National Convention & Commission v. Assemblea Generale, Gran Consiglio & Capo dei Capi
Hey folks, this is a long one! I am fairly new here, so hope this is the right way to post somethimg like this. I would love any feeback or thoughts!
In various episodes of the Mob Archeologists podcast, the gang has discussed the pre-Commission governing bodies of the American Mafia – the Capo dei Capi (Boss of Bosses), the Gran Consiglio (Grand Council) and the Assemblea Generale (General Assembly). This often involves reference to the later governing Commission, formed in 1931, by way of comparison. In particular, the first half hour of the episode examining the 1908 Morello-Dispenza letter was spent discussing the references in the first paragraph to the Assembly and the Council, and it was in response to this that I wrote this article. Hence, this article references this podcast episode on occasion.
As well as considering information from member sources to examine what these bodies might be, I think it may also offer some pointers to consider what these terms tend to mean more broadly in the realm of governance and political science, where arguably they fit a pretty standard template of parliamentary government. As noted in the podcast, these mafia bodies were not created in a vacuum, but borrowed from the representative bodies of early unification Italy. Neither were the representative bodies of post-unification Italy created in a vacuum, themselves fitting within a broader rough template. Additionally, I have been looking at how Joe Bonanno in his memoir defined the roles of the Capo dei Capi/Capo Consiglieri, and the later institutions of both the Commission and what he referred to as the National Convention/National Meeting, to see if his descriptions may match this broad somewhat standard governmental template.
Note – this is simply a draft, not a final piece of work to publication standard. It does not have the full range of sources such a work would require. Notably, it lacks any reference to Gentile. Though I am trying to source one, I do not have a translation of his Vita de Capo Mafia.
General Assembly & Grand Council: General Political Usage
When looking at any set of governmental institutions, it is helpful to consider where within these institutions the core constitutional competencies of executive, legislative and judicial authority reside. In this regard, General Assembly and some form of Council are fairly common terms or formats for governmental bodies. Typically, though I can’t say always, a General Assembly would be a gathering of the entirety of an institution and would have legislative authority. Often, an associated Council would be made up of a smaller group and would have executive and administrative function. The Assembly creates laws, the Council executes them (or puts them into practice).
The Collins Dictionary defines an Assembly as “a large group of people who meet regularly to make decisions or laws for a particular region or country.” The Merriem-Webster Dictionary defines a General Assembly as “a legislative assembly”, and notes that the term is first recorded in this context in 1550. Thesaurus.com gives, inter alia, “parliament” and “congress” as synonyms for General Assembly, both of which are common terms for legislative bodies. One dictionary source (I can find it again if necessary) showed the use of the term General Assembly to increase heavily in about 1800, and continue in use at this higher rate until the present day. So it fits for the time period in which the mafia would likely have created this body. I did check if either the Bourbon Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, or the Kingdom of Italy formed in 1860, used the term General Assembly for their legislatures. It seems, however, that they both used the term Parliament. Nevertheless, these parliaments could have been described generically as general or legislative assemblies.
Tony suggested at 18:00 that maybe the General Assembly voted for things, like who would have seats on the Grand Consiglio. Voting for who would hold executive power, and therefore who will sit on an executive council, is certainly something legislative assemblies do sometimes do. For example, in the UK government, Parliament (the legislative assembly) votes for which of its members will become Prime Minister (the Chief Executive), who then appoints an executive Cabinet from among the members of the legislature. Though Cabinet is not the same term as Council, the Cabinet is in fact a committee of the Privy Council, meaning the Private Council of the King (who historically was the Chief Executive). Therefore, Cabinet members are in fact Privy Counsellors. So we have an example where the general assembly (Parliament) votes for one of its members as chief executive (Prime Minister, e.g. Boss of all Ministers) and for other of its members to sit on an executive council (the Cabinet). I believe similar processes occur in other Parliamentary systems (as distinct from Presidential systems where there is more separation between legislature and executive), so it might be worth looking at the late Bourbon or early Italian systems? Or at the regional level at these times? As you guys noted in your shows, these mafia bodies seem to borrow from the representative institutions implemented in early post-unification Italy.
