludable, as we explain below, we conclude that neither the admission of that part of his testimony, nor his testimony that Lombardozzi is affiliated with organized crime, affected Lombardozzi's substantial rights.
ii. The error did not affect Defendant's substantial rights
1415“[A]n error affects a defendant's substantial rights if it is prejudicial and it affected the outcome of the [case].” Dukagjini, 326 F.3d at 61 (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, where “the effect of an error on the result in the district court is uncertain ... indeterminate” or only speculative, we cannot conclude that appellant's substantial rights have been affected. United States v. Williams, 399 F.3d 450, 458 (2d Cir.2005). Here, the government has shown that any effect on the outcome of the decision below is speculative at best.4 McCabe did not offer an opinion as to an ultimate issue or even as to a critical issue in the case. Cf. United States v. Forrester, 60 F.3d 52, 64–65 (2d Cir.1995) (“Error going to the ‘heart’ of a critical issue is less likely to be harmless.”). He merely offered an opinion that Lombardozzi is affiliated with organized crime and a soldier in the Gambino crime family—facts that did not constitute an offense for which Lombardozzi stood trial. In fact, Judge Leisure properly instructed the jury that it need not believe the expert witness, and that Lombardozzi was not on trial for being a member of the Gambino crime family.
Lombardozzi's affiliation with organized crime could be inferred, moreover, from other properly admitted evidence including, inter alia, Leung's statement to an FBI agent that he believed Lombardozzi was connected to organized crime and Leung's direct testimony that Lombardozzi lent him money on behalf of a person Leung knew to be affiliated with organized crime. With respect to McCabe's testimony as to Lombardozzi's specific rank as “soldier,” Leung's subjective beliefs about Lombardozzi's debt collection practices would have been reasonable even if Lombardozzi *75 —known by Leung to be acting on behalf of Marino, a known organized crime figure—were merely affiliated with organized crime. Thus, the effect of the admission of McCabe's testimony on the outcome of the case can only be characterized as uncertain and speculative. See Dukagjini, 326 F.3d at 62 (holding that mere corroborative and cumulative evidence did not affect the jury's verdict and did not therefore affect the defendant's substantial rights).

[TSNYC]

In sum, the admission of McCabe's testimony did not cause the “miscarriage of justice” required under plain error analysis. See Banks, 464 F.3d at 190. Because any Confrontation Clause error resulting from the admission of McCabe's testimony did not affect Lombardozzi's substantial rights, we find it is not correctable as plain error and we need not consider whether Lombardozzi has met the requirements of the fourth prong of plain error analysis.5 Williams, 399 F.3d at 458 (“Because this appellant has not carried his burden as to the third prong of the plain error test, we have no occasion to decide how he would have fared under the fourth prong.”).
3. The Erroneous Admission of Isoldi's Plea Allocution was Harmless
A. The Plea Allocution and Limiting Instruction
The following portion of Isoldi's plea allocution was introduced against Lombardozzi as evidence tending to prove the existence of a conspiracy to use extortionate means to collect on an extension of credit in violation of § 894, charged in Count 9 of the indictment, and Isoldi's role in that conspiracy:
Q: Now, let's turn to Count 9, which charges you with conspiracy to collect extensions of credit by extortionate means on debtor two. Tell me what you did.
A: Again, your Honor, I conspired with others to collect a loan from Mr. Leung and, again, Mr. Leung interpreted my words as a sign of threat.
....
Q: And as part of that agreement, did you do anything? What did you do?
A: Basically, what I did was just call him and speak with him and ask him to pay his debt.
Q: And did you use means that were calculated to create fear in him?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: Fear that there would be physical harm if he didn't pay, correct?
A: Yes.
Q: Let's make that clear, Mr. Isoldi. You agreed with one or more other persons to do what you described to this particular victim, correct?
A: Correct, your Honor.
Q: There was an agreement with others to do what you understand to be an unlawful act?
A: Absolutely, your Honor.
Lombardozzi argues that this evidence constituted the only proof at trial that he had the requisite intent in conspiring to use extortionate means to ensure repayment of Leung's loans, and absent the plea allocution statements, the jury could not *76 have found that he had that state of mind required under § 894. We disagree.
B. Standard of Review
The government concedes that in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford, the district court erred in admitting Isoldi's plea allocution, and that Lombardozzi properly preserved for appellate review the question of whether the plea allocution was admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause. The district court's admission of the plea allocution is thus subject to harmless error review. See United States v. McClain, 377 F.3d 219, 222 (2d Cir.2004) (noting that “t is well established that violations of the Confrontation Clause, if preserved for appellate review, are subject to harmless error review ... and Crawford does not suggest otherwise”).
161718“[A]n otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). Thus, in determining whether an error was harmless, we must, upon a review of the entire record, be satisfied “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of”—in this case the introduction of Isoldi's plea allocution—“did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” McClain, 377 F.3d at 222 (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, to find the erroneous admission of Isoldi's plea allocution harmless “we must be able to conclude that the evidence would have been ‘unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.’ ” United States v. Quiroz, 13 F.3d 505, 513 (2d Cir.1993) (quoting Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991)).
