by outfit guy » Sat Feb 01, 2020 8:42 am
1. Bolita
The Defendants were part of an organized crime enterprise (the
Corporation) that ran “bolita,” a numbers gambling operation in New York and
New Jersey. The organization was devoted to making as much money as possible –
especially for those at the top – through numerous bolita gambling locations. It
also existed to protect that money by any means necessary. The indictment charges
that the conspiracy began in 1964, and involved the commission of a variety of
predicate acts, including murder, arson, and money-laundering. Jose Battle, Sr.
was at various times the head of the Corporation and was the father and codefendant of Battle, Jr., who also played a leadership role for a certain period of
time. Battle Sr. plead guilty, but he died after he was sentenced. Acuna was a
long-time confederate of Battle, Sr., who acted as Battle Sr.’s bodyguard and
worked as an “enforcer” for the organization.
In the beginning Abraham Rydz and fellow Cuban emigres, including Battle
Sr., Juan Mojica, and Humberto Davila, operated separate bolita operations in New
York and New Jersey. Over time, Rydz became a partner of Mojica, who had
moved to Spain, Antonio Rodriguez, who lived in Florida, and Luis Tinta. Rydz
and Tinta managed 40 bolita “spots” (a location such as a business or store where a
5
bolita worker took bets, also known as a “store” or “bank”) that collected over a
million dollars in bets per week. Davila’s bolita operation, known as the
“Company,” rivaled Battle Sr.’s Corporation. The Corporation’s enforcers would
ensure compliance with the “two-block rule” (that a new spot could not be opened
within two blocks of a competitor’s existing spot) by first issuing a warning to
business owners and workers; if unsuccessful, enforcers would then resort to such
tactics as destruction of property, arson, assault, extortion, and murder.
In 1977, Battle Sr. and Acuna were tried for the murder of Ernesto Torres, a
former Corporation employee. Torres had left the organization because of a
dispute with Battle, Sr. over his own outside gambling activities, which Battle, Sr.
believed were inconsistent with the interests of the organization. Torres also owed
the organization bolita money that he had collected as a banker. After Torres
kidnapped and killed one of the Corporation's bankers, Acuna and Battle, Sr.
tracked Torres down in Florida, where he was living with his girlfriend Idalia
Fernandez. Acting under the direct orders of Battle, Sr. Acuna entered the
apartment, shot and wounded Fernandez while she watched television in the living
room, and following a shootout with Torres, shot and killed him in the bedroom
closet.
The deposition testimony of two witnesses from that murder trial, Carlos
6
Hernandez and Idalia Fernandez, was read into the record in the instant case.
Within weeks of being deposed, Fernandez was shot to death in New York.
Battle, Sr. plead guilty to conspiracy to murder Torres and the charges
against Acuna were dismissed. Upon release from prison in late 1979, Battle, Sr. 2
began working with his son, who in a sense, had been “tutored” in the bolita
business by Rydz at Battle, Sr.’s request. Manuel Marquez, Sr., his uncle, helped
run the operations. Rydz asked Battle, Jr. if he could represent that they were
partners so that Battle, Sr.’s reputation would afford Rydz’s some protection.
Battle, Jr. agreed. Rydz’s partners wanted to retire, and Rydz, needing protection,
agreed to merge his bolita operation into the Battles’ smaller business. At that
point, Rydz, Battle, Jr. and Battle Sr. each received 16% of the profits, and
Marquez was paid a percentage of the business as a salary.
This combined organization operated in Queens, the Bronx, Brooklyn and in
portions of Manhattan. Battle, Sr. confided to Rydz that he had gone to Miami in
1976 in order to get rid of Torres, and that he would also like to get rid of
Fernandez, who had been with Torres when he was murdered. Battle, Sr. later told
Rydz that Fernandez had to be “disappeared” because she had witnessed Torres’
Specifically, Battle, Sr. was convicted on conspiracy and solicitation counts, but on 2
appeal, the conspiracy charge was dismissed and the solicitation counts were reversed; he later
pleaded guilty to conspiracy and was sentenced to 33 months’ probation with credit for time
served. Acuna had absconded after the 1977 Torres murder charge; he was arrested in 1984.