Rick suggested at about 5:00 that the Grand Council/Gran Consiglio may have had an advisory capacity. This may well have been the case, though as I noted, often a Council in this context would have some kind of executive authority. These two concepts may be reconciled when one considers that in a Parliamentary system, ultimate executive authority rests with the Prime Minister, who is advised by his Cabinet (his council). The Prime Minister delegates authority over specific areas of policy to his different cabinet/council members, who therefore have an executive role, but ultimately it is the chief executive who can say yes or no, and can overrule his advisors on the council (the same actually applies to the US President and his cabinet - Secretary of State, Attorney General, etc.). It must be noted, however, that sometimes, particularly in unusual quasi-governmental institutions, these terms may be used but they may not directly match the standard Legislative v Executive model. For example, the main deliberative bodies of the United Nations are called the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council, matching the terminology. But, as the UN is not exactly a governmental body with a standard governmental remit, these chambers do not quite match the norm. Therefore, despite their form and names, we cannot definitively assume that the early mafia bodies matched this standard constitutional format. Nevertheless, if one was to draw a parallel between this largely standard constitutional framework and the early mafia bodies, this could suggest that maybe the Capo dei Capi was the chief executive, the Gran Consiglio was his advisory cabinet, and one or both of these positions were elected by the General Assembly?
Joe Bonanno on the Mafia’s Constitutional Bodies
Executive Power? Capo dei Capi, Gran Consiglio, Commission
NOTE – all page number references to Joe Bonanno’s memoir, A Man of Honor, are to the linked PDF version on pdfdrive.com, which has no printed page numbers, rather than to the printed book.
At this point it will be useful to examine the function of the overarching mafia institutions as described by Joe Bonanno. With regard to the possible executive and administrative function of the pre-Commission Gran Consiglio and Capo dei Capi, Bonanno does not reference the Gran Consiglio, but he does discuss what he calls the Capo Consigliere [Memoir pp.121-122]. He explicitly rejects the title Boss of Bosses (Capo dei Capi) and the notion of executive power, stating that, “A capo consigliere is not an executive or an administrator.” He defines the Capo Consigliere as “a head counselor [sic], a chief adviser”.
At 12:15 in the video, Tony says that the Commission is likely an extension of the Gran Consiglio but they just got rid of the Capo dei Capi/Capo Consigliere role. If we take this to be the case, Bonanno also discusses the function of the Commission extensively, so this may give us some idea of the role of the Gran Consiglio and Capo Consigliere. Bonanno states [Memoir p.157] that “The Commission would have influence but no direct executive power”, thereby rejecting the notion of executive authority for the Commission as well as the old Capo Consigliere. He goes on to state that “More than anything else, the Commission was a forum. […] Families did not give up their independence; they were free to do what they wanted. The Commission could only exert influence.”
If, then, we were to take Bonanno’s word at face value, we would have to believe that the Gran Consiglio, the Capo dei Capi/Capo Consigliere, and later the Commission, had no executive authority at all. These were merely advisory bodies “at the disposal of” entirely sovereign families. However, we should consider; what were the motivations of Bonanno in writing this?
In his memoir, Bonanno was clearly building a political and “legal” case (meaning a case in Cosa Nostra law, rather than the law of the United States), as well as a public relations message for the general public, in relation to two specific major points of his mafia career. 1) Supporting the dissident faction against Capo dei Capi Joseph Masseria in the Castellemarrese War; and 2) his own guilty judgment and removal from office by the Commission in the mid-1960s (though he avoids saying the latter actually occurred). In both instances, it is in his interests to present an interpretation of Cosa Nostra law and precedent that argues that these bodies had no officially sanctioned executive authority. Thereby, he is able to argue that “Some leaders, such as Masseria, decide they can impose themselves by force. […] We call such leaders tyrants, and consider their ascension to power illegitimate. [p.122]” He can present himself as acting lawfully and justly, stating that “the Castellammarese War was a war of liberation for all.” Regarding the 1960s, he is able to argue that “I shouldn’t have to justify myself to the Commission and certainly not in matters concerning only my Family [Memoir, p.252].” Though he never actually says the Commission deposed him in so many words, he has built the case that they had no authority to do so.
As such, while Bonanno is an important source, we should bear in mind his motivation, and compare to other sources. Even he himself in the same book says some things which indicate that the Commission may have had some executive authority over individual families in certain circumstances. He states that, at least until 1961, the Commission had been “a legitimate regulatory body” [Memoir, p.290]. A regulatory body has to have some enforceable authority over those it regulates, or it is not regulating them. He states that the Commission could “arbitrate disputes brought before it. [p.157]” Though he does not say so, this likely implies that the result of such an arbitration carries some binding authority. These are executive powers.