In assessing an error's likely impact on the jury, “the Supreme Court has found the following factors to be relevant ... (1) the overall strength of the prosecution's case; (2) the prosecutor's conduct with respect to the improperly admitted evidence; (3) the importance of the wrongly admitted testimony; and (4) whether such evidence was cumulative of other properly admitted evidence.” Zappulla v. New York, 391 F.3d 462, 468 (2d Cir.2004). The strength of the prosecution's case, however, “is probably the single most critical factor.” United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 87 (2d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the past, this Court has generally found admissions of evidence in violation of Crawford to be harmless only where the remaining admissible evidence was “overwhelming.” See McClain, 377 F.3d at 222.
C. Analysis
1920“The essence of the [conspiracy] offense [under § 894] is that the conspirators entered into a scheme or plan to extort and committed an overt act in furtherance of that scheme or plan.” United States v. Rizzo, 373 F.Supp. 204, 206 (S.D.N.Y.1973). On summation, the government stated:
There can be no doubt that a conspiracy existed because Frank Isoldi pled guilty to being a member of the conspiracy. He pled guilty to agreeing with others to use threats of physical harm to collect from Leung, so to suggest that Lombardozzi was not a member of the conspiracy is absurd, and to suggest that Lombardozzi did not know that extortionate means were going to be used is also absurd. It would cut against all the evidence which you heard.
Although the government asserted in its summation that Isoldi's plea allocution proves both that a conspiracy to extort *77 existed and that Isoldi, as a member of the conspiracy, engaged in activity that meets the definition of extortionate means—two of the elements necessary to support Lombardozzi's conviction on Count 9—a review of the summation as a whole shows that the government placed little emphasis on Isoldi's plea allocution. See Reifler, 446 F.3d at 87. First, early in its summation, the government stressed to the jury that “Leung's testimony is all you need to convict the defendant on all four counts.” Second, the transcript of the government's summation reveals that mention of Isoldi's allocution comprises less than one page of an approximate fifty-page summation. See, e.g., Reifler, 446 F.3d at 88 (mention of erroneously admitted plea allocution comprising one paragraph of a summation totaling more than 110 pages of transcript supports conclusion that admission of allocution was harmless). Finally, when the government did make reference to Isoldi's allocution, it also stated to the jury that Lombardozzi's membership in the conspiracy was supported by “all the evidence which you heard.”
In that regard, the admissible evidence offered by the government to establish the conspiracy charged in Count 9 was overwhelming. At trial, Leung testified that he asked Marino for a loan; Marino introduced him to Lombardozzi; Lombardozzi agreed to provide Leung with the money; and Isoldi delivered to Leung that money, and other moneys subsequently borrowed from Lombardozzi. Leung also testified as to his understanding that Lombardozzi was approving the loans, that his loan payments were ultimately given to Lombardozzi, and that Lombardozzi mentioned the loans and Leung's repayment responsibilities every time he saw him. In addition, recorded conversations reveal, inter alia, Leung expressing concern, as a result of his failure to make timely loan payments, over getting “in trouble” with Billy Scotto—described by Leung as the “muscle” of the group—as well as being visited by Lombardozzi. Thus, Isoldi's plea allocution—allowed as evidence of the existence of an extortionate-collection conspiracy and Isoldi's role in that conspiracy—was entirely cumulative of the government's non-allocution evidence as to both the existence of the conspiracy and Isoldi's membership in it.
Because the government's properly admitted evidence as to Count 9 is “overwhelming,” and the reference it made in summation to the allocution was limited, we hold the admission of Isoldi's plea allocution was harmless error, and we affirm Lombardozzi's conviction on Count 9. See, e.g., Reifler, 446 F.3d at 90 (admission of plea allocutions that bore on two essential elements of a conspiracy charge was harmless error given, inter alia, “the brevity of the government's mention of the plea allocutions, the purely cumulative character of the statements, and the strength of the government's case”).
4. Other Issues
A. Bolstering
2122In addition to Lombardozzi's above-addressed arguments that the admission of McCabe's expert testimony was error, Lombardozzi argues that McCabe's testimony was improperly used to bolster the testimony of other fact witnesses. Noting that “[t]he decision whether to admit expert testimony under Fed.R.Evid. 702 is ... left to the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be set aside unless the ruling was manifestly erroneous,” United States v. Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410, 425 (2d Cir.1991) (internal quotation marks omitted), we hold that Lombardozzi's argument is without merit.