7
murder and had testified against Battle Sr. in his murder trial. (Fernandez had
testified that on June 16, 1976, after she and Torres fled to Florida, that Acuna
broke into their Hialeah, Florida apartment, shot her in the face and chest, and,
when she awoke, she discovered Torres had been killed.)
Rydz and Battle, Jr., now allies, moved to Miami in 1982, and Battle Sr.
likewise relocated there. Battle, Sr. set up a 20-acre farm called “El Zapotal.”
While Marquez managed bolita operations on a day-to-day basis, Rydz and Battle,
Jr. called Marquez and others in New York on a daily basis, checking on operations
and managing the business. Rydz and Battle, Jr. traveled to New York at least
twice a month to review gambling records and reports, claim their percentage of
profits in cash, and make management decisions. Employees of the enterprise
transported millions in cash from New York to Miami and delivered the money to
Battle, Jr., Rydz, and Battle Sr. and later, to Marquez, after he relocated to Florida.
The testimony at the trial in the instant matter showed that the enterprise
expanded quickly to the point where by 1988, it operated 250-300 spots and 12-15
offices for processing bets, counting cash and keeping records. It involved the use
of bankers who, in exchange for operating spots, would be reimbursed for
operational overhead, would be provided protection, and would receive a portion of
the profits.
8
Competition with Davila increased. In response to Davila’s establishment of
competing spots in violation of the two-block rule, the enterprise began an arson
campaign, burning out spots in order to protect its share of the business, maintain
the respect of its competitors and preserve the loyalty of its bankers and employees.
The enforcers were paid to commit bodily harm, arson, and murder. From 1983
through 1984, one enforcer paid a thug for 30 to 35 arsons of rival bolita spots.
Some arsons resulted in deaths. The Corporation established an account called
“UNESCO” to pay for these arsons and other enforcement actions, including bail
and legal defense of enterprise employees or associates. Battle, Jr. did not favor
the arsons and preferred to negotiate when the two-block rule was violated; in fact,
Battle, Jr. never authorized an arson before it was committed. Nevertheless, both
Rydz and Battle Jr. continued to receive bolita profits while the arson campaign
raged on and for years thereafter. Acuna served as Battle Sr.’s bodyguard and
personal assistant. He also worked as an enforcer, collecting money from
delinquent debtors, sometimes by force.
2. Money Laundering
The evidence at trial further established the laundering of the enterprise’s
bolita proceeds. Battle, Jr., Rydz, Battle, Sr., Marquez and others – with the help
of the accountant for the criminal organization, Orestes Vidan – concealed the
9
enterprise’s proceeds in domestic and foreign bank accounts and foreign
corporation’s bank accounts (located in Panama and Curacao). Battle, Jr. and his
co-conspirators used nominee names or “front men” to hide the true identities of
the owners of the money. The main persons used as nominees or “front men” for
these foreign corporations were Vidan and Maurilio Marquez, the brother of
Marquez, Sr. Marquez, Sr., Rydz, and Battle, Jr. each had foreign bank accounts
set up in Switzerland. The money was either wire transferred to the Swiss accounts
through nominee accounts in the names of Vidan and Maurilio Marquez, or was
body carried directly to Switzerland. They also invested their bolita earnings in
real estate or otherwise legitimate businesses to avoid arrest, hide the illegal source
of their wealth, and provide for their children. One such business was Union
Financial Research (“UFR”), a mortgage company located in Florida, where Battle,
Jr. and Rydz worked and in which they had acquired a 25% interest. Another was
a clothing manufacturing business.