Though Bonanno does state that it would have been “World War III” [p.260] if the Commission had tried to depose him as Father of his own Family, he also discusses multiple points where other bosses were arguing before the Commission that both he and Magliocco should be removed as Fathers of their respective families, including stating that the Commission “once had recognized Gaspar [DiGregorio] as temporary Father of my Family” [p.289]. This only really makes sense if the Commission had at least some say under some circumstances on removing and appointing family bosses. This is obviously a very important executive power.
I don’t think we should understand from this that Bonanno was straight up lying about the powers of these institutions. He is a lawyer presenting an interpretation of the law and facts that best suits his client (in this case himself). Nevertheless, I think a neutral judge would probably conclude he pushes his case too far. Though not presented here, I am fairly confident that further research of additional sources, which should be carried out, would demonstrate the execution of executive authority by the Commission.
Conflicts between centralised executive authority and other elites over where legitimate exercise of power lies, with both sides presenting plausible interpretations of law and precedent, have a long pedigree. For example, the First Baron’s War in England, which birthed the Magna Carta, limiting the power of the King; the English Civil War of the 17th Century where King and Parliament fought for their interpretations of where power lay; and indeed the American Revolutionary War (I am English, so am most familiar with English/British history). In all these cases, and many more, both sides felt they had the law on their side. Seen in this context, the Castellamarrese War, and to some extent Bonanno’s dispute with the Commission in the 60s, fit into a broader category of conflict.
Though it seems to be the case that at least some important executive power resided with the Commission, and likely therefore earlier with the Capo dei Capi and Gran Consiglio, it is unclear how such executive authority was allocated within and between these latter two bodies. Based on the way things often work between a chief executive and an executive council more generally, as discussed above, it may be the case that ultimate executive authority resided with the Capo dei Capi, who was advised and assisted by the Gran Consiglio. As noted in discussion in previous episodes by the Archaeologists, however, based on analysis of, inter alia, the removal of Joe Masseria as Capo dei Capi, and likely of family bosses by various individual families’ Consiglios, it is also possible that the Gran Consiglio provided some check on the unrestrained authority of the Capo dei Capi. Perhaps united the Gran Consiglio could veto or remove the Capo dei Capi? In the UK parliamentary system this is possible with respect to the Prime Minister (chief executive), though it is Parliament (the general assembly) that carries this power, not the Cabinet (executive council).
Joe Bonanno on the Mafia’s Constitutional Bodies
Legislative Power? General Assembly, National Convention
National Convention: 5 Yearly Commission Meeting or Assembly of All Families?
With regard to the suggested legislative and representative function of the General Assembly, Bonanno does not mention this body. He does, however, discuss an institution which existed for the first three decades of the Commission era, which he refers to as the “national convention”, “national meeting”, or “national conference” (I will use National Convention as a shorthand for these descriptors). He states that:
I have seen some discussion on the Black Hand Forum as to whether these five yearly National Conventions described by Bonanno refer to regularly timed Commission meetings, or whether they refer to something more akin to the continuation of the General Assembly. The fact that the quote above, in which Bonanno explains the agreement to hold National Conventions every five years, is presented in the middle of the passage in his memoir (pp.157-158) where he first explains the founding of the Commission and how it will work, could be interpreted as stating that these five yearly conventions are Commission meetings. He even uses the term “diplomatic conventions” once here to describe Commission meetings.We agreed to hold national conventions once every five years. Our first national meeting was in 1931, when the Commission was formed. Subsequent meetings were held in 1936, 1941, 1946, 1951 and 1956. [Memoir, p.158]
However, I think looking at the multiple references in context, it is clear that these are not merely meetings of the Commission, but are meetings of the leadership of every family in America. For example, Bonanno states that there was a “national convention in late May of 1931 in Chicago—our first national conference [Memoir, p.125].” He goes on to explain:
Only the VIPs amounted to a few hundred people! Even if this is an exaggeration, this is clearly a national meeting of all families.We held many parties and informal get-togethers at the hotel. But there was only one meeting that really mattered, and that was held in the hotel basement. Maranzano, acting as master of ceremonies, welcomed the few hundred people there; only the VIPs had been invited to this exclusive gathering. [Memoir, p.127]
However, Bonanno is not entirely consistent. He states in pages 125-127 of his memoir that the first National Convention was the meeting held in Chicago in May 1931 to anoint Maranzano. However, in the quote from p.158 above, where he introduces the fact that there will be regular National Conventions every five years, he states that the “first national meeting was in 1931, when the Commission was formed”. The Commission was not formed until Maranzano was dead, so the meeting to anoint Maranzano cannot be the meeting where the Commission was formed (unless he does mean this. He never explains another meeting where the Commission was formed. But this conflicts with what we know from elsewhere about the formation of the Commission, right?). Therefore, he makes two conflicting statements about the “first” national convention. As such, the meeting of all the families in Chicago in May 1931, which he refers to repeatedly as a “national convention”and once as a “national conference”, could still be a different kind of meeting than the five yearly meetings, which he describes both as “national conventions” and “national meetings”. However, his further statements regarding the five yearly National Conventions would seem to settle the argument, making clear that he is referring to an assembly of the leadership of all families nationally.