2324Expert testimony may not be used to bolster the credibility of fact witnesses. *78 See United States v. Cruz, 981 F.2d 659, 662–63 (2d Cir.1992) (citing United States v. Castillo, 924 F.2d 1227, 1231 (2d Cir.1991)). It is well established, however, that expert testimony may be admitted “to help explain the operation, structure, membership, and terminology of organized crime families” such as the Gambino family. United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 936 (2d Cir.1993). This Court has also permitted expert testimony regarding the organization and structure of organized crime families in prosecutions brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) where proof of an ongoing racketeering enterprise is required. See, e.g., United States v. Amuso, 21 F.3d 1251, 1263–64 (2d Cir.1994). Although such expert testimony is not limited to RICO cases, it has been “carefully circumscribed ... to occasions where the subject matter of the testimony is beyond the ken of the average juror.” Castillo, 924 F.2d at 1232. This is one such case. For instance, McCabe described the particular roles played by organized crime family members, thereby giving the jury insight that it might not otherwise have. See Amuso, 21 F.3d at 1264 (noting that “the operational methods of organized crime families are still beyond the knowledge of the average citizen”). McCabe's testimony also put into context Lombardozzi's argument that he was unaware that Isoldi was loaning money to Leung. Cf. Headley v. Tilghman, 53 F.3d 472, 475 (2d Cir.1995) (“Where the accused's defense is that he was on the scene but unaware of any drug transaction, we have held that expert testimony may be introduced to explain the defendant's role in the transaction.”). Finally, McCabe's testimony did not “ask the jury to infer [Appellant's] guilt from the conduct of unrelated individuals.” Id. at 476. Rather, it merely provided a means by which the jury could understand Lombardozzi's role in the crimes charged; the other evidence was sufficient to link Appellant to the extortionate loan. Thus, the admission of McCabe's testimony was not manifestly erroneous.
B. Evidence of prior bad acts
25262728Lombardozzi also challenges the district court's admission of evidence related to prior extortionate loans. In particular, he argues, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony of Peter Perrotta and Ronald Massie, Isoldi's loansharking customer and associate respectively. In relevant part, Rule 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). This Court reviews “404(b) evidence under an ‘inclusionary approach’ and allows evidence ‘for any purpose other than to show a defendant's criminal propensity.’ ” United States v. Garcia, 291 F.3d 127, 136 (2d Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. Pitre, 960 F.2d 1112, 1118 (2d Cir.1992)). “To determine if the court properly admitted prior act evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b), we consider whether: (1) the prior act evidence was offered for a proper purpose; (2) the evidence was relevant to a disputed issue; (3) the probative value of the prior act evidence substantially outweighed the danger of its unfair prejudice; and (4) the court administered an appropriate limiting instruction.” Garcia, 291 F.3d at 136. A district court's decision to admit evidence of prior bad acts is reviewed for abuse of *79 discretion, which we will find only if the judge acted in an arbitrary and irrational manner. Id.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the government to introduce the testimony of Perrotta and Massie. Here, Lombardozzi attempted to distance himself from Isoldi by asserting that he was not involved with Isoldi's loans to Leung. Perrotta's and Massie's testimony establishing similar acts of extortion that Lombardozzi committed with Isoldi in the past, however, directly contradicted that assertion, and thus is both relevant and highly probative. Furthermore, the district court issued a proper limiting instruction. It instructed the jury that it “may not consider the evidence of the similar conduct as a substitute for [proof] that the defendant committed the crime charged” and was to consider the evidence only as proof of Lombardozzi's intent, absence of mistake, and identity. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the government to present evidence of prior bad acts.
C. Grand jury testimony
29Finally, Lombardozzi contends that his indictment should be dismissed because Agent Bryceland misled the grand jury into believing that Leung feared for his safety and that his fear was based on an interaction with Isoldi. In support of his argument, Lombardozzi points to Agent Bryceland's grand jury testimony that Leung “understood that if he didn't make his payment, physical harm would come to him” and “the basis of [Leung's] concern was the conversations [Leung] had with Mr. Isoldi.” Lombardozzi asserts that no proof was offered at trial in support of Agent Bryceland's grand jury testimony on this point, and argues that this lack of proof, coupled with Leung's trial testimony that he continued to make loan payments because it was only “fair,” demonstrates that Agent Bryceland misled the grand jury.
303132“[D]ismissal of an indictment following a conviction is an ‘extraordinary’ remedy.” United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1182 (2d Cir.1989). Indeed, “to warrant dismissal of an indictment after a conviction, ‘the prosecutor's conduct [must] amount[ ] to a knowing or reckless misleading of the grand jury as to an essential fact.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Bari, 750 F.2d 1169, 1176 (2d Cir.1984)). In addition, the mere fact that evidence presented to the grand jury was unreliable, misleading, or inaccurate, is not sufficient to require dismissal of an indictment. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 260–61, 108 S.Ct. 2369, 101 L.Ed.2d 228 (1988). Here, there is no basis to conclude that Agent Bryceland knowingly or recklessly misled the grand jury. At trial, Agent Bryceland testified that in February of 2001 Leung said “that he [was] concerned about his safety due to the type of people that he believes Mr. Isoldi and Mr. Scotto are” and that he felt “ ‘they would do harm to him personally or to his restaurant if he did not make timely payments.’ ” This testimony was based on Agent Bryceland's memorandum of a conversation he had with Leung that had been admitted into evidence. Agent Bryceland's testimony at trial regarding Leung's state of mind was, therefore, substantially consistent with his testimony before the grand jury.