Cash from the Corporation’s illegal gambling operations was also physically
carried by members of the conspiracy to Panama, where it was deposited into
various foreign bank accounts in the names of various foreign corporations. The
most significant of these foreign corporations were Panamanian corporations,
Voltaire Trading and Investment Corporation (“Voltaire”) and Aztec Financial
10
Enterprises, Inc. (“Aztec”), both of which were incorporated in Panama and
utilized to invest in real estate in south Florida, and Stanara N.V. (“Stanara”),
which was incorporated in the Netherlands Antilles.
One of the primary money laundering schemes was to transfer the money as
“loans” from the foreign corporations to a series of domestic corporations which
were partially or wholly owned by members of the criminal enterprise. These
corporations would then pay members of the Corporation large salaries. The first
one of these domestic corporations was UFR, the mortgage company incorporated
in Florida.
In 1983 Rydz and Battle, Jr. were stopped at JFK airport carrying $500,000
in bolita cash that they had obtained from Marquez in New York. The cash was
seized. Battle, Jr. was carrying a report of bolita business for the week of April 2,
1983, which listed $2,173,448 in assets and possibly accounts receivable, and the
contents of the UNESCO account. The publicity surrounding the seizure caused
the bank which had loaned $20 million to UFR to demand the identity of the source
of the funds which Battle, Jr. and Rydz had loaned the company. This, in turn,
caused Rydz and Battle to cash out of UFR. This return of capital contributions
were transferred by Vidan through various foreign bank accounts and ultimately
wound up in Union Bank of Switzerland accounts belonging to Battle, Jr. and
11
Rydz.
The evidence at trial also showed that several domestic clothing
manufacturing businesses were involved in the manufacturing and sale of women’s
clothing to further launder illegal gambling proceeds. In order to buy into these
domestic companies, Rydz and Battle, Jr. received money in the form of “loans”
from another puppet company, Stanara Company Corporation (“Stanara Corp.”)
Battle and Rydz also laundered bolita proceeds through commercial real estate
corporations which held accounts oversees.
The Corporation also utilized companies to purchase real properties in
Florida, construct multi-million dollar homes on the properties, and then “lease”
the residences to the owners of the illegal gambling money. This included
Voltaire’s purchase of 350 Island Drive, Key Biscayne, Florida, using Battle, Sr.’s
bolita proceeds; this house was leased by Voltaire to Battle, Jr.’s mother in 1984.
Battle, Jr. eventually sold the house for $1.9 million in 2001. Of this, $281,000
received at closing was deposited in Voltaire’s account at Ocean Bank, most of
which was later wired to Marquez’s account in Curacao, and then to a Swiss
account owned by Battle, Jr. Voltaire held a $1.3 million balloon mortgage on the
house from the buyer, and Battle, Jr. ordered that this mortgage be assigned to Key
Financial Services in return for $150,000. Battle owned stock in Key Financial
12
Services, which received interest payments on the house, $285,000 in cash, and
then took a loss on the sale in 2002.
Similarly, in 1984 Rydz and Marquez purchased real estate at 730 and 740
Mashta Drive, Key Biscayne, through a Panamanian corporation, Aztec Financial
Enterprises; the money came from UFR proceeds as well as other Panamanian
accounts containing bolita proceeds. Marquez later transferred title to lot 730 to
Battle, Jr.
Rydz and Battle, Jr. supervised the enterprise’s bolita operations in New
York and New Jersey until early 1989. At a funeral for a family member, Rydz and
Battle both expressed to other bolita managers their desire to retire from daily
bolita operations. Luis Perez testified that Rydz took a small calendar out of his
pocket on which a date was circled, and told a fellow corporation member, “This is
the day I’m leaving. Have my totals ready.” However, the government maintained
at trial that Rydz and Battle, Jr. continued to launder their own and the enterprise’s
bolita proceeds long after ending their direct involvement in the gambling
operation.