Bonanno later refers to the 1957 meeting in Apalachin, New York, as a “national convention” [Memoir, p.204]. We know that this was a meeting of all the families. In this context, he refers to these conventions in the plural, stating:
It is clear therefore that such all family meetings were held periodically. But the Apalachin convention was held in 1957, which does fit into the five yearly pattern of National Conventions from 1931 to 1956 set out by Bonanno, so perhaps these were a different kind of meeting? Bonanno actually addresses this, however, and makes clear that Apalachin was an irregular special instance of the five yearly National Convention, stating that:Those privileged enough to attend such a national meeting anticipated it with the same glee as do Republicans or Democrats when they meet every four years for their national conventions. As with the Republicans and the Democrats, our conventions served more than political purposes. These national meetings were also great social occasions for men of my world to mingle, to renew friendships and to exchange views. National meetings were both pageants of power and ceremonies that reminded us of our common way of life. [Memoir, p.204]
This makes quite clear that the five yearly National Conventions were meetings of the leadership of all families nationwide, in the same vein as Apalachin.Up to 1957, we had been holding our national meetings every five years. Our last one had been in 1956. There was no precedent for another national convention a year later. [Memoir, p.209]
Given all of the above, and notwithstanding the confusion over subject matter of the first National Convention – the anointing of Maranzano as Capo dei Capi or the creation of the Commission, it seems safe to conclude that the five yearly National Convention was a meeting of leadership of all families nationwide, at which important national Cosa Nostra business would be conducted.
This seems very similar in form to the pre-1931 General Assembly.
General Assembly, National Convention & Representative Mandate
It seems that Bonanno does not consider these five yearly all family assemblies to have a formal name (or if he does, he does not tell the reader), hence he uses various terms simply as descriptors to help his lay American audience understand what they were. From the quote on p.204 of his memoir above, one can see he often uses the term “national convention” at least in part because he is comparing these meetings to the National Conventions of the Democratic and Republican parties, where delegates from all states gather to nominate their candidate for President. As such, this seems a useful term to select as a name to make discussion of this specifically Commission era body easier (though it must be remembered it is not an official inside term). As well as bolstering the case that the mafia’s National Conventions were all family affairs, Bonanno’s comparison to American political party conventions is clearly relevant relating to Tony’s suggestion in the podcast that perhaps one function of the General Assembly is to vote for the membership of the Gran Consiglio (as was noted above, this kind of representative function is often a feature of such assemblies). In fact, Bonanno goes on to state that:
He also states that two new members – Detroit and Philadelphia – were added to the Commission by vote of the 1956 National Convention [Memoir, p.228]. Clearly, therefore, one function of the post-Maranzano National Convention was to vote for membership of the mafia’s executive body of its day, the Commission.Among other things, these conventions served to confirm the membership of the Commission for another five-year term. [Memoir, p.158]
Bonanno takes the idea that the Commission derives its authority from a vote of an assembly of all the families very seriously. He states that at a Commission meeting in the early 1960s:
Aside from the Apalachin reference, this statement further bolsters the case that the five yearly National Conventions were not mere Commission meetings – the national meeting they aught to have called must have been something else, because they were already at a Commission meeting. Though expressing understanding that this would not have been a good time for another National Convention, Bonanno goes on to state:it was casually suggested that the Commission representatives extend their terms without being ratified at a national meeting. Lucchese and Magaddino were in favor of voting ourselves in for another five-year term without calling a national meeting. Since we all wanted to avoid another Apalachin, their suggestion seemed motivated solely by caution. I suspected there was more to it than that. [Memoir, p.229]
In the next paragraph, he uses the term “illegality” in reference to the function of the post-1961 Commission. After this point, he often refers to the “so-called Commission”, and even goes so far as to report telling New Jersey boss Sam DeCavalcante that “there is no Commission” [Memoir, p.257].since our last uninterrupted national meeting had been in 1956, our terms had formally expired in 1961. Strictly speaking, we were an unauthorized Commission. [Memoir, p.229]
The fact that the Commission was not re-elected, or reauthorized, by a National Convention of the whole American mafia in 1961 or later is a central plank of Bonanno’s legal claim that the Commission had no authority over him or his family in the mid-1960s. One might wonder why this is necessary if his original claim that the Commission had never held any executive authority in the first place were true. Nevertheless, he strengthens his case with what seems a reasonable point of mafia constitutional law.