33Even if the grand jury were misled into believing that Agent Bryceland had evidence that Leung's fear was based on a specific interaction with Isoldi, Lombardozzi has not shown that such misleading was reckless or intentional or anything more than Agent Bryceland's simple inability to remember accurately all of the details of a conversation he had with *80 Leung some two years before his grand jury testimony. In addition, the fact that Agent Bryceland's testimony before the grand jury was at odds with Leung's trial testimony in no way proves that Agent Bryceland's grand jury testimony was false. Finally, even if we were to find that the grand jury indictment was defective, all of the discrepancies between Agent Bryceland's grand jury testimony and the evidence at trial were submitted to the petit jury which found Lombardozzi guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It is well settled that a guilty verdict at trial “remedies any possible defects in the grand jury indictment.” United States v. Eltayib, 88 F.3d 157, 173 (2d Cir.1996) (citing United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72–73, 106 S.Ct. 938, 89 L.Ed.2d 50 (1986)).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Lombardozzi has moved for a remand to the District Court for reconsideration of his sentence pursuant to United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir.2005). The case is hereby remanded for that purpose unless Lombardozzi now withdraws his motion for remand or, within ten days of the issuance of the mandate in this appeal, Lombardozzi informs the District Court that he no longer wishes to have his sentence reconsidered.
All Citations

491 F.3d 61
Footnotes
1
This Circuit has not yet ruled on whether a debtor's state of mind is an element of conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 892. Other Circuits that have addressed the issue have held that the debtor's state of mind is irrelevant. See, e.g., United States v. Nakaladski, 481 F.2d 289, 297 (5th Cir.1973) (“In order to convict appellants of conspiring to make an extortionate extension of credit, it [is] necessary for the government to prove only that appellants had planned and intended that [the debtor] would understand the possibility that harmful consequences could be attendant upon his default or delinquency.”); United States v. Annoreno, 460 F.2d 1303, 1309 n. 7 (7th Cir.1972) (noting that because the defendants were charged under § 892 with conspiring to make extortionate loans, not with the substantive violations, “the actual understanding of specific borrowers was not an element of the conspiracy with which defendants were charged. The government need only have proved that the defendants planned and intended that those to whom they extended credit would understand the possible harmful consequences of default or delinquency”). Here, the district court instructed the jury that the victim's state of mind was relevant, and the jury nonetheless convicted Lombardozzi under this heightened standard. Because it is clear that under either standard the evidence here is sufficient to support Lombardozzi's conspiracy conviction under § 892, we need not reach the issue.
2
In weighing Leung's testimony, a jury could reasonably infer that because Leung feared retribution, he minimized the extent of his fear when he testified. See United States v. DeLutro, 435 F.2d 255, 257 (2d Cir.1970) (approving such an inference and noting that a jury is free to use common sense); see also United States v. Chen, 378 F.3d 151, 162 (2d Cir.2004) (noting that the jury is free to disbelieve a witness's denials); but see United States v. Zimmitti, 850 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir.1988) (noting that “[t]he government [is] not entitled to prove that the defendants made threats to [the victim] simply by putting [the victim] on the stand, allowing him to indicate that no threats were made, and asking the jury to disbelieve that testimony”).
3
Lombardozzi's other objection to the admission of McCabe's expert testimony is addressed in this opinion in section 4.A., infra.
4
When the source of plain error is a supervening decision, we have employed a modified plain error standard whereby the government bears the burden of proving that the error did not affect the defendant's substantial rights. We need not decide whether the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson, 520 U.S. 461, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718, requires that we place the burden on the defendant in such cases because we find the error did not affect the defendant's substantial rights even under our more lenient standard. See Banks, 464 F.3d at 189 n. 1.
5
Lombardozzi argues alternatively that the district court's admission of McCabe's testimony was error because his testimony is based on inadmissible hearsay. Because Lombardozzi failed to object below, we review for plain error and hold, for the same reasons articulated in our disposition of Lombardozzi's Confrontation Clause argument, that the district court's admission of McCabe's testimony, if error, was not plain error because it did not affect Lombardozzi's substantial rights., Defendant–Appellant.
Docket No. 04–0380–cr.
Argued: Nov. 30, 2004.
Decided: July 11, 2007.
Synopsis
Background: Defendant was convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Peter K. Leisure, J., of conspiring to make and making an extortionate extension of credit and conspiring to use extortionate means to collect an extension of credit. Defendant appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Hall, Circuit Judge, held that:
1 evidence was sufficient to establish victim's requisite state of mind;
2 evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's requisite state of mind;
3 any Confrontation Clause error resulting from admission of expert testimony did not affect defendant's substantial rights;
4 admission of co-conspirator's plea allocution was harmless error;
5 prior bad acts testimony was admissible; and
6 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent did not knowingly or recklessly mislead grand jury in his testimony.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes (33)
Expand West Headnotes
Attorneys and Law Firms

*65 Alan S. Futerfas, New York, NY, for Appellant.
