General Chicago Outfit Info Dumping Ground

[funkster]

In his newest video, JP says when he was locked up with Ernie Grillo he had a friend of his from Chicago sending him italian sausage and meatballs. lmao i wonder who it was..

[funkster]

Calandra interviews Frank Jr. in his latest video. Haven't watched yet.

[Tonyd621]

Did Mandell actually torture anybody or did he just talk about it alot? It seems the feds had tabs on him from the beginning

[Patrickgold]

Did Mandell actually torture anybody or did he just talk about it alot? It seems the feds had tabs on him from the beginning

He suspected of killing that Italian restaurant guy in highland park. The guy was found dead in a fire so I don’t think they determined if he was tortured but definitely possible.

[Tonyd621]

Did Mandell actually torture anybody or did he just talk about it alot? It seems the feds had tabs on him from the beginning

He suspected of killing that Italian restaurant guy in highland park. The guy was found dead in a fire so I don’t think they determined if he was tortured but definitely possible.

So one guy for sure we can speculate on? But more bark then bite. I understand he was saying some very, very sick sh*t.

[Patrickgold]

Did Mandell actually torture anybody or did he just talk about it alot? It seems the feds had tabs on him from the beginning

He suspected of killing that Italian restaurant guy in highland park. The guy was found dead in a fire so I don’t think they determined if he was tortured but definitely possible.

So one guy for sure we can speculate on? But more bark then bite. I understand he was saying some very, very sick sh*t.

He was a very dangerous guy. The murder in highland park , where he was definitely a suspect in, was very similar to a double murder of a bar owner and bartender in a Schiller Park bar at around the same time. He would think he was definitely a suspect in that.

[Etna]

Stupid question. I often hear "juice lenders" and "collectors" associated with the crews in Chicago. Were some of these crews solely made up of loan sharking or were they more diversified than it sounds?

[Coloboy]

Stupid question. I often hear "juice lenders" and "collectors" associated with the crews in Chicago. Were some of these crews solely made up of loan sharking or were they more diversified than it sounds?

No surprise on the answer…but it depends.

There were certain made guys whose specialty was loan sharking. Mad Sam Destefano and Frank Calabrese come to mind. This is not to say they weren’t engaged in other activities, they certainly were. However, juice loans were their main racket.

Other times, you had smaller or associate level operators who were running loan shark enterprises and simply paying a tax to the outfit for permission.

Lastly, bookmaking and loan sharking go hand in hand. Sometimes guys operated as both, but more often a bookie had a preferred relationship with a loan shark to refer clients to.

From what I understand, juice loan rackets became a lot less necessary when payday loan places and legal predatory lending grew. It sounds like some of those legal places charge the same or more than what the mob used to in points

[Etna]

Stupid question. I often hear "juice lenders" and "collectors" associated with the crews in Chicago. Were some of these crews solely made up of loan sharking or were they more diversified than it sounds?

No surprise on the answer…but it depends.

There were certain made guys whose specialty was loan sharking. Mad Sam Destefano and Frank Calabrese come to mind. This is not to say they weren’t engaged in other activities, they certainly were. However, juice loans were their main racket.

Other times, you had smaller or associate level operators who were running loan shark enterprises and simply paying a tax to the outfit for permission.

Lastly, bookmaking and loan sharking go hand in hand. Sometimes guys operated as both, but more often a bookie had a preferred relationship with a loan shark to refer clients to.

From what I understand, juice loan rackets became a lot less necessary when payday loan places and legal predatory lending grew. It sounds like some of those legal places charge the same or more than what the mob used to in points

Thanks for the response. It just seems like the way guys like Cullotta and Calabrese Jr. talk about it, the crews in Chicago had specific purposes for running loans - or that the Chicago family had a centralized loan business.

[PolackTony]

Stupid question. I often hear "juice lenders" and "collectors" associated with the crews in Chicago. Were some of these crews solely made up of loan sharking or were they more diversified than it sounds?