Battle, Jr. delayed construction on his Florida residence until 1994;
ultimately, Battle, Jr. and Rydz leased the houses from Aztec, after using various
corporate accounts, rather than their own names, to finance construction of the
13
houses. Marquez had moved to Florida in 1985 and reviewed bolita reports and
visited the various offices until the end of 1995, when he fled to Spain. Battle, Jr.
had planned to move to Spain and was beginning to move his bolita money to the
Canary Islands. Rydz sold the property located at 740 Mashta Drive for
$2,717,500 on June 4, 2001; Battle, Jr. sold 730 Mashta Drive on May 8, 2002.
Aztec received $2,128,664.98 at closing for 740 Mashta Drive and $2,866,311.66
at closing for 730 Mashta Drive. At Battle, Jr.’s direction, Vidan deposited these
proceeds in Aztec’s account at Plantars Bank, then wired $2,400,000 to a corporate
account in the Canary Islands.
The Curacao corporation’s accounts remained active for some time. In
August and September of 1998, it wired $903,000 to Rydz’s and Battle, Jr.’s
accounts in Switzerland, which were never closed, and in 2000 it wrote certain
small payment checks to pay for corporate registration and such.
The daily management of the enterprise’s bolita business was conducted by
Willie Pozo, and by 1996, the bolita’s profits had decreased. From 1985 through
1995, the Corporation took in $2 million in bets weekly; in contrast, from 1995
through 2003, the total diminished to $700,000 weekly. In early 2000, Battle, Sr.
threatened to kill Pozo and an associate in order to “take his business back.”
Marquez continued to receive a share of the Corporation’s illegal gambling profits
14
until 2001. The enterprise’s central bolita office was managed by Luis Perez, who
was arrested in the summer of 2003. When Rydz and Battle, Jr. were arrested in
March 2004, they were still receiving money from the commercial real estate
business in Miami. The corporate tax returns for El Zapotal, Battle, Sr.’s 20-acre
farm in Miami, showed that in 1999, Battle, Sr. gave El Zapotal to Battle, Jr. and
his family as a gift, and that corporate returns had been filed from 2000-2002,
listing Battle, Jr. as the largest shareholder.
1. Bolita
The Defendants were part of an organized crime enterprise (the
Corporation) that ran “bolita,” a numbers gambling operation in New York and
New Jersey. The organization was devoted to making as much money as possible –
especially for those at the top – through numerous bolita gambling locations. It
also existed to protect that money by any means necessary. The indictment charges
that the conspiracy began in 1964, and involved the commission of a variety of
predicate acts, including murder, arson, and money-laundering. Jose Battle, Sr.
was at various times the head of the Corporation and was the father and codefendant of Battle, Jr., who also played a leadership role for a certain period of
time. Battle Sr. plead guilty, but he died after he was sentenced. Acuna was a
long-time confederate of Battle, Sr., who acted as Battle Sr.’s bodyguard and
worked as an “enforcer” for the organization.
In the beginning Abraham Rydz and fellow Cuban emigres, including Battle
Sr., Juan Mojica, and Humberto Davila, operated separate bolita operations in New
York and New Jersey. Over time, Rydz became a partner of Mojica, who had
moved to Spain, Antonio Rodriguez, who lived in Florida, and Luis Tinta. Rydz
and Tinta managed 40 bolita “spots” (a location such as a business or store where a
5
bolita worker took bets, also known as a “store” or “bank”) that collected over a
million dollars in bets per week. Davila’s bolita operation, known as the
“Company,” rivaled Battle Sr.’s Corporation. The Corporation’s enforcers would
ensure compliance with the “two-block rule” (that a new spot could not be opened
within two blocks of a competitor’s existing spot) by first issuing a warning to
business owners and workers; if unsuccessful, enforcers would then resort to such
tactics as destruction of property, arson, assault, extortion, and murder.