Adam B. Siegel, Assistant United States Attorney, (David N. Kelley, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Diane Gujarati, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), New York, NY, for Appellee.
Before: KEARSE, SACK, and HALL, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
HALL, Circuit Judge:
Appellant George Lombardozzi was charged in four counts of a 19–count indictment. Count 7 charged him with conspiring to make an extortionate extension of credit in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 892; Count 8 charged him with the substantive offense of making an extortionate extension of credit in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 892; Count 9 charged him with conspiring to use extortionate means to collect on an extension of credit in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 894; and Count 10 charged him with using extortionate means to collect on an extension of credit in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 894. The four charges all stemmed from loans amounting to approximately $100,000 that Lombardozzi made in 1998 and 1999. A jury convicted Lombardozzi of three of the four charged offenses. They acquitted him of Count 10, the substantive offense of using extortionate means to collect on an extension of credit. His conviction was based in part on evidence *66 presented in the form of a co-defendant's plea allocution. Following the trial, the United States Supreme Court decided Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), holding that in order for testimonial evidence such as a plea allocution to be admissible against a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause requires the unavailability of the witness and a prior opportunity for cross-examination of the witness by the defendant. Id. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354.
Lombardozzi raises a number of challenges to his conviction. He argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction; that the admission of his co-conspirator's plea allocution violated his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights; that the district court improperly admitted expert testimony and evidence of prior bad acts; and that the government presented perjured testimony to the grand jury.
For the reasons set forth below, the judgment of the district court (Leisure, J.) is affirmed.
Background
Lombardozzi, an alleged member of the Gambino La Cosa Nostra Crime Family, first met Henry Leung in 1994 at a restaurant that Leung managed in Manhattan. Leung was planning to open a new restaurant and needed a loan to be able to do so. One of Leung's frequent customers was Daniel Marino, whom Leung knew was engaged in racketeering and loansharking or, as Leung described him, a “wiseguy .... involved with the mob.” Leung asked Marino for a $50,000 loan. In response, Marino introduced Leung to Lombardozzi who agreed to provide him with the loan. Leung was told that Lombardozzi was the guy who “takes care of the money.” Frank Isoldi, another member of “Marino's group” and Lombardozzi's co-defendant, subsequently met Leung in the restaurant's wine cellar and gave him a brown paper bag containing $50,000 in cash. Thereafter, Leung made repayments to William Scotto, whom he described as the “muscle” for the group. The loan was eventually paid off and is not the subject of the current indictment.
In 1998, Leung sought an additional $20,000 loan from Marino's group. Because Marino was incarcerated, Lombardozzi and Isoldi agreed to loan Leung the money. Again, in the wine cellar of Leung's restaurant, Isoldi delivered to Leung a paper bag containing the money. The terms of the loan originally required repayment in the amount of $1,500 per month for two years, but Scotto subsequently informed Leung that “the old man”—whom Leung understood to mean Lombardozzi—had changed the terms and increased the payments to $2,500 per month for two years.
Shortly thereafter, Leung again borrowed money from Lombardozzi and Isoldi, this time for both himself and his friend Michael Wong. He originally asked for $25,000 ($20,000 for Wong and $5,000 for himself), but the principal amount of the loan eventually ballooned to $100,000. Leung was required to pay two points, or two percent, interest each week (104% per year), which amounted to $2,000 per week in interest in addition to the $100,000 principal.
Given the exorbitant payments required, Leung had to borrow money from other loansharks just to pay his debt to Lombardozzi in a timely manner. The interest on the additional loans was 250%—more than twice what he was paying Lombardozzi. In addition, Leung sold many of his personal possessions, moved to a less expensive residence, and borrowed money from friends. Eventually, Leung was able to *67 renegotiate the terms of the loans with the other loansharks, although he never sought to do so with Lombardozzi.
The FBI approached Leung in early 2001 seeking information about his dealings with Lombardozzi, but Leung denied knowing him. Leung told Isoldi and Scotto about the FBI's inquiry, and they gave him the phone number of a lawyer. Despite the inquiry, the collections continued until Lombardozzi was arrested in May 2002.
In September 2002, Isoldi pleaded guilty to Count 9 of the indictment, under which he was charged as a co-defendant of Lombardozzi with conspiring to use extortionate means to collect on the extension of credit made to Leung. In connection with his Rule 11 guilty plea proceedings, in response to Judge Leisure's questioning, Isoldi allocuted to the relevant facts underlying that charge. Then, prior to the commencement of Lombardozzi's trial in April 2003, the district court granted a motion in limine allowing the government to introduce a redacted version of Isoldi's plea allocution as evidence against Lombardozzi. Judge Leisure instructed the jury that it was to consider the redacted plea allocution only as evidence of the existence of the conspiracy charged in Count 9 of the indictment and the nature of Isoldi's role in that conspiracy. Following a nine-day trial, in which the government's evidence against Lombardozzi consisted of, inter alia, Isoldi's plea allocution, intercepted telephone calls, Leung's testimony, and expert testimony, the jury convicted Lombardozzi on Counts 7, 8, and 9. It acquitted him of the substantive offense of using extortionate means to collect on an extension of credit (Count 10). The district court sentenced Lombardozzi principally to 41 months' imprisonment, the lowest sentence possible within the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range.