It seems somewhat strange that Bonanno never mentions the pre-Commission General Assembly, and talks as if the National Convention was a new innovation of the post-Castellemarrese War settlement, writing of “our first national convention”, when they seem very similar indeed. Perhaps he simply never knew about the General Assembly as he only became a made member shortly before the war (though one might think he would hear mention of previous such national meetings)? It is also notable that he does not mention the Gran Consiglio, but only the Boss of Bosses/Capo Consiglieri, even though the Commission seems heavily based on this body, and he would have been surrounded by senior members from the pre-Commission era. Additionally, the fact that a National Convention was required to extend the Commission another five year term highlights the conundrum raised by his conflicting reports of the subject matter of the “first” National Convention. Given the authority of the Commission appears to derive from a vote of all families nationwide at a National Convention, it would seem odd if there were no such National Convention in 1931 to empower the body in the first place. Though he does state that this was the work of the “first” National Convention, the only “first” National Convention he actually details was the installing of Maranzano as Capo Consiglieri. From whence then did the mandate of the first Commission derive?
In any case, given that a core function of the National Convention was to vote for the membership, and ratify the authority, of the Commission, and given the seeming similarity between the National Convention and General Assembly, this would add support to the idea that the same functions and relationships existed regarding the pre-Commission General Assembly, Gran Consiglio and Capo dei Capi.
General Assembly, National Convention & Legislative Authority
The other suggested function of the General Assembly, based on the general usage of the term, was that of a legislative body. Bonanno strongly indicates that this was indeed a function of the National Convention. He states that:
Bonanno does not discuss legislation of specific issues nearly as much as he discusses constitutional power relations within Cosa Nostra, presumably because this is more central to his case. Nevertheless, this passage demonstrates that one function of the National Convention was to make decisions on what was illegal and what was lawful under the mafia regime. Having said that, additional research should be conducted to look for examples of legislation arising from large mafia meetings in the relevant years. Legislating would likely have been subject to discussion at these assemblies, though we don’t know the specifics of how such a decision would be taken – consensus, majority vote, etc. Given that legislation was apparently a function of the National Convention, as an assembly of all the families, it seems likely that it was also a function of the pre-Commission General Assembly.another item on the Apalachin agenda was supposed to be the narcotics issue. My Tradition outlaws narcotics [emphasis added]. […] This growing problem had been discussed at our 1956 national meeting. If the 1957 meeting had gone according to plan there no doubt would have been a reaffirmation of our Tradition’s opposition to narcotics. [Memoir, p.209]
Despite Joe Bonanno’s constitutional concerns regarding the apparent dissolution of the National Convention of all mafia families, the American mafia continued to function after 1961. This raises the question: what happened to the representative and legislative functions of this body? It seems likely that once National Conventions ceased to occur, the mafia’s quasi-democratic representative mandate simply ceased to be, and legislative authority was by default transferred to the Commission (though substantiating this will require more research – do we find examples of the Commission legislating after 1961 in a way it did not before?). Due to its being a successfully secret mafia institution, and to its demise not being associated with a major mob war or with any publicly visible actions of notorious men like Masseria, Maranzano or Luciano, this important historical body went out with a whimper rather than a bang. Nevertheless, if this is what happened (and this must be further verified), the termination of the representative and legislative mandate of the General Assembly/National Convention in 1961 was as big a constitutional revolution for Cosa Nostra as was the termination of the executive position of Capo dei Capi in 1931 (arguably bigger).
Perhaps Joe Bonanno was onto something with his objections?