In 1977, Battle Sr. and Acuna were tried for the murder of Ernesto Torres, a
former Corporation employee. Torres had left the organization because of a
dispute with Battle, Sr. over his own outside gambling activities, which Battle, Sr.
believed were inconsistent with the interests of the organization. Torres also owed
the organization bolita money that he had collected as a banker. After Torres
kidnapped and killed one of the Corporation's bankers, Acuna and Battle, Sr.
tracked Torres down in Florida, where he was living with his girlfriend Idalia
Fernandez. Acting under the direct orders of Battle, Sr. Acuna entered the
apartment, shot and wounded Fernandez while she watched television in the living
room, and following a shootout with Torres, shot and killed him in the bedroom
closet.
The deposition testimony of two witnesses from that murder trial, Carlos
6
Hernandez and Idalia Fernandez, was read into the record in the instant case.
Within weeks of being deposed, Fernandez was shot to death in New York.
Battle, Sr. plead guilty to conspiracy to murder Torres and the charges
against Acuna were dismissed. Upon release from prison in late 1979, Battle, Sr. 2
began working with his son, who in a sense, had been “tutored” in the bolita
business by Rydz at Battle, Sr.’s request. Manuel Marquez, Sr., his uncle, helped
run the operations. Rydz asked Battle, Jr. if he could represent that they were
partners so that Battle, Sr.’s reputation would afford Rydz’s some protection.
Battle, Jr. agreed. Rydz’s partners wanted to retire, and Rydz, needing protection,
agreed to merge his bolita operation into the Battles’ smaller business. At that
point, Rydz, Battle, Jr. and Battle Sr. each received 16% of the profits, and
Marquez was paid a percentage of the business as a salary.
This combined organization operated in Queens, the Bronx, Brooklyn and in
portions of Manhattan. Battle, Sr. confided to Rydz that he had gone to Miami in
1976 in order to get rid of Torres, and that he would also like to get rid of
Fernandez, who had been with Torres when he was murdered. Battle, Sr. later told
Rydz that Fernandez had to be “disappeared” because she had witnessed Torres’
Specifically, Battle, Sr. was convicted on conspiracy and solicitation counts, but on 2
appeal, the conspiracy charge was dismissed and the solicitation counts were reversed; he later
pleaded guilty to conspiracy and was sentenced to 33 months’ probation with credit for time
served. Acuna had absconded after the 1977 Torres murder charge; he was arrested in 1984.
7
murder and had testified against Battle Sr. in his murder trial. (Fernandez had
testified that on June 16, 1976, after she and Torres fled to Florida, that Acuna
broke into their Hialeah, Florida apartment, shot her in the face and chest, and,
when she awoke, she discovered Torres had been killed.)
Rydz and Battle, Jr., now allies, moved to Miami in 1982, and Battle Sr.
likewise relocated there. Battle, Sr. set up a 20-acre farm called “El Zapotal.”
While Marquez managed bolita operations on a day-to-day basis, Rydz and Battle,
Jr. called Marquez and others in New York on a daily basis, checking on operations
and managing the business. Rydz and Battle, Jr. traveled to New York at least
twice a month to review gambling records and reports, claim their percentage of
profits in cash, and make management decisions. Employees of the enterprise
transported millions in cash from New York to Miami and delivered the money to
Battle, Jr., Rydz, and Battle Sr. and later, to Marquez, after he relocated to Florida.
The testimony at the trial in the instant matter showed that the enterprise
expanded quickly to the point where by 1988, it operated 250-300 spots and 12-15
offices for processing bets, counting cash and keeping records. It involved the use
of bankers who, in exchange for operating spots, would be reimbursed for
operational overhead, would be provided protection, and would receive a portion of
the profits.
8
Competition with Davila increased. In response to Davila’s establishment of
competing spots in violation of the two-block rule, the enterprise began an arson
campaign, burning out spots in order to protect its share of the business, maintain
the respect of its competitors and preserve the loyalty of its bankers and employees.
The enforcers were paid to commit bodily harm, arson, and murder. From 1983
through 1984, one enforcer paid a thug for 30 to 35 arsons of rival bolita spots.