No surprise on the answer…but it depends.

There were certain made guys whose specialty was loan sharking. Mad Sam Destefano and Frank Calabrese come to mind. This is not to say they weren’t engaged in other activities, they certainly were. However, juice loans were their main racket.

Other times, you had smaller or associate level operators who were running loan shark enterprises and simply paying a tax to the outfit for permission.

Lastly, bookmaking and loan sharking go hand in hand. Sometimes guys operated as both, but more often a bookie had a preferred relationship with a loan shark to refer clients to.

From what I understand, juice loan rackets became a lot less necessary when payday loan places and legal predatory lending grew. It sounds like some of those legal places charge the same or more than what the mob used to in points

Thanks for the response. It just seems like the way guys like Cullotta and Calabrese Jr. talk about it, the crews in Chicago had specific purposes for running loans - or that the Chicago family had a centralized loan business.

It depends on what one means by “crew”. The government charged Frank Calabrese in the 90s as the head of the “Calabrese street crew”. Confusingly, the Feds also used the term “street crew” to designate actual LCN decine (e.g., the “Carlisi street crew”). The “Calabrese street crew”, wasn’t a decina, so in that sense it wasn’t formally a “crew”, it was a juice loan enterprise that was part of the 26th St/LaPietra crew (hilariously, the judge in the Calabrese case forebode the prosecution from using the term “street crew” during the actual trial, as he considered it derogatory to Italian-Americans, even though the judge was not Italian and the prosecutor was, lol). Frank was the head of this juice loan business, and thus was like a “lieutenant” or “crew boss” running an enterprise for and under his capo, LaPietra. The LaPietra crew, of course, had other activities and businesses apart from loan sharking, such as gambling/bookmaking, collecting street taxes, Union activities, control of city patronage jobs, legit businesses and real estate investments, and (I believe) financing narcotics operations.

There are several reasons why juice became such a central racket for the Chicago mob. First, there were just huge profits to be made. Look at the Calabrese “crew”: this operation alone had over 100 clients, and was charging anywhere from 1 to 10 points in their loans (so, annualized rate from 52% to 520%). A corollary to juice is extortion, as guys who couldn’t pay would be forced to let Outfit guys take over their businesses and/or real estate (several examples of this with the Calabrese operations, just as an example). It’s the Davey Scatino storyline from the Sopranos, and there were a LOT of Daveys in Chicago. As ColoBoy already noted, juice also goes hand in hand with gambling, in that gambling clients would be directed from their bookie to an affiliated juice operation for loans. But the relationship also went the other way between gambling and juice. Juice provided a ready arena for reinvestment of capital generated from other Outfit enterprises like gambling. The family had so much money, that at times they didn’t have sufficient outlets to channel their profits. They bought tons of businesses, properties, laundered money and turned it into legitimate enterprise for their families.

But juice was always an available sector of investment. To get to your second point, about there being a “centralized loan business”. I believe that this was the case. Not that the Outift was explicitly and definitively a juice loan pyramid at heart, but that, again, juice was such an easy and attractive way to reinvest family profits. Guys running the business were receiving loans from their capos, who in turn were either co-invested with or receiving loans from the admin. That’s how I see it, anyway. The family would charge low interest, like a point or whatever, which guaranteed their return on investment, and the guys downstream were juicing the shit out of their “customers”. That the family itself had coffers, or a pool of investment capital, essentially, is suggested by older accounts that refer to guys like Ricca and Frank Ferraro as “treasurers”, or “holding the purse strings”. It’s also suggested by the claims that, at least in the past, the family paid stipends or benefits to retired members or to their families (they seem to have done so up until the 60s with Capone’s family, for example). So, in this way, juice loan operations — like gambling — were subsidiary enterprises of the family.