Discussion
1. The Government Presented Sufficient Evidence at Trial
A. Standard of Review
Lombardozzi challenges the sufficiency of the government's evidence with respect to two elements of the crimes for which he was convicted. The first is the victim Leung's understanding that the loans he received were extortionate, an essential element for conviction under § 892. The second is Lombardozzi's own state of mind with respect to the extortionate nature of the loans and their collection, an essential element for conviction under both §§ 892 and 894.
123“As we have repeatedly observed, a defendant raising an appellate challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction faces a ‘heavy burden,’ because we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor.” United States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438, 459 (2d Cir.2004). This deferential standard “is especially important when reviewing a conviction of conspiracy .... because a conspiracy by its very nature is a secretive operation, and it is a rare case ‘where all aspects of a conspiracy can be laid bare in court with the precision of a surgeon's scalpel.’ ” United States v. Pitre, 960 F.2d 1112, 1121 (2d Cir.1992) (quoting United States v. Provenzano, 615 F.2d 37, 45 (2d Cir.1980)). “Reversal is warranted only if no rational factfinder could have found the crimes charged proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Gaskin, 364 F.3d at 459–60.
B. Statutes Under Which Lombardozzi Was Convicted
4Lombardozzi was convicted of conspiring to make and making extortionate *68 extensions of credit in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 892 and conspiring to use extortionate means to collect on an extension of credit in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 894. Section 892(a) prohibits “mak[ing] any extortionate extension of credit, or conspir[ing] to do so.” An “extortionate extension of credit” is defined as “any extension of credit with respect to which it is the understanding of the creditor and the debtor at the time it is made that delay in making repayment or failure to make repayment could result in the use of violence or other criminal means to cause harm to the person, reputation, or property of any person.” 18 U.S.C. § 891(6) (emphasis added). The states of mind of the defendant and the debtor are, therefore, both essential elements of the crime of making extortionate extensions of credit under § 892.1 See United States v. Allen, 127 F.3d 260, 266 (2d Cir.1997) ( “Crucial to conviction under this statute is proof that both the creditor and the debtor understood when the loan was made that force could be used to collect the loan at issue.”); United States v. Natale, 526 F.2d 1160, 1168 n. 10 (2d Cir.1975) (noting that unlike 18 U.S.C. § 894, “the state of mind of the victim [is] an essential element of [§ 892] to be proved by the Government”). Section 892(b) further provides that the government can establish prima facie evidence that a loan was extortionate if it can show: (1) the repayment of the loan would be unenforceable through civil judicial process against the debtor, (2) the loan had an annual interest rate in excess of 45 percent, and (3) “[a]t the time the extension of credit was made, the debtor reasonably believed that ... the creditor had a reputation for the use of extortionate means to collect extensions of credit or to punish the nonrepayment thereof.” 18 U.S.C. § 892(b).
56Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 894(a) prohibits “knowingly participat[ing] in any way, or conspir[ing] to do so, in the use of any extortionate means (1) to collect or attempt to collect any extension of credit, or (2) to punish any person for the nonrepayment thereof.” “[E]xtortionate means” is defined as “any means which involves the use, or an express or implicit threat of use, of violence or other criminal means to cause harm to the person, reputation, or property of any person.” 18 U.S.C. § 891(7). Unlike § 892, proof of a victim borrower's state of mind is not an element of this offense. See Natale, 526 F.2d at 1168 (noting that “it is the conduct of the defendant, not the victim's individual state of mind, to which the thrust of [§ 894] is directed”). With regard to the defendant's *69 state of mind, the government must prove that he intended by his conduct to instill fear of harm in the victim borrower. See United States v. Sears, 544 F.2d 585, 588 (2d Cir.1976).
C. Whether the Evidence Was Sufficient to Prove Leung's State of Mind
78Lombardozzi argues that the government's evidence was insufficient to prove Leung's requisite state of mind. We disagree. “[T]he inquiry [into the victim borrower's state of mind] should be whether the record as a whole discloses a reasonable basis upon which the borrower[ ] might have predicated [his] fear that default or delinquency might result in harm to [himself] or [his] famil[y].” Annoreno, 460 F.2d at 1309. A finding that the record discloses such a reasonable basis does not necessarily depend on evidence of explicit threats made by the creditor, and the victim borrower's requisite state of mind can be inferred. See, e.g., id. (“Our review of the record compels the conclusion that the nature of these transactions, in which oral, unsecured loans were made at rates of interest often 30 times the commercial rates with provision for nefarious repayment at such places as street corners, taverns, pool halls and closed barber shops, would inform the average borrower ... that the loans were extortionate in nature.”). In our analysis, the component of our standard of review that requires us to draw all reasonable inferences in the government's favor is significant because even though Leung did not testify as to any specific threats or discuss his state of mind in detail, his state of mind can be inferred from the evidence offered at trial.