Some arsons resulted in deaths. The Corporation established an account called
“UNESCO” to pay for these arsons and other enforcement actions, including bail
and legal defense of enterprise employees or associates. Battle, Jr. did not favor
the arsons and preferred to negotiate when the two-block rule was violated; in fact,
Battle, Jr. never authorized an arson before it was committed. Nevertheless, both
Rydz and Battle Jr. continued to receive bolita profits while the arson campaign
raged on and for years thereafter. Acuna served as Battle Sr.’s bodyguard and
personal assistant. He also worked as an enforcer, collecting money from
delinquent debtors, sometimes by force.
2. Money Laundering
The evidence at trial further established the laundering of the enterprise’s
bolita proceeds. Battle, Jr., Rydz, Battle, Sr., Marquez and others – with the help
of the accountant for the criminal organization, Orestes Vidan – concealed the
9
enterprise’s proceeds in domestic and foreign bank accounts and foreign
corporation’s bank accounts (located in Panama and Curacao). Battle, Jr. and his
co-conspirators used nominee names or “front men” to hide the true identities of
the owners of the money. The main persons used as nominees or “front men” for
these foreign corporations were Vidan and Maurilio Marquez, the brother of
Marquez, Sr. Marquez, Sr., Rydz, and Battle, Jr. each had foreign bank accounts
set up in Switzerland. The money was either wire transferred to the Swiss accounts
through nominee accounts in the names of Vidan and Maurilio Marquez, or was
body carried directly to Switzerland. They also invested their bolita earnings in
real estate or otherwise legitimate businesses to avoid arrest, hide the illegal source
of their wealth, and provide for their children. One such business was Union
Financial Research (“UFR”), a mortgage company located in Florida, where Battle,
Jr. and Rydz worked and in which they had acquired a 25% interest. Another was
a clothing manufacturing business.
Cash from the Corporation’s illegal gambling operations was also physically
carried by members of the conspiracy to Panama, where it was deposited into
various foreign bank accounts in the names of various foreign corporations. The
most significant of these foreign corporations were Panamanian corporations,
Voltaire Trading and Investment Corporation (“Voltaire”) and Aztec Financial
10
Enterprises, Inc. (“Aztec”), both of which were incorporated in Panama and
utilized to invest in real estate in south Florida, and Stanara N.V. (“Stanara”),
which was incorporated in the Netherlands Antilles.
One of the primary money laundering schemes was to transfer the money as
“loans” from the foreign corporations to a series of domestic corporations which
were partially or wholly owned by members of the criminal enterprise. These
corporations would then pay members of the Corporation large salaries. The first
one of these domestic corporations was UFR, the mortgage company incorporated
in Florida.
In 1983 Rydz and Battle, Jr. were stopped at JFK airport carrying $500,000
in bolita cash that they had obtained from Marquez in New York. The cash was
seized. Battle, Jr. was carrying a report of bolita business for the week of April 2,
1983, which listed $2,173,448 in assets and possibly accounts receivable, and the
contents of the UNESCO account. The publicity surrounding the seizure caused
the bank which had loaned $20 million to UFR to demand the identity of the source
of the funds which Battle, Jr. and Rydz had loaned the company. This, in turn,
caused Rydz and Battle to cash out of UFR. This return of capital contributions
were transferred by Vidan through various foreign bank accounts and ultimately
wound up in Union Bank of Switzerland accounts belonging to Battle, Jr. and
11
Rydz.
The evidence at trial also showed that several domestic clothing
manufacturing businesses were involved in the manufacturing and sale of women’s
clothing to further launder illegal gambling proceeds. In order to buy into these
domestic companies, Rydz and Battle, Jr. received money in the form of “loans”
from another puppet company, Stanara Company Corporation (“Stanara Corp.”)
Battle and Rydz also laundered bolita proceeds through commercial real estate
corporations which held accounts oversees.