It’s useful here to compare the “Calabrese street crew” case to the earlier “Carlisi street crew” case. Again, the former was a made guy who was in charge of a specific subsidiary enterprise under his captain. The latter was an actual decina, and as such had diversified interests and was involved in multiple enterprises. Carlisi was financing Lenny Patrick’s juice operation. But he also had one of his own members, Tony Zizzo, overseeing their own juice operation. But Zizzo (again, as something like a “lieutenant“) was also tasked with overseeing gambling operations and street tax collection in the Carlisi crew territory. So the guys under them who were also charged in the case were tasked with duties like collection, enforcement, running gambling enterprises, extortion, etc. As with the Calabrese thing, the majority of guys charged were associates, as they were essentially employees of the family who performed most of the actual work in the enterprises. I use “associate” broadly here, as I believe that only the more important guys were likely formal, on record LCN associates (who were like supervisors, if the made guys were like management), while other guys were lower-level workers (basically, “staff”) who answered to the higher-level associates. In both cases, there were also made guys (Nick Calabrese, Chiaramonte), who functioned as assistants, essentially, to another made guy (Frank Calabrese, Zizzo) in running their operations. For the sake of argument, if the G had not been able to build a case against Carlisi (for example, if Patrick, a top-echelon associate who was more like a “partner” than an “employee” and was being directly financed by a captain, hadn’t flipped), than they may have built a more limited case against, say, the “Zizzo street crew”. If they had only targeted the juice loan operation that Zizzo oversaw, that hypothetical case would’ve looked much the same as the “Calabrese street crew” profile.

[Coloboy]

This topic also piques my curiosity surrounding the bookmaking business in chicago. We've had similar reports of outfit related operations being tied together financially. Hell, even up until today the feds connected paolians operation to Del Guidice's operation just last year. These were MASSIVE books, to the tune of $160 million in Paolians case.

I remember reports in the past that the book belonging to Marco D'Amico was a sort of central clearing house for other outfit rings. Meaning they would lay off bets with D'Amicos operation.

Curious how that all ties together. Also curious what happened to D'Amicos book and who took those clients over.

[PolackTony]

This topic also piques my curiosity surrounding the bookmaking business in chicago. We've had similar reports of outfit related operations being tied together financially. Hell, even up until today the feds connected paolians operation to Del Guidice's operation just last year. These were MASSIVE books, to the tune of $160 million in Paolians case.

I remember reports in the past that the book belonging to Marco D'Amico was a sort of central clearing house for other outfit rings. Meaning they would lay off bets with D'Amicos operation.

Curious how that all ties together. Also curious what happened to D'Amicos book and who took those clients over.

Agreed. To me, gambling operations aren’t as clear-cut as juice, in that typically gambling operations require less investment capital for start-up. Sure, there are costs incurred in getting a gambling enterprise up and running (in the past, at least, wire rooms and the like), but the very concept of a juice operation depends on the outlay of a base capital investment or start-up loan (putting “money on the street”). With juice, a major question is then return on investment, or financing of a start-up loan, within a financial system of loans and subsidiary loans (similar concerns would pertain to returns on investment with mob-financed narcotics operations, legit businesses, etc.). With gambling operations, I suspect that the organizing principal is more akin to a licensing or franchise system.

These kinds of questions raise multiple distinct avenues through which to explore them. Personally, one of my main interests is in how the operation of mob-controlled business enterprise intersects with the formal organizational apparatus of the mafia (others will certainly have different interests). To be clear, I don’t see the mafia as, essentially, a “business enterprise” at heart. I see it as a system of formal representation (a la CC) and a chain-of-command. While the business enterprise aspect of the mob is very interesting and important, I see it as downstream from the organizational/formal aspects: the mafia system of representation and chain-of-command (and associated cultural values that adhere around these) provide the institutional ecosystem and structural framework through which the mafia is able to shape and dominate specific markets, as well as manage enterprises (much the same as the body of business/property law and associated cultural values of business ethics do for legitimate sectors).