First, the jury could infer from several portions of Leung's trial testimony his understanding that violence or criminal harm would result if he defaulted on his loans. Leung testified that he was introduced to Lombardozzi through Marino, someone he knew was a “wiseguy .... involved with the mob,” who engaged in racketeering and loansharking. See United States v. Madori, 419 F.3d 159, 169 (2d Cir.2005) (upholding the admission of evidence that the debtor believed the creditor was “connected to organized crime ... to show the debtor's belief that the [creditor] would use, or had a reputation for using, extortionate means to collect extensions of credit” (citing United States v. Gigante, 729 F.2d 78, 83 (2d Cir.1984))). Regarding the loans he took out on behalf of his friend Wong, Leung testified that he sought money from other sources in order to repay the loans “ecause when the time come[s], the day to collect, I have got to have the money ready, because they are not going after [Wong], they are going after me.” With regard to making payments in general, moreover, Leung testified that he was “very nervous ... because every morning when I wake up, it's this money, that money. And I have a business, I cannot run away, and I don't want anything to happen to the business.” In describing a telephone conversation with Isoldi about making payments, Leung explained that in telling Isoldi “f you can help me with that, I would be deeply appreciat[ive],” he meant that he wanted Isoldi to hold off Lombardozzi. Indeed, he testified that “I just don't want them to do anything, you know—you know, I'm a little scared, so that's why I'm just telling him to hold off, hold off [Lombardozzi].” Finally, on cross examination, Leung testified that when he was having trouble making payments, Lombardozzi told him that he had “better take care of it.” Although this statement does not necessarily rise to the level of an explicit threat, it at least permits the inference of an implied threat from which Leung's fear of harm can be reasonably inferred. See *70 Madori, 419 F.3d at 169 (upholding the admission of evidence of veiled threats to prove the victim borrower's state of mind) (citing Gigante, 729 F.2d at 83).
Leung's understanding that extortionate means would be used to collect on any default can also reasonably be inferred from his testimony regarding the terms of the loan, i.e., 104% interest, the delivery of the money in a paper bag in Leung's wine cellar, and his statement to FBI Agent Christopher Bryceland that Isoldi acted as a “runner” for Lombardozzi (giving Leung the actual cash and collecting payments on Lombardozzi's behalf). See Annoreno, 460 F.2d at 1309. Leung also testified that he sold his assets, sought loans from friends, and borrowed money from other loansharks at interest rates of more than 250% in order to repay his loan to Lombardozzi on time, all evidence from which the jury could permissibly infer that Leung feared the consequences of non-payment.
Finally, the testimony of Agent Bryceland and tape-recorded conversations between Isoldi and Leung constitute additional evidence from which the jury could infer Leung's understanding that delays in making payments could result in violence or other criminal harm. Specifically, Agent Bryceland testified that Leung told him that Leung believed Lombardozzi was involved with organized crime and that he would be dead if he talked to the FBI. Leung also informed Agent Bryceland that he was concerned for his safety and that Isoldi and another associate “have muscle and ... would do harm to him personally or to his restaurant if he did not make timely payments.” In a telling exchange with Agent Bryceland, Leung initially denied knowing either Lombardozzi or Isoldi and lied about the loans, likely out of fear for his own safety, and from the taped conversations in evidence, the jury could infer that Leung was scared and nervous. See, e.g., United States v. Wills, 346 F.3d 476, 499 (4th Cir.2003) (noting that it is reasonable for a jury to conclude, based on recorded conversations, that the victim was in fear).2
Based on the foregoing proof and reasonable inferences that could be drawn from it, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Leung understood that delay or default in making repayment could result in violence or other criminal harm.
D. Whether the Evidence Was Sufficient to Prove Lombardozzi's State of Mind
9With respect to Lombardozzi's state of mind, under § 892 the government had to prove that at the time Lombardozzi caused the loan to be made to Leung, Lombardozzi had an understanding that if Leung delayed in making, or failed to make, repayment, Leung could be harmed. Under § 894 the focus is on the defendant's actions and intentions with respect to the collection activity. The government had to establish that, in collecting the loans, Lombardozzi intended, as the result of his actions, to cause Leung to fear he would suffer harm to his person, reputation, *71 or property. Lombardozzi argues that the government did not provide evidence sufficient to prove that he had the required state of mind. We disagree.