The Corporation also utilized companies to purchase real properties in
Florida, construct multi-million dollar homes on the properties, and then “lease”
the residences to the owners of the illegal gambling money. This included
Voltaire’s purchase of 350 Island Drive, Key Biscayne, Florida, using Battle, Sr.’s
bolita proceeds; this house was leased by Voltaire to Battle, Jr.’s mother in 1984.
Battle, Jr. eventually sold the house for $1.9 million in 2001. Of this, $281,000
received at closing was deposited in Voltaire’s account at Ocean Bank, most of
which was later wired to Marquez’s account in Curacao, and then to a Swiss
account owned by Battle, Jr. Voltaire held a $1.3 million balloon mortgage on the
house from the buyer, and Battle, Jr. ordered that this mortgage be assigned to Key
Financial Services in return for $150,000. Battle owned stock in Key Financial
12
Services, which received interest payments on the house, $285,000 in cash, and
then took a loss on the sale in 2002.
Similarly, in 1984 Rydz and Marquez purchased real estate at 730 and 740
Mashta Drive, Key Biscayne, through a Panamanian corporation, Aztec Financial
Enterprises; the money came from UFR proceeds as well as other Panamanian
accounts containing bolita proceeds. Marquez later transferred title to lot 730 to
Battle, Jr.
Rydz and Battle, Jr. supervised the enterprise’s bolita operations in New
York and New Jersey until early 1989. At a funeral for a family member, Rydz and
Battle both expressed to other bolita managers their desire to retire from daily
bolita operations. Luis Perez testified that Rydz took a small calendar out of his
pocket on which a date was circled, and told a fellow corporation member, “This is
the day I’m leaving. Have my totals ready.” However, the government maintained
at trial that Rydz and Battle, Jr. continued to launder their own and the enterprise’s
bolita proceeds long after ending their direct involvement in the gambling
operation.
Battle, Jr. delayed construction on his Florida residence until 1994;
ultimately, Battle, Jr. and Rydz leased the houses from Aztec, after using various
corporate accounts, rather than their own names, to finance construction of the
13
houses. Marquez had moved to Florida in 1985 and reviewed bolita reports and
visited the various offices until the end of 1995, when he fled to Spain. Battle, Jr.
had planned to move to Spain and was beginning to move his bolita money to the
Canary Islands. Rydz sold the property located at 740 Mashta Drive for
$2,717,500 on June 4, 2001; Battle, Jr. sold 730 Mashta Drive on May 8, 2002.
Aztec received $2,128,664.98 at closing for 740 Mashta Drive and $2,866,311.66
at closing for 730 Mashta Drive. At Battle, Jr.’s direction, Vidan deposited these
proceeds in Aztec’s account at Plantars Bank, then wired $2,400,000 to a corporate
account in the Canary Islands.
The Curacao corporation’s accounts remained active for some time. In
August and September of 1998, it wired $903,000 to Rydz’s and Battle, Jr.’s
accounts in Switzerland, which were never closed, and in 2000 it wrote certain
small payment checks to pay for corporate registration and such.
The daily management of the enterprise’s bolita business was conducted by
Willie Pozo, and by 1996, the bolita’s profits had decreased. From 1985 through
1995, the Corporation took in $2 million in bets weekly; in contrast, from 1995
through 2003, the total diminished to $700,000 weekly. In early 2000, Battle, Sr.
threatened to kill Pozo and an associate in order to “take his business back.”
Marquez continued to receive a share of the Corporation’s illegal gambling profits
14
until 2001. The enterprise’s central bolita office was managed by Luis Perez, who
was arrested in the summer of 2003. When Rydz and Battle, Jr. were arrested in
March 2004, they were still receiving money from the commercial real estate
business in Miami. The corporate tax returns for El Zapotal, Battle, Sr.’s 20-acre
farm in Miami, showed that in 1999, Battle, Sr. gave El Zapotal to Battle, Jr. and
his family as a gift, and that corporate returns had been filed from 2000-2002,
listing Battle, Jr. as the largest shareholder.