So, street taxes can be collected from independent operators, because the Outfit is able to effectively exercise a monopoly on that market place and extract revenue (as a side note, the very notion of street “tax” also points to the quasi-state-like aspirations that lay at the heart of the mafia. While these are most developed in Sicily, Chicago arguably provided an example of the closest that American Cosa Nostra came to imposing that sort of system). The ability to extract these revenues was downstream from the Outfit’s near-monopoly on the use of force (which, it bears emphasizing, is a key theoretical definition of the state), at least within the underworld: because their chain-of-command enabled the efficient and rationalized use of violence on the part of members and associates, but also because cultural values (“omertà”) and the systematic exploitation of corrupt local institutions of government allowed them to operate for decades almost as if they were above the law (as another side note, this is why I see cases like GambAt, Silver Shovel, and Greylord as critically weakening and irrevocably transforming the Outfit, as so much of what they did was predicated upon their corruption of politicians, city services, police, and judges).

But then, what about gambling operations controlled and operated directly by Outfit members and associates? Let’s say these guys are “kicking up” 10% of their earnings (gross, or profit?) to their captain and/or the admin. I think that some might erroneously characterize this as “tribute”, which I think is actually closer to what independent operators are forced to hand over. Instead, I see associates and members having to kick up for their operations as a sort of licensing fee, paid to the body of officers that enable the organization and control of the market place (through the use of force, the rationalization of criminal activities via chain-of-command, protection from the police and court system, etc). Something like a licensing/franchising fee and dues to a union or fraternity (for enjoying the benefits of membership, or in the case of associates, protection and representation by the system). All the corollary stuff, like laying off bets on another book, providing juice loans to keep customers betting, is all part of a business ecosystem enabled by an organizational system that is supported by revenues (return on investment, licensing fees, “dues”, extortion/taxes) that are split between members and the officers that hold critical positions in the management of the system (captains, admin).

Now, D’Amico is a very interesting case, as, for all we know, he wasn’t even a member; if he was ever made, it would’ve happened late in his career, so he’s an example of a high-level associate. Lenny Patrick was also a high-level associate, but, at least in the case of his juice loan operation, the way things worked seem pretty clear: he was financed by the mafia, who presumably charged him comparatively low rates on loans, so that he could in turn charge higher rates to clients. The system is doing him a service, in providing him with capital as well as permitting him to operate, but he’s also doing them a service, in actually turning their investment into profit (servicing clients, paying his own workers out of his portion of the profits, etc). But for D’Amico’s book, what would be involved in terms of how much he kicks up? Would it have been different if he had been a member? Assuming for the sake of argument that these guys explicitly, rather than implicitly, thought of his operation as “licensed”, who technically held the license: D’Amico, or the member/s (presumably at the later phase of his career, DiFronzo, maybe also Andriacchi?)? If he still wasn’t a member when he died, how might that have effected how his business was dealt with?

[Coloboy]

All great topics of conversation. Agreed that the traditional "mafia" organization was really the heart of what we call the "Outfit", which was a larger criminal apparatus that owed it's function and success to the mafia aspect at it's core.

All I know about D'Amico is that he was very well off. I can only confirm this at it pertains to the later years of his life, say post 2005. He was generous with his money, and liked to buy people dinner, drinks etc. One would have to assume that he was certainly "involved" post 2005. If Scott B's reports hold any weight, he may have become the outfit consigliere there towards the end, but who knows about that. What I do is those top guys in EP, namely Andriacchi, Difronzo, and D'Amico all made themselves lots of money, both legit and illegal. Their money laundering techniques were advanced and sophisticated, funneling tons of illegal cash into legal investments. I have to assume their family members are well set moving forward.

[Snakes]

This topic also piques my curiosity surrounding the bookmaking business in chicago. We've had similar reports of outfit related operations being tied together financially. Hell, even up until today the feds connected paolians operation to Del Guidice's operation just last year. These were MASSIVE books, to the tune of $160 million in Paolians case.