Joe Bonanno on the Mafia’s Constitutional Bodies
Social & Political Functions? General Assembly, National Convention
As well as the representative and legislative authority of the National Convention, Bonanno notes these gatherings had important social and political functions:
the nature of this meeting was political. These men weren’t coming together to sign contracts, or to form criminal cartels, or to organize illicit enterprises. Neither were these men going to Chicago as vassals paying tribute to their new master. It wasn’t like that at all. The convention was held mainly to allow everyone to identify and place himself within the new political constellation in our world.
The meeting itself was a showcase. The actual work had already been accomplished behind the scenes. [Memoir, p.125]
It is likely that these same social and political functions would have been associated with the earlier General Assembly meetings. As an aside, these functions are similar to that of the medieval tourney, and so may contribute further to the hypothesis that “tourna”, the phonetic transcription of the name for the assembly of the whole Milwaukee Family given by member informant Maniaci, is in fact a dialect pronunciation of the Italian word for tournament - “torneo”.As with the Republicans and the Democrats, our conventions served more than political purposes. These national meetings were also great social occasions for men of my world to mingle, to renew friendships and to exchange views. National meetings were both pageants of power and ceremonies that reminded us of our common way of life. [Memoir, p.204, emphasis added]
Judicial Power
Capo dei Capi, Gran Consiglio, Commission
So far the legislative and executive competencies of the mafia constitutional bodies have been examined. There is one other core competency that should be considered - that of judicial authority. It seems that in the Commission era, this power sat with the Commission. We sometimes hear about “mafia trials”. Within families these seem to take place before the administration, and at the highest level before the Commission. This can be seen in how the Commission handled the investigation into, and sentencing for, the role of Joe Bonanno in the alleged plot along with Joe Magliocco against Lucchese and Gambino. Note - I am basing this on my general understanding of the situation rather than referencing sources properly.
The allegation against the two bosses was brought before the Commission by a Cosa Nostra member (Joe Colombo). The Commission issued summons to the accused to come and account for themselves. This is a judicial function, similar to a court summons in the regular legal system. Joe Magliocco obeyed the summons. The Commission heard his case, pronounced him guilty of violating Cosa Nostra law, and passed the sentence of shelving him. This also is a judicial function. Presumably, he just obeyed the verdict. But, if some enforcement action had been required, for instance an execution, the Commission would have empowered some person or group to carry out the sentence, and they would have done so. This is an executive function.
Bonnano did not obey the summons. Therefore, the Commission empowered a number of panels to investigate the situation. This is an executive function, similar to an investigation by prosecutors or the police. Again, the Commission received this information, assessed it, and passed judgment. This is the judicial function. Any enforcement ordered to enact the judgment is again an executive function. So we can see the separation of powers between executive and judiciary did not exist in the Cosa Nostra constitutional framework (though separation between those powers and the legislature probably did exist, at least until 1961). It is likely therefore, in the absence of contrary evidence, that in the pre-Commission era, both executive and judicial power sat with the Capo dei Capi and the Gran Consiglio, though exactly how these judicial powers were distributed within and between those institutions is unknown. More research from earlier sources could be carried out into this.
Conclusion
Based on both the general usage of the political/governmental terminology of the pre-Commission institutions, as well as an analysis of the descriptions by Joe Bonanno of the constitutional bodies of the mafia both pre and post the formation of the Commission, and some unsourced general knowledge, it seems very likely that:
A) the General Assembly and the National Convention are very similar institutions. It is possible that the latter is simply the continuation of the former, though it is also possible that there were differences between the pre and post Commission forms. These bodies may have held representative and legislative power, as well as important social and political functions;
B) the formation of the Commission likely amounts to a continuation of executive and judicial functions that may have previously been held by and somehow dispersed between the Capo dei Capi and the Gran Consiglio. Based on more general norms, it is possible that ultimate executive (and judicial) authority had sat with the Capo dei Capi, who was advised and assisted in these roles by the Council. It is also possible, however, that the Council provided some check on the unrestrained authority of the Capo dei Capi, and perhaps united could veto or remove him;
C) after the expiration in 1961 of the mandate of the final uninterrupted National Convention of 1956, it seems likely that the quasi-democratic representative mandate of the American mafia simply terminated, and the legislative authority of the General Assembly/National Convention passed to the Commission. If this is so, it would be a hugely significant revolution in the constitutional framework of Cosa Nostra.