Lombardozzi's state of mind, much like Leung's, can reasonably be inferred from the terms of the loans that he extended. Indeed, a jury may permissibly infer that someone who makes an unsecured loan and charges exorbitant interest rates surely intends to back up the loan with threats of violence. See United States v. Polizzi, 801 F.2d 1543, 1555 (9th Cir.1986) (“The jury could reasonably have concluded that [the] evidence proved that [defendant] knew [the victim] was paying an extortionate rate of interest on his debt and that [defendant] must therefore have known that the debt could have been secured only by threats of violence or harm to [the victim].”). Given the context of an unsecured loan at an exorbitant interest rate, a jury could also infer from Lombardozzi's own statements his intent to back up the loan with threats of violence. For instance, he told Leung to “keep up what [he was] doing” when Leung made payments, which Leung understood to mean “make the payments on time, be a good boy.” Further, when Leung started having trouble making payments, Lombardozzi told him that he had “better take care of it.” It is reasonable for a jury to infer that these statements were threatening in nature, if not direct threats themselves. In addition, those statements permitted the inference that Lombardozzi not only understood the extortionate nature of the loan, which is the state of mind required under § 892, but that he intended to instill fear in Leung, which is the state of mind required under § 894. While those statements were not made contemporaneously with the making of the loans, they nonetheless did provide evidence as to Lombardozzi's state of mind regarding their repayment. See United States v. Lamattina, 889 F.2d 1191, 1193 (1st Cir.1989) (“Although these threats were made after the time of the loans, they may still shed light on appellant's intentions when he made the loans. Surely, this evidence is more than sufficient to reasonably infer the requisite ‘understanding.’ ”).
Taped conversations between Leung and Isoldi also shed light on Lombardozzi's state of mind. The jury was entitled to infer from those conversations that Leung was afraid; that Isoldi, as a coconspirator, was speaking for Lombardozzi; and that instilling such fear was Lombardozzi's intent. For example, in one such conversation, occurring at a time when Leung was having trouble making payments, Isoldi told him “I think I'm going to have to make an appointment for you to see [Lombardozzi] in person, because it's going to get out of hand.” Isoldi also threatened to bring Lombardozzi to the restaurant if Leung did not make his payments. Peter Perrotta, Isoldi's associate, corroborated the details of the conversations. Perrotta testified that “[Isoldi] seemed very animated that [Leung] wasn't ready to see [Lombardozzi], and basically said that [Lombardozzi] wasn't going to be happy, and that he doesn't want to have to send [Scotto].” From this evidence, a jury could reasonably infer that Lombardozzi intended to harm Leung if he did not pay, or at the very least that he intended Leung to fear harm, particularly considering the suggestion of sending Scotto—the group's “muscle”—to see him.
E. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, there is sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that the government proved the requisite states of mind for Leung and Lombardozzi so as to sustain Lombardozzi's convictions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 892 and 894.
*72 2. The Admission of Kenneth McCabe's Expert Testimony was not Plain Error
A. The Expert Testimony of Kenneth McCabe
The government called Kenneth McCabe, a criminal investigator for the United States Attorney's office for the Southern District of New York, as an expert who testified as to, inter alia, the general structure of La Cosa Nostra in New York and Lombardozzi's affiliation with organized crime. On direct examination McCabe was asked whether he had an opinion as to whether Lombardozzi is affiliated with organized crime. McCabe answered, “Yes. George Lombardozzi is a soldier in the Gambino crime family.” Earlier in his testimony, in describing the general structure of organized crime, McCabe stated that “soldiers” are also known as “made” members. On cross-examination McCabe testified that his opinion regarding Lombardozzi's affiliation with organized crime was based on conversations with cooperating witnesses and confidential informants, but added that he personally observed Lombardozzi's activities approximately two dozen times since 1985. McCabe testified that during his surveillance he witnessed Lombardozzi having conversations with known organized crime figures and frequenting social clubs which McCabe identified as “meeting place[s] for organized crime members to socialize and commit planned crimes, collect monies.” Lombardozzi failed to object to the admission of McCabe's testimony on Confrontation Clause grounds at trial.
Lombardozzi now argues on appeal that the admission of McCabe's expert testimony was improper under, inter alia,3 the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment because McCabe's opinion, in effect, directly conveyed to the jury out-of-court testimonial statements of confidential informants and cooperating witnesses whom Lombardozzi never had an opportunity to cross-examine. In Crawford, the Supreme Court stated that the Confrontation Clause “does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.” 541 U.S. 36, 60 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177. In light of that statement in Crawford and this Court's previous determination that it is permissible for an expert witness to form an opinion by applying her expertise to otherwise inadmissible evidence because, in that limited instance, the evidence is not being presented for the truth of the matter asserted, see United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 57–58 (2d Cir.2003), the admission of McCabe's testimony was error only if he communicated out-of-court testimonial statements of cooperating witnesses and confidential informants directly to the jury in the guise of an expert opinion. While the record indicates that may have been the case, and admission of McCabe's testimony, therefore, may have constituted error, we hold it did not rise to the level of reversible plain error because it did not affect Lombardozzi's substantial rights.

[Uforeality]

So Pandrella is going with the argument that he didn't steal the money so he had no reason to kill his friend. That video is a big deal tho. Pandrella is looking at a long time in prison.

[Dave65827]

He’s gonna die in the can