I remember reports in the past that the book belonging to Marco D'Amico was a sort of central clearing house for other outfit rings. Meaning they would lay off bets with D'Amicos operation.

Curious how that all ties together. Also curious what happened to D'Amicos book and who took those clients over.

So, street taxes can be collected from independent operators, because the Outfit is able to effectively exercise a monopoly on that market place and extract revenue (as a side note, the very notion of street “tax” also points to the quasi-state-like aspirations that lay at the heart of the mafia. While these are most developed in Sicily, Chicago arguably provided an example of the closest that American Cosa Nostra came to imposing that sort of system). The ability to extract these revenues was downstream from the Outfit’s near-monopoly on the use of force (which, it bears emphasizing, is a key theoretical definition of the state), at least within the underworld: because their chain-of-command enabled the efficient and rationalized use of violence on the part of members and associates, but also because cultural values (“omertà”) and the systematic exploitation of corrupt local institutions of government allowed them to operate for decades almost as if they were above the law (as another side note, this is why I see cases like GambAt, Silver Shovel, and Greylord as critically weakening and irrevocably transforming the Outfit, as so much of what they did was predicated upon their corruption of politicians, city services, police, and judges).

But then, what about gambling operations controlled and operated directly by Outfit members and associates? Let’s say these guys are “kicking up” 10% of their earnings (gross, or profit?) to their captain and/or the admin. I think that some might erroneously characterize this as “tribute”, which I think is actually closer to what independent operators are forced to hand over. Instead, I see associates and members having to kick up for their operations as a sort of licensing fee, paid to the body of officers that enable the organization and control of the market place (through the use of force, the rationalization of criminal activities via chain-of-command, protection from the police and court system, etc). Something like a licensing/franchising fee and dues to a union or fraternity (for enjoying the benefits of membership, or in the case of associates, protection and representation by the system). All the corollary stuff, like laying off bets on another book, providing juice loans to keep customers betting, is all part of a business ecosystem enabled by an organizational system that is supported by revenues (return on investment, licensing fees, “dues”, extortion/taxes) that are split between members and the officers that hold critical positions in the management of the system (captains, admin).

A couple of examples:

Nick Calabrese testified that agents for his sportsbook (in which he was partnered with Frank and Ronnie Jarrett) would keep 25 to 50% of the profit (whatever was previously agreed upon). 50% of that would then be kicked up to the capo (in this case, Angelo LaPietra). Nick estimated that 50% of what Angelo took in was "turned in" (kicked up). He went on to say that "anything" you did (juice loans, gambling, etc.), you had to kick 50% up to your capo. The time period Nick described this as taking place during was prior to him (or Frank) being made, so it's unknown if this arrangement changed. Also, I would imagine that each crew had their own arrangements with their own members, kicking up more or less depending on the racket or individuals involved.

Scarpelli, who collected street tax for the Ferriola/Infelise crew, stated that he received a base "salary" of $2,000 dollars that he would deduct before kicking up the remainder to Infelise. Scarpelli stated this was normally around 13 to 20k a month but that it could be as low as 10 or as high as 30. In the early 80s, Scarpelli had earlier been in a "crew" of collectors under John Monteleone, which also included Dukie Basile. It's possible that the work flow was changed by the time Scarpelli began kicking direct to Infelise but it's also possible that he was promoted as he was by then made and Monteleone was in prison.

Another informant described the Outfit as consisting of a number of "top echelon bosses" (presumably capos) who manage and direct lower street crew bosses (presumably made members or high-level associates) who in turn employ an "unspecified number of members and associates" who each have their own responsibility within the crew. Again, arrangements probably varied from crew to crew.

[Snakes]

Related to the above and according to a source, the Outfit (and the Cicero crew in particular) was in such dire straits by the mid-90s that they had begun to utilize "pooches" (very low-level guys) to pick up street taxes and other profits because so many of the top guys had been imprisoned or